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5PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This PhD dissertation is a result of my decade-long studies both in philosophy
of science and in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Having started
from the investigation of the vast field of scientific realism, I came, step by
step, to comprehend the significance of a relatively ill-examined territory of
epistemological views — the sociology of scientific knowledge. The shift in my
research interests that led to the change of the topic for the PhD dissertation
was mainly due to the opportunity for guest studies at a leading centre for sci-
ence studies — the Department of Theory of Science and Research, University
of Göteborg, Sweden. At the beginning, the plurality of perspectives and ap-
proaches, which I found at the famous Vetenskapsteori, seemed scaring. My
prior training was in natural sciences, basically chemistry, and in analytically
oriented philosophy of science. Both of these fields are quite different from
science studies. It was the friendly atmosphere and openness to various ideas
that encouraged me to learn more about the sociology of scientific knowledge
which is the main theoretical tradition in science studies. What also promoted
my curiosity was a particular feature of the early SSK manifestations: it was the
fact that the SSK adherents tended to contrast their views with scientific real-
ism. However, their descriptions did not quite coincide with what I regarded as
scientific realism.
By 1990s several philosophers of science had already paid attention to the
SSK, most of them expressing their disapproval of this ‘post-modernist fash-
ion’. Thus, the sociologists and the philosophers seemed to ridicule each
other’s views. Still, a few outstanding British philosophers within the realist
school (Mary B. Hesse and Rom Harré) appeared to favour the new sociology,
and their arguments seemed to be convincing. Sociologists in their turn, saw
Roy Bhaskar’s version of realism as a tenable position. In addition to that, phi-
losophers who advocate social epistemology — an epistemology sensitive to
the social and cultural contexts of knowledge (Aant Elzinga, Steve Fuller and
Helen Longino) — had proposed a compromise between traditional epistemol-
ogy and the relativist sociology of scientific knowledge. Influenced by these
two traditions in philosophy — scientific realism and social epistemology — I
decided to continue my studies on the perspectives for reconciling the SSK and
the philosophy of science.
It was exactly then, in 1996, that the ‘Sokal-affair’ restarted the ‘science
wars’. The debates between philosophy of science and the SSK obtained the
character of a serious opposition. Suddenly, the realism-relativism issue was a
hot topic. Accordingly, the amount of publications increased very fast, so that it
has become somewhat hard to follow the course of the debate.
In this PhD thesis, however, I will not even attempt to offer an overview of
the entire range of these ‘science-wars’ debates. Instead, I am going to focus on
6three particular discussions of the SSK issues, which enable to shed light on the
epistemological, ontological and methodological assumptions of this account of
science; via these case studies I also intend to reveal the nature of the ‘science-
wars’ debate. After the general introductory considerations in chapter 1, I will,
in chapter 2, analyse the philosophical debate on the consistency of relativism
that has been going on mainly within the SSK community. In chapter 3, I am
going to consider a case of an ‘imported’ philosophical argument — the Du-
hem-Quine underdetermination thesis and its consequences for the SSK. In the
final chapter, I will consider the SSK as a methodological programme for the
study of history of science in the light of the debate between externalism and
internalism.
Slightly different versions of the chapters 2 and 3 have been previously
published in Trames: Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, respec-
tively no 4, 1998, 299–330, and no 2, 2002, xxx–xxx. Chapter 4 is based on an
article published in Estonian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 139–150. All these articles are reprinted
here by permission of the the publishers.
One of the main theoretical points in my thesis is that, in the ‘science-wars’
arguments, the dichotomy of the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’ is assumed: the ra-
tional account of scientific knowledge is regarded as excluding any reference to
anything social and vice versa (see, e.g., Laudan 1981, 1982, 1990, 1996, Ko-
ertge 1998, 1999, Newton-Smith, Hollis, and Barnes & Bloor 1982, Collins
1981c).
The adherents of the ‘rationalist’ tradition tend to present the opponent’s
position as irrational and even as endorsing politically dangerous views like
treating the scientific evolutionary biology and creationist’s ideas alike. The
adherents of the ‘sociological’ tradition, in their turn, tend to ignore the norma-
tive questions of philosophy of science.
For the reconciliation purposes, the dichotomy needs to be overcome. One
way for achieving this is via the reinterpretation of the ‘rational’ so that it will
be regarded as social by its nature. This is how some advocates of the SSK, the
strong programme sociologists Barry Barnes, David Bloor, Steven Shapin and
philosopher Martin Kusch, actually have construed the concept of the ‘ra-
tional’. Thus they should rather be seen as sharing a third-way position. On the
other hand, the social practices may be reinterpreted as rational (Longino
2002).
Due to the third-way interpretation, the rational standards for justification
will be regarded as a local, context-dependent matter. In my licentiate thesis
defended in 1999 at the Department of Theory of Science, University of Göte-
borg, published in the series of reports of the department in 2001, I proposed a
third-way view on the underdetermination thesis and social explanation. How-
ever, when the respective part of my work — newly elaborated and ready to be
included in the present thesis — was already submitted for publication in
7Trames, an excellent philosophical treatment of the issue, The Fate of Knowl-
edge by Helen Longino (2002), was published. If I had received the book ear-
lier, the thesis might have become different. Now Longino’s essay serves for
me as a proof that I have found the right path to keep to.
There are several people who have been leading the way during my studies:
Professor Rein Vihalemm, Chair of Philosophy of Science, University of Tartu,
who was the supervisor of my first philosophical paper in 1985; Emeritus Pro-
fessor Eero Loone, Tartu University, the supervisor of this thesis, who encour-
aged me to take the opportunity of studying abroad; Professor Aant Elzinga, my
supervisor in Göteborg — they all deserve my greatest thanks. Two friends of
mine have been reading either the earlier manuscripts or the draft versions of
the present one, asking helpful questions and suggesting changes: I wish to
thank Dr Margit Sutrop, by now Professor in Practical Philosophy, Tartu Uni-
versity, and Tiiu Hallap, MA, who, in addition to many interesting discussions,
has corrected my English.
My thanks go to Tarja Knuuttila, University of Helsinki, and Dr Bernd
Schofer, University of Heidelberg, who have sent their comments on chapter 2
in this volume.
Studies abroad would not have been possible without the scholarships
awarded by the Royal Society of Sciences and Arts in Göteborg, Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers, and the Swedish Institute. In the framework of the co-operation
project funded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, several helpful theo-
retical discussions took place. I have greatly profited from the partnership pro-
grammes between the Universities of Helsinki and Tartu, as well as from those
between the Universities of Göteborg and Tartu. that enabled me to become
acquainted with the relevant literature when it was not available here in Tartu.
A grant from the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, made it eas-
ier to obtain the necessary literature.
For very important feedback, I am grateful to all students who have attended
my seminars.
When studying abroad, friends become more important than ever. I want to
thank Lili Kaelas, Jan Bärmark, Mona Hallin, Linn Bärmark, Alice Malmström
and Lumme Erilt who made my stay in Göteborg safe and comfortable.
There are many of those — colleagues, critics, and friends — who have
been important for me during the PhD studies. Here I would like to thank them
all without taking the risk of leaving somebody out of the list.
Last but not least, my parents, Ellen and Endel Lõhkivi, brother Ants, sister-
in-law Marju and niece Kristiina Lõhkivi deserve my greatest thanks for pa-
tience and comprehension.
***
As always, all flaws in this thesis are entirely my own responsibility.
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1. RECONCILING THE SSK AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1.1. A survey of the philosophical problems
in the SSK
Until the 1970s when the first programmatic works in sociology of scientific
knowledge (SSK) appeared, philosophy of science, sociology of science and
sociology of knowledge were all separate disciplines with no connections to
each other. From the very beginning, the SSK had philosophical ambitions:
most of its theoretical views have been developed in opposition to some domi-
nant conception in philosophy of science. The SSK account of scientific
knowledge was intended to substitute the philosophical mainstream view. The
strong programme, one of the pioneers in this new approach, claimed, for ex-
ample, that instead of the traditional concept of knowledge as true and justified
belief, one should treat knowledge as a ‘natural phenomenon’ (Bloor 1991: 5).
For a sociologist, knowledge is whatever people take to be knowledge. This
does not mean that the strong programme is engaged with the study of idiosyn-
cratic beliefs: rather, it focuses on scientific knowledge as institutionalised
knowledge that enjoys a special authority in society. There are many specifi-
cally sociological questions to be asked in connection with scientific knowl-
edge:
Our ideas about the workings of the world have varied greatly. This has been
true within science just as much as in other areas of culture. Such variation
forms the starting point for the sociology of knowledge and constitutes its
main problem. What are the causes of this variation, and how and why does
it change? The sociology of knowledge focuses on the distribution of belief
and the various factors which influence it. For example: how is knowledge
transmitted; how stable is it; what processes go into its creation and mainte-
nance; how is it organised and categorised into different disciplines or
spheres? (Bloor 1991: 5)
Accordingly, for the strong programme, knowing reality is mediated by social
circumstances, and this mediation requires empirical investigation. Bloor pro-
poses four methodological principles for such an investigation. First, the so-
ciological explanation of belief adoption should be causal: all causes, back-
ground beliefs, empirical evidence, technologies available have to be taken into
account. Second, the explanation should be impartial. In the analysis, a sociolo-
gist of scientific knowledge is not allowed to favour one view under investiga-
tion over another, even though a particular theory might appear rationally more
justified than its rival. Third, the sociologist has to consider the alternative
views under investigation symmetrically: what has been regarded as rational or
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irrational according to some specific standards, both have to be explained by
similar kinds of causes. Finally, these principles have to be reflexive: if re-
quired they must obtain in sociology as well (Bloor 1991: 7).
This new methodology was designed both for the historical studies of sci-
ence and for the analysis of contemporary scientific controversies. It has proven
particularly successful as a meta-historiographical theory, since it has suggested
a way for overcoming the notorious ‘Whig history’ — a presentist methodology
for studying the history of science which imposes modern evaluative standards
upon past science. On the other hand, the fact that controversy studies have be-
come an independent sub-discipline within the SSK speaks for itself.
The main difference between the SSK and the mainstream philosophy of
science in the early seventies was that the SSK approach is descriptive whereas
the philosophy of science was mainly normative at that time.1 However, the
strong-programme authors were certainly inspired by the philosophy of Thomas
Kuhn and late-period Ludwig Wittgenstein.
There are several other traditions in the SSK which also came into existence
in the 1970s and 1980s. Methodologically, there are remarkable differences
between them: some schools apply anthropological, ethnographic and ethno-
logical research methods in their ‘laboratory studies’, others focus on the de-
construction of written texts, still others are engaged with the semiotic analysis
of sign systems applied in the sciences. Most of the SSK schools and pro-
grammes, however, have been influenced by the theoretical core of the strong
programme, although the four central tenets have been widely discussed among
them. One might even construe the division into seeparate traditions of SSK via
their respective stands on the four tenets, as will be seen in chapter 2.
Also, the critics of the SSK have made great efforts in order to show that the
theses are either controversial or unachievable. So, e.g., Larry Laudan at-
tempted to show that, on the one hand, it is an ambition of the strong pro-
gramme to give a scientific analysis of science: Bloor, for example, refers to the
natural sciences and thinks that the four tenets have always been applied there.
On the other hand, it appears to be a pseudo-science, because the theoretical
principles lack the empirical support (Laudan 1981)2. Martin Hollis and Wil-
liam Newton-Smith, e.g., have tried to show that relativism which is assumed
by the strong programme, makes it self-refuting. Hence, the four principles with
all their possible consequences could be seen as one of the central issues in the
philosophical debates on the SSK.
The ambiguity of the concept of the social construction of knowledge has
given rise to another kind of philosophical discussions on the SSK. Those pro-
                                                     
1
 In contemporary philosophy of science there are several schools which prefer a de-
scriptive approach — naturalised epistemologies, naturalised philosophies of mind, etc.
2
 The methodological principles are seldom empirically proven in the sciences: rather,
they must be theoretically justified.
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voked by the bold rhetoric of the early laboratory studies, such as the Labora-
tory Life. The Construction of Scientific Facts by Bruno Latour and Steve
Woolgar (1979), or Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle
Physics by Andy Pickering (1984), seem to interpret the social construction as
construction of facts, not as construction of knowledge (claims). Thus, e.g.,
Noretta Koertge, the editor of the journal Philosophy of Science, has collected a
number of articles by outstanding mainstream philosophers of science into a
volume entitled A House Built on Sand: Explaining Postmodernist Myths about
Science (1998). With a few exceptions, most of the authors in this volume seem
to regard the SSK as a philosophically idealist programme that attempts to dis-
credit science. One of the main theses put forward in this book is which the
SSK takes the scientists to be creating arbitrarily both the accounts and the re-
ality.
This criticism is unfair because, with the exception of Woolgar’s reflexivist
programme, the SSK assumes only a social construction of the accounts, not
one of the reality. Bloor explains the SSK position in his reply to a criticism by
Gerald Holton, an outstanding historian of science. The strong programme has
been asked: what about Mme Curie and the radium? Surely, Mme Curie dis-
covered this element in nature and extracted it from there; she did not construct
it. However, a social constructivist may explain the discovery in the following
way. There were actually two competing schools which were both close to the
discovery — the French and the British one. The difference between them con-
sisted mainly in different styles of work. Basically this means that different
conceptual currencies were in use: the Curie’ tradition relied upon the French
thermodynamics, whereas Rutherford and Soddie relied upon the theory of par-
ticles. What Mme Curie (re)constructed, was the concept of radioactivity and
the concept of the element radium (Ra), which, in its turn, changed the chem-
ists’ views on the atom. This theoretical construction enabled her to discover
this element in nature. So, nature is approached through a theoretical construc-
tion, located in a particular context of social interactions. (See Bloor 1997).
Another critical thesis often presented, and repeated by several authors in
the aforementioned collection of essays, concerns the balance between the em-
pirical evidence and the social circumstances. Some of the critics seem to re-
gard the aspect of tradition in science either as a secondary topic (this has been,
historically, the dominant view among philosophers of science), or as an aspect
which gives birth do biased, irrational accounts of reality. In case of the most
radical criticism, the SSK stance is construed as involving a total rejection of
empirical constraints. Koertge, for instance, in one of her articles, identifies the
‘social’ aspect in science with wishful thinking (Koertge 1999), and then easily
comes to conclude that the ‘social’ needs to be eliminated from science because
this is the (social) norm accepted by scientists. Even if some scientists occa-
sionally invoke metaphors or speculate hypothetically without proper reference
to evidence, they are eager and willing to replace the metaphors with literal
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terms, and the speculations with theories confirmed by evidence (Koertge 1999:
783).
Again, this criticism misses the point. To make the roots of the mistake ex-
plicit, the adherents of the strong programme have invoked the term ‘zero-sum
view’ to label the position claiming that scientists’ beliefs are caused either by
cognitive or social facts (Bloor & Edge 2000: 158). This kind of dichotomiza-
tion is generally characteristic to the recently re-opened debates between the
traditional philosophy of science and the SSK. As noted above, this time the
debates are being called the ‘science wars’. It is Alan Sokal, an American
physicist, who claims to have proven that the SSK endorses irrational accounts,
because he succeeded in publishing an article which contained nothing but non-
sense in an academic peer-reviewed SSK journal (Sokal 1996, for an overview
see also Hacking 1999). Nevertheless, according to the strong programme diag-
nosis, arguments of this kind erroneously assume that the explanation of the
scientists’ belief adoptions must be either rational or social in its nature. Ac-
cordingly, the ‘science-wars’ argument claims that any rational belief adoption
excludes any influence by factors that could be regarded as social.
Thus, many critics of the SSK accounts of science find that, if one succeeds
in showing that empirical evidence is necessary for theory choice, there will be
no room left for the social explanation. Other critics are ready to admit that,
sometimes, this is social values rather than evidence which influences particular
theory choices, but in most cases it is not so. Both these criticisms may be di-
agnosed as suffering from the ‘zero-sum assumption’.
However, for the strong programme, culture and society operate like specta-
cles — through them people collectively perceive and grasp the world. Even the
methodological norms for the science community are socially mediated and
accepted. In addition to norms, skills and practical patterns of action are shared
within the community, and transferred from one member of the community to
another. At this point, the Kuhnian and late-Wittgensteinian influences on the
strong programme could be recognised — the following argument sounds quite
like the ‘private-language argument’:
The point is that something can only become ‘evidence’ within the frame-
work of an agreed theoretical understanding of nature. For the sociologist,
the question is how that agreement was reached and how it is sustained.
These (social) processes must be presupposed before talk of ‘evidence’
makes sense. […] It is the context of co-operation, interaction and coordina-
tion around these experiences that converts them into meaningful evidence
and thus makes them available as an explanatory resource. This is a social
achievement. (Bloor & Edge 2000: 159)
Accordingly, the strong programme does not appeal to ‘purely social explana-
tion’, in the sense the critics tend to stress. The critics often attack a straw-man
image.
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Nevertheless, as to other traditions within the SSK, the criticism may be
partially adequate, Harry M. Collins, e.g., has often emphasised what he calls
relativism in methodology: in social explanation, nature has to be treated as
non-existing (Collins 1981c). Nature is supposed to be explained through soci-
ety, and reduced to society. Even if this view might still be interpreted as a
‘spectacles-view’, the way society is depicted by Collins will provide critics
with what they have been expecting. Collins assumes society to be intelligible
via commonsensical reflection. This somewhat naive attitude towards the
knowability of society makes one to draw parallels with the early modern ideas
of privileged access to one’s own mental states. Due to the reflexivity thesis,
this criticism can be rejected by the strong programme. Since Collins aban-
doned the tenets of impartiality and reflexivity, he has to face the criticism. To
some extent, the concepts of alternation and meta-alternation enable Collins to
parry the accusations in infallibilism: it is only for methodological reasons that
one treats nature as non-existing, and society as entirely knowable via empirical
studies (see section 2.4.3 in this essay). In a recent article, he has proposed a
special meta-sociological theory of socialness where the socialness is defined
as a basic human capacity, like the capacity of language (Collins 1998). Possi-
ble studies of socialness could resemble the studies of consciousness. Never-
theless, the concept of the ‘social’ still belongs to the issues which continue to
be discussed within the SSK community.
The French school in the SSK — Bruno Latour and Michel Callon — argues
against the (essentially) social explanation because, for them, it would be tan-
tamount to a new asymmetry. In their opinion, the British social explanation
exaggerates the inter-subjective relations at the cost of the research instruments,
technologies and natural agents like laboratory mice or bacteria (see section
2.4.2 in this paper).
Also, the true post-modernists such as Steve Woolgar regard the strong pro-
gramme approach, as well as the ‘social realism’ of Harry Collins, as naively
positivist stands because their interpretations of science appear to be essential-
ist: both British schools seem to assume the independent existence of science as
a research object, whereas actually it is created as such only through a repre-
sentation process (see below, section 2.4.1).
In a slightly different form, the aforementioned ‘zero-sum assumption’
claiming the dichotomy of the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’, appears in connection
with the application of the Duhem-Quine thesis in the SSK context. In the early
stage of modern sociology of knowledge, many adherents of the SSK endorsed
the following argument: as shown by Duhem and Quine, theory choices are un-
derdetermined by data; therefore, some other than purely rational — or purely
deductive-logical — criteria for choosing between competing theories have to
be operating; hence, it is the social circumstances that determine the choices.
The underdetermination was regarded by the sociologists of scientific knowl-
edge as a simple matter of fact, so it was quite often used with the purpose of
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proving the relevance of social explanation. At that time, this was also a topic
in the debate between scientific realism and sociological relativism. Barry
Barnes, for example — a strong-programme sociologist — declared that, since
the Duhem-Quine thesis is correct, he is certainly a relativist, not a realist.
What the eager supporters of the underdetermination argument left unno-
ticed, is the hidden dichotomy of the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’ which is in-
volved in this argument, if construed as the direct inference of social explana-
tion from the lack of rational criteria. As will be analysed in more detail in sec-
tion 3, the inference would rather imply that social explanation is relevant only
in case there are no rational criteria available. Such a position is known as the
‘arationality assumption’. This is a classical view held, for instance, by Imre
Lakatos and Larry Laudan, that sociology is required to explain only those
anomalies which philosophy is unable to explain by its methods of rational re-
construction. The arationality assumption contradicts some central ideas of the
SSK, such as the symmetry and the causality of explanation.
In this case of application of the underdetermination thesis, the SSK itself
has introduced the dichotomy of rational vs. social, and as far as the dichotomy
is sustained, those who endorse it must be regarded as responsible for the ‘sci-
ence wars’. This would obviously minimise the perspectives for reconciling
philosophy and sociology of science. However, the problem is still not insolu-
ble, because again a third-way solution could be suggested. The third-way pro-
posal is quite similar to the above-considered solution suggested by the strong
programme in connection with the problem of constructivism: what counts as
‘rational’ justification should be seen as a result of cultural and social settings.
Respectively, for introducing social explanation, one is not required to reject
the ‘rational’ criteria for theory choice, rather, these criteria must be seen in the
social context. From the third-way perspective, it does not make sense to de-
duce social explanation from rational underdetermination, because rational de-
termination — or underdetermination — is seen as an issue for social explana-
tion by its very nature. As Longino suggests in her version of social epistemol-
ogy, rational justifications should be seen as local and epistemology should be
seen as contextual:
the epistemological problem is not determining which of a set of alternatives
is always the superior one, but rather specifying the conditions under which it
is appropriate to rely on a given set of assumptions.” (Longino 2002: 206)
However, Longino also stresses that merely showing that there is a social di-
mension in cognitive processes is not sufficient for the conclusion that knowl-
edge is social. In social epistemology, one should also be able to show how the
social dimensions of cognition have resources for the correction of possible
inappropriate exercise of authority, or shared biases invisible to a community
otherwise critical (Longino 2002: 205). Therefore, as the strong programme
account of science is a descriptive one, Longino does not regard it as a middle-
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way approach between the two caricature extremes. In her analysis, however,
she seems to rely upon the early studies by Barnes, Bloor and Shapin which
they endorsed the idea of explanation by social interests. If one had literally
considered the social interests as the only reason for the scientists’ adherence to
one or another theory, the scientific practice would have become to only a
question of loyalty. As shown by the historical case studies conducted by Ste-
ven Shapin & Simon Schaffer — as well as by studies of Jan Golinski, a histo-
rian of science who has applied the methodology suggested by the strong pro-
gramme — it is not a social reduction of this sort which is sought (see also sec-
tion 1.2.3. and chapter 4 in this volume). Their purpose is rather to give a causal
explanation: why, in a particular research arena, a scientist has accepted one
theory and rejected another, why he or she has chosen a certain methodology,
what kind of evidence and why was preferred, etc. Therefore, the explanation
by interests does not necessarily mean an appeal to macro-sociological group
interests; the interests should rather be taken as related to the micro-level of the
research process.
When seen in the light of the above-considered criticism, (the accusations in
idealism, irrationality, etc.), the strong programme sociology may certainly be
characterised as a middle-way position. When seen in the light of social epis-
temology, the strong programme remains a sociological account of science, al-
though very close to social epistemology.
Surely the strong programme cannot be criticised in the way Laudan (1990)
does in his paper on the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination. Laudan
ascribes the strong programme and Mary Hesse the view that ‘everything is ei-
ther deductive logic or sociology’ (see below, section 3.6.2).
Although the SSK authors may not approve the idea, it seems that their
views have changed remarkably, if one compares their current position with
their first programmatic works. When Barnes, in his paper from 1981, sincerely
trusts that the Duhem-Quine thesis makes the distinction between realism and
relativism, at present, I think, nobody would take such ideas seriously. First, the
Duhem-Quine thesis should be distinguished from the radical underdetermina-
tion thesis: it is the latter rather than the former that makes the distinction in
question. Second, scientific realism which was twenty years ago depicted as the
main possible opponent to the SSK views, has by now rather become an ally. In
Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (1996), Barnes, Bloor and Henry
come to favour a very strong version of metaphysical realism such as the one
proposed by Kripke and Putnam. The authors point out that a relativist theory
of knowledge requires a strong metaphysical thesis saying that the reality re-
mains the same in spite of the varying accounts used for describing it. At the
same time, the acceptance of the metaphysical realism by the strong pro-
gramme, contradicts its central view of meaning finitism. The discussions be-
tween the SSK and the several versions of scientific realism continue over the
issues finitism and rule-following. There are certainly other philosophical
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problems in connection with the SSK which have not been taken up in the pres-
ent essay. What I hope to have proven thus far is that the sociology of scientific
knowledge deserves on-going philosophical scrutiny.
1.2. The plan of the argument
1.2.1. Relativism in the SSK and the problem of self-refutation
According to the classical, absolutist definition of the term, relativism involves
a theoretical problem known either as the liar’s paradox or the problem of self-
refutation, or the problem of (in)consistency. In chapter 2, I shall first consider
a case of self-refuting relativism, as discussed by Newton-Smith. After that I
shall analyse some moderate versions of relativism which manage to avoid the
aforementioned problems. Most of the philosophical criticism against relativ-
ism in the SSK is directed towards some supposed hidden assumptions — the
implicit absolutist notions of truth and relativism. This criticism could be re-
jected, since such absolutist notions are not assumed in most versions of the
SSK, and in those versions which do endorse such ideas, the issue of truth has
been considered separately from the issue of the relative social context of
knowledge claims.
Within the SSK community, the issue of relativism has given rise to debates
about consistency. Those who stress the consistent relativisation of all beliefs,
the position-consistency relativists, accuse others, who restrict relativism with
some specific level(s) of belief, in inconsistency. On further consideration, one
may find that the position-consistency relativism, in its turn — besides the
problematic relativist regress it involves — is inconsistent in quite another
sense: the empirical studies in this tradition are based on the hidden assumption
that the claim for position-consistency is not really valid.
In this chapter, in addition to the analysis and classification of different SSK
views, I shall also reach the conclusion that a version of moderate relativism in
SSK, although inconsistent, can be reconciled with some versions of scientific
realism.
1.2.2. The Duhem-Quine thesis and
the debates between the SSK and the philosophy of science
In chapter 3, the Duhem-Quine thesis (DQT) of the underdetermination of theo-
ries by facts together with its consequences which play a central role in the de-
bates between the philosophy of science and the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge will be analysed. Traditionally, the DQT has been taken as an argument
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for relativist SSK. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that such an unconditional
acceptance of the DQT may turn against the entire sociological programme,
since the application of the underdetermination argument gives rise to an in-
adequate dichotomy — ‘rational’ vs. ‘social’. The dichotomy involves the ‘ara-
tionality assumption’: it is only the arational which requires sociological ex-
planation. This idea, however, contradicts the main claims of the SSK.
The analysis of the argument of underdetermination leads to the issue of the
‘science wars’ — the radical version of the debates between philosophers and
sociologists. Much of the ‘science wars’ controversies is due to mutual misun-
derstanding based on the dichotomy of rational vs. social.
1.2.3. SSK as a meta-historiographical position
In chapter 4, I consider a significant case in the history of chemistry, the activi-
ties of an outstanding scholar of the period very close to those major changes in
chemistry which are widely known as the Scientific Revolution. This is Herman
Boerhaave, the great teacher from Leiden who lived and worked in the first half
of the 18th century. According to internalist meta-historiography, Boerhaave
deserves attention only as an early Newtonian scientist who applied mechanis-
tic principles in chemistry. From this meta-historiographical viewpoint, his ac-
count of science would be regarded as progressive because it suits well into the
logic of further development. He contributed to the progress of ideas. However,
this meta-historiographical view is a thoroughly whiggish and presentist one,
because it imposes today’s perspectives of development upon past science. As
an alternative meta-historiography, the externalism could be suggested. In this
framework, one appeals to wider social, economic, political, cultural as well as
metaphysical and religious factors in the explanation of past science. Curiously,
even in this framework, Boerhaave may be regarded mainly as an adherent to
Newtonian metaphysics. Does not this show that there is no unambiguous dis-
tinction between these two meta-historiographical positions? Being far from the
naive belief that there is an entirely objective history, I rather tend to share the
SSK perspective on historiography. I have chosen to follow the explanatory
scheme proposed by Jan Golinski, a historian whose meta-historiographical
position coincides with the view characteristic to the British sociology of sci-
entific knowledge. Golinski together with J. R. R. Christie, suggests that the
problematic classification be replaced with another. Respectively, he contrasts
the extrinsic approach with the intrinsic one. In this latter account of science,
the historian’s task is to reconstruct the scientific practice so that, in addition to
purely formal matters, didactic, instrumental, and communicative factors would
be reported as well. Therefore, criticisms like the one advanced by Laudan
(1996) which are directed against the social history — asserting that the latter
ignores the cognitive aspect of science — are irrelevant. Even the wider context
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of social and cultural settings would be important for the explanation, but only
to the extent that is relevant for a particular problem. Thus the intrinsic meta-
historiography consists in a local or micro-historiographical model. This would
be opposed to the extrinsic perspective, according to which one considers par-
ticular cases only as the instances of general metaphysical, political, and social
ideas. When considered in the light of the intrinsic stance, Boerhaave obtains a
far more significant position in the history of chemistry than might have been
expected within the more traditional explanatory scheme. The SSK historiogra-
phy enables to reveal more of the instrumental, communicational, and didactic
patterns than its traditional rivals, and it is certainly less whiggish3. Sometimes
the critics have pointed to the problem that the SSK tends to entrench the ex-
isting myths by picking up the most outstanding scientists for the social study.
Boerhaave’s case proves that this is not true.4 However, even this case study
could serve as an example of the perspectives for reconciling philosophy of sci-
ence and the SSK: the case shows that nothing is lost in the cognitive part
whereas there is much to win through a more flexible explanatory scheme.
                                                     
3
 I am afraid that the author’s or investigator’s present-day-perspective will not disap-
pear even via self-reflection, but it could be minimised.
4
 In most cases, the SSK rather brings forth relatively less known scientists who re-
main invisible in the whiggish history of winners.
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2. THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY
IN RELATIVIST SOCIOLOGY
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
2.1. Introduction
With the acceptance of methodological relativism the sociology of scientific
knowledge (SSK) has inherited a number of troublesome consequences that
flow from relativism as such. The main and most inconvenient among them is
the problem of consistency, known already from ancient philosophy. The con-
temporary applications of relativism, however, differ from the preliminary,
purely logical version. Relativism in sociology of scientific knowledge can be
seen as a tool, a method, invoked in certain cases, regarding particular pur-
poses. Therefore one can distinguish between different variants of relativism in
the sociology of knowledge, each one claiming relativism with particular
strength and some area of application. This diversity of views involves endless
discussions between the ‘relativisms’.
My strategy in this chapter is first to consider the general, basically philo-
sophical problem of inconsistency and self-refutation of relativism, and then to
show how the problem of inconsistency applies to some variants of sociology
of scientific knowledge. In this respect I shall devote special attention to the so-
called strong programme. The last part of the chapter will be devoted to the de-
bate on (in)consistency occurring within the community of the sociology of sci-
entific knowledge. The debate between different branches of SSK concerns ba-
sically the radically relativist programmes of the so-called reflexivism, the pro-
gramme initiated by Steve Woolgar, the so-called symmetrism as proposed by
the Paris School, Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, and some modest varieties
of relativism. Both the radical programmes claim consistency in relativism, re-
lativisation of every single belief. The modest variants of relativism constrain
consistency to certain dimensions or levels of relativist analysis. I shall con-
sider what sorts of consequences follow from the seemingly consistent relativ-
ism. I shall question if the approach is really consistent and contrast the so-
called position-consistency relativism5 with modest relativism as it emerges,
firstly, in the strong programme of the Edinburgh School (David Bloor, Barry
Barnes and Steven Shapin), and secondly, in the empirical programme of rela-
tivism (EPOR) developed by Harry Collins and Steven Yearley.6
                                                     
5
 The terms ‘position consistency’ and ‘inter-level consistency’ come from Ingemar
Bohlin (Bohlin 1995: 32).
6
 What counts as radical or modest relativism depends largely on the context of com-
parison. The empirical programme of relativism can be seen as a radical programme for
its social reductionism. From a scientific realist’s point of view social reductionism be-
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One of my main purposes in this paper is to demonstrate how scientific re-
alism can be reconciled with the modest relativism of the strong programme,
and even more, how some form of realism7 must be accepted as part of relativ-
ism to avoid the notorious paradox of self-refutation.
The main reason for the everlasting discussions on relativism consists in the
fact that relativism as such involves a troublesome problem of self-refutation.
The problem of self-refutation of relativism is known in the history of philoso-
phy as the liar’s paradox. It is the paradox of one and the same statement’s be-
ing simultaneously both, true and false. The liar’s paradox may have a number
of troublesome consequences for relativism. Thus, relativism as such may turn
out to be self-refutational in another sense — consistent relativisation of all
beliefs, statements and judgements leads to the regress of relativism. A relativ-
ist cannot refute the statement ‘”relativism is wrong” is wrong’ since this
statement needs to be relativised too.
One way to abandon the paradoxical nature of relativism is to invoke certain
constraints. But as soon as we restrict relativism in certain respects, or if we
introduce some special conditions to a variant of relativism, we may become a
target of severe criticism for inconsistency of relativism, i.e., such a restricted
relativism is often taken to involve partial foundationalism, objectivism, repre-
sentationalism, reductionism, etc. Thus, there seem to be two alternative incon-
sistencies to choose between, the first, which is partially non-relativist, re-
stricted relativism and therefore inconsistent, and the second, seemingly con-
sistent relativism which necessarily leads to self-refutation and regress.
Curiously, an unexpected kind of inconsistency appears in the actual studies
of the position-consistency-relativism in SSK — their empirical research is of-
ten based on a controversial hidden assumption as if there were no regress, i.e.,
not all the beliefs need to be relativised, in spite of the theoretical claim of total
relativisation.8 Thus we may ask again, which kind of inconsistency to prefer,
                                                     
longs to radical skepticism. However, in comparison with symmetrism and reflexivism,
EPOR belongs certainly to a modest, restricted kind of relativism for, as it will be shown
below, EPOR does not require relativisation of all beliefs, whereas the other two kinds
of relativism do.
7
 It would be reasonable, however, to distinguish between scientific realism as a philo-
sophical ‘-ism’ with a number of different variants and realism as a position or a ten-
dency through or over certain ‘-isms’ which may apply to ontological, epistemological
or, for example, moral issues claiming independent existence of something, either enti-
ties, ideas, attitudes, virtues or social relations. In most cases scientific realism combines
realism in ontology with modest epistemological relativism and judgmental rationalism,
to present it in Bhaskarian terms (Bhaskar 1978).
8
 See, for example, Collins’s and Yearley’s critique on Latour’s and Callon’s applica-
tion of symmetry in their empirical field work, which is in sharp contrast with the theo-
retical concept of generalised symmetry, or symmetrism. Collins and Yearley find a
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either the inconsistency of restricted relativism, where the restriction is made
by the rules of the game, by the framework conditions, as they are called, or the
hidden inconsistency of the so-called consistent relativism.
2.2. Relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)
In an SSK interpretation, knowledge has to be relativised to knowers. Knowl-
edge is seen as someone’s knowledge in space-time location, in certain cultural,
historical and social environment. According to such a view, knowledge is not
made up purely of former knowledge by rational and logical inferences. Know-
ledge claims are erected in particular circumstances in the light of particular
practical (research) tasks. This view on knowledge is radically different from
the traditional rationalist methodology of scientific knowledge as it was devel-
oped in the methodology of research programmes of Imre Lakatos or in the
critical rationalism of Karl Popper. In traditional methodologies of science,
knowledge is delineated without the knower, science is outlined as research
without researchers. Researcher as a subject becomes visible in the picture of
science only when s/he acts irrationally, makes a mistake or ignores the internal
“logic” of science. According to Lakatos, for example, a sociologist of science
may explain only mistakes, deviations from the rational path, by reference to
the external (social) factors that caused the scientist’s error. Thus Lakatos pre-
scribes internal rationality to sciences, that can be reflected, reconstructed, gen-
eralised and normatively criticised in philosophical methodology of science,
and leaves sociology of science with anomalous cases in the history of science,
events of less significance, with the so-called history of errors.9
Such a normativity is certainly not acceptable in relativist sociology. Rela-
tivist sociology claims methodological neutrality, disinterestedness and episte-
mological finitism. This can be best illustrated by the example of the ideology
of the strong programme.
In the strong programme, knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular,
is explained by its generative causal mechanisms. Whether rational or irra-
tional, true or false beliefs, they all need to be considered in the context of their
emergence.
The methodological principles for the strong programme have been formu-
lated by Bloor in the shape of four tenets. Plausibly the most important tenet,
the symmetry tenet, claims symmetry of explanation. Symmetry in explanation
                                                     
similar hidden inconsistency to emerge in Woolgar’s application of reflexivity.
Collins & Yearley (1992a & 1992b). In this essay see basically part 2.4.
9
 See Lakatos (1971: 9), where he distinguishes between primary internal history of
rational reconstruction of science with its internal ‘logic’, and secondary, external his-
tory that shows the deviations from mainstream history.
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assumes that we treat both true and false beliefs equally. Both true and false
beliefs are generated by their cognitive and cultural environments, they both
have causes, therefore they need to be explained from the same causal basis, by
reference to the same kind of causes.10
As one can notice, Bloor does not subscribe to the classical epistemological
meaning of the term knowledge. The classical concept of knowledge as defined
in ancient philosophy involves the notorious problem of foundationalism — in
classical accounts, knowledge has been defined as true and justified belief.11 To
get rid of the possible consequences of foundationalism, Bloor constrains
knowledge just to beliefs, collectively adopted beliefs: ”[K]nowledge for the
sociologist is whatever people take to be knowledge.” (Bloor 1991: 5)
Such a definition, however, does not allow any arbitrary beliefs to count as
knowledge:
In particular the sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are taken
for granted or institutionalised or invested with authority by groups of peo-
ple. Of course knowledge must be distinguished from mere belief. This can
be done by reserving the word “knowledge” for what is collectively en-
dorsed, leaving the individual and idiosyncratic to count as mere belief
(Bloor 1991: 5).
In this way, interpreting knowledge as collectively endorsed beliefs, abandon-
ing the troublesome normativity of classical epistemology, Bloor overcomes the
asymmetry of traditional rationalist methodology of science, where rational and
true statements, beliefs and theories were seen as self-explanatory, whereas er-
rors and arational action were taken to be explicable by reference to their psy-
chological, social, historical, cultural, etc. causes.
With the other two tenets — those of impartiality and reflexivity — the
symmetrical approach becomes even stronger. The impartiality tenet empha-
sises the methodological neutrality of a researcher. The reflexivity claim means
that if needed, all four tenets must be applicable on the strong programme itself.
Different SSK authors who make use of the tenets of the strong programme
emphasise different particular tenets. One might say that David Bloor and also
Harry M. Collins in his empirical programme of relativism (EPOR) claim sym-
metry to be a central principle. Similarly Bruno Latour of the Paris School em-
phasises the symmetry tenet, however, the meaning of the concept has shifted
in his use as will be considered in greater detail below. Collins points out that
in contradistinction to the symmetry thesis, the causality and reflexivity theses
can be seen as redundant, or perhaps even threatening to his empirical pro-
                                                     
10
 See Bloor (1991: 7). Originally the tenets were put in the following order: causality,
impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity.
11
 About the problems of foundationalism see, e.g., Dancy (1985), or Everitt & Fischer
(1995).
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gramme (Collins 1981c: 215). Steve Woolgar in his turn puts a lot of effort into
developing a ‘really consistent’ relativist programme, by playing up so-called
reflexivism, revolving around its central thesis of reflexivity. According to
Woolgar, neither the strong programme nor the Bath-relativism satisfies the
conditions of reflexivity, and therefore they are all inconsistent in relativism.
According to the Paris School, neither the strong programme nor Bath-
relativism satisfies the symmetry tenet, and both approaches are therefore in-
consistent.
2.3. The problem of self-refutation in relativism
Joseph Margolis has suggested a special term for an inconsistent, paradoxical,
relativist point of view, according to which any statement, belief or sentence
must be true and false at the same time, it is protagoreanism (Margolis 1986:
xiii). Often, when the self-refutational character of relativism is under consid-
eration, obviously protagoreanism is kept in mind. As an example, I consider
here how William Newton-Smith deals with the problem of self-refutation of
relativism.
Newton-Smith poses the problem of self-refutation of relativism in a general
philosophical manner. This implies quite a different approach to relativism than
that of sociology of scientific knowledge. Newton-Smith finds that relativists
are attracted by the variation of beliefs and opinions from one group to another,
from one age to another, from one culture to another, etc. Different things are
true for different social groups, they have different truths and so they live in
different worlds. Despite the widely accepted belief that relativism has a par-
ticularly great explanatory power, Newton-Smith argues that in such explana-
tions of varying beliefs relativism itself remains unexplained in quite many
cases. Relativism of what? Relativism to whom? Newton-Smith finds the con-
cept of relativism to be incoherent and the explanatory power of relativism du-
bious. Himself he defines relativism as follows:
The central relativist idea is that what is true for one tribe, social group or
age might not be true for another tribe, social group or age. If it were so, it
would appear to license one to talk about the different tribes, social groups or
ages as inhabiting different worlds, as relativists have been notoriously prone
to do. Schematically expressed the relativist thesis is:
something, s, is true for ψ and is false for φ (Newton-Smith 1982: 107).
Newton-Smith asks what exactly varies from one context to the other. What is
that something? Is it a sentence, the truth of which varies? For example, it can
be a sentence like ‘grass is good to smoke’, that can be true for a group of hip-
pies and false for a farmer from Wales. Although the hippies and the Welsh
farmer live in the same neighbourhood, their worlds are different, though not in
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the substantial sense. In both cases the truth value of the sentence depends on
its meaning and on how things in the world really are. The truth value of a sen-
tence can change from a group to another when the meaning changes, but the
state of real things in the world remains the same. At the same time, as soon as
we take the varying something not to be a sentence but a proposition instead,
the incoherence of relativism becomes obvious. One and the same proposition
cannot be both true and false already by definition, be there different contexts
or not (Newton-Smith 1982: 108).
Newton-Smith provides an example from the history of science which en-
ables him to explain why and how relativism comes to incoherence. In Gali-
leo’s time, in the 17th century, it was widely believed that there are seven plan-
ets in the solar system. This belief was justified by the existence of seven ‘win-
dows’ in the human head. According to a relativist, if seen from our point of
view, such a justification will not obtain as rational justification, although, for
them in the 17th century and earlier, it was a good and rational justification.
Them and us are different. They did not make a mistake, they just applied other
reasons for justification. Newton-Smith finds, however, that here the explana-
tion should not end. Rather we should start the inquiry here. Then we would
find that, according to the conceptual scheme valid in the 17th century, God
created a harmonious universe. Harmony means that cosmos and the human
being mirror each other, and therefore one can deduce the features of cosmos
from the features of man. Thus there is really no difference between them and
us:
The difference between them and us is not a difference in what is a reason
for something but a difference as to whether the conditions in question ob-
tain. This fact which I will call the conditionalization of reason shows the
reason is not relative and explains why it can appear to be so. We should not
simply assume that different things are reasons for others. We should con-
sider their web of belief. We are likely to find that difference is explicable in
terms of difference in beliefs about what conditions actually obtain. This
means that if we shared their beliefs about what conditions obtained we
would tend to share their beliefs about which beliefs are reasons for which
beliefs. (Newton-Smith 1982: 111).
Relativists, however, assume difference on two levels, according to Newton-
Smith, difference in the beliefs about the world, and difference between beliefs.
This diversity easily leads to incommensurability and skepticism. There is no
further need to say that incommensurability involves self-refutation and turns
relativism to incoherence.12 Possibly this is the item Newton-Smith wants to
point out — that relativism is incoherent for the incommensurability it involves.
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 See, for example, Harris (1993) about self-refutation of the incommensurability-
relativism. Also Putnam has pointed out that incommensurability, despite the radical
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Newton-Smith’s argument can be read so that if we wish to save relativism we
will have to avoid incommensurability. One way to escape incommensurability
is to abandon relativism of truth in the traditional sense, and replace the sharp
bipolarity of true and false with some more flexible, not mutually exclusive
values, such as credibility and incredibility, for example, or those of plausibility
and implausibility, as has been suggested by Margolis.
In a recent monograph Rom Harré and Michael Krausz indicate that the
paradoxes of relativism may take a number of different forms. What is common
to all these forms of paradox is that relativism needs a non-relativist, absolutist
ground to make sense as a methodological programme. The general paradox of
relativism has been conceived perhaps most dramatically by Richard J. Bern-
stein who offers a definition of relativism that he ascribes originally to Hans-
Georg Gadamer: “For relativism, he thinks, is not only dialectical antithesis of
objectivism; it is itself parasitic upon objectivism” (Bernstein 1982: 37).
As one could see above, Harré and Krausz define relativism as anti-
absolutism too, but according to their view, this means that relativism may ap-
pear either as anti-objectivism, anti-foundationalism or anti-universalism. In
addition to this classification, they distinguish between ontological and discur-
sive variants of relativism (Harré & Krausz 1996: 4-7). Relativism may vary
from one context to another, for instance, a variant of discursive relativism in a
certain context may be anti-foundational but may allow universalism to some
extent, etc. Thus, Harré and Krausz interpret relativism quite flexibly, relativ-
ism is capable of being combined with a number of epistemological and onto-
logical positions. In addition, there are stronger and weaker forms of relativism.
I shall return to the ‘weaker’ variants of relativism after I have considered
what kind of theoretical consequences may follow for the strong programme in
SSK, from the paradox of relativism of truth which appears to be the strongest
possible form of the self-refuting relativism.
It is namely the paradox of relativism of truth, the form of the paradox of
relativism on which Newton-Smith and many other anti-relativists base their
arguments against relativism. Harré and Krausz describe the form of the para-
dox as follows:
(I)‘”Truth is culture-bound” is true’
Either ‘I’ is itself culture bound or it is not.
(a) If ‘I’ is culture-bound, that is if it is true, there will be some cultural
settings in which it is false, or in which it cannot be formulated at all.
(b) If ‘I’ is not culture-bound, that is if it is false, then it will be true in all
cultures.
                                                     
diversity of views, beliefs, opinions, statements, and worlds, always, presupposes a
God’s Eye View — a universal point of view where from the diversity is defined — and
is, therefore, inconsistent (Putnam 1982: 10–12).
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Therefore, if ‘I’ is true it is false, and if it is false it is true (Harré &
Krausz 1996:28).
It is obvious that relativism of truth, based on the traditional interpretation of
truth and relativism, and truth relativism, involves self-refutation. However, if
an epistemic, i.e., relativist concept of truth is assumed, the paradox will disap-
pear, and the thesis (a) will be true13. Nevertheless, it does not follow from the
classical paradox of relativism of truth, that relativism of knowledge in general
would necessarily be self-refuting. The paradox works on the mutually exclu-
sive concepts of truth and falsity. These mutually exclusive concepts are cer-
tainly not applied in the concept of knowledge of the strong programme. For
this reason, the critics of the strong programme, endeavouring to show the self-
refuting character of the programme, have been looking for a way of translat-
ing, i.e., transferring, the paradox into the conceptual scheme of Bloor’s four
tenets, to make the paradox bite also in the case of sociology of scientific
knowledge.14 For example, a possible result of such ‘translation’ might appear
in the following form:
(II) “Scientific knowledge is causally generated by its context” is causally
generated by its context.
Thus, not only are the claims of the object science to be explained by their
causes but also the meta-scientific claims must be explained by causal mecha-
nisms. Similarly, one can construe three other forms of the paradox and assume
self-refutation of the strong programme as a consequence, each of the para-
doxes based on a particular tenet, either symmetry or impartiality or reflexivity.
For example:
(III) “Scientific knowledge needs to be explained symmetrically” needs to be
explained symmetrically.
The argument against relativism in such ‘quasi-translations’ is built on the as-
sumption that social causation of beliefs or the need of symmetric explanations
themselves entail falsity of the beliefs. Bloor has summed up such attempts of
criticism in the following passage:
If someone’s beliefs are totally caused and if there is necessarily within them
a component provided by society then it has seemed to many critics that these
beliefs are bound to be false or unjustified. Any thorough-going sociological
theory of belief then appears to be caught in a trap. For are not sociologists
bound to admit that their own thoughts are determined, and in part even so-
cially determined? Must they not therefore admit that their own claims are
false in proportion to the strength of this determination? (Bloor 1991: 17)
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 The thesis (a) might, accordingly, appear rather as a definition for such relativism.
14
 See, for example, Hollis 1982.
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It is easy to see that the concepts of ‘causally generated by its context’ (II) or
‘symmetrically explained’ (III) cannot be identified with the concept of truth as
it was seen to be relativised in (I); neither is relatedness to a context equal to
falsity. The ‘translation’ as such has failed. Even if one were to start from the
other end and try to find an opposite term to ‘context-bound’, it could be ‘uni-
versal’, and this is certainly not an exclusive opposite to ‘context-bound’, at
least not in the language game of Margolis, Harré and Krausz’. As Harré and
Krausz (1996: 210) put it, the opposition does not need to be one of contradic-
tion. ‘Universal’ and ‘context-bound’ may be incompatible, but the truth of
some belief being context-bound does not make its negation necessarily false.
So, according to Harré and Krausz, it is important to note that relativism is
paradoxical only in the case of supposing the opposition between universal, or
absolute truth, and relativism of truth, which indeed would involve self-
refutation of relativism. In most of the actual discussions on scientific beliefs,
this opposition is not involved. Instead of the absolutist concept of truth, often
either pragmatic or epistemic concepts are assumed.
And even if one still assumes the absolutist concept of truth, it does not nec-
essarily contradict knowledge relativism when a fallibilist theory of knowledge
is favoured. In such a case, truth must be seen as a semantic relation between
the epistemic entities like beliefs, statements, theories, models, etc., and reality.
Independently of the truth value of the statements — which depends purely on
the state of affairs in reality — the construction of knowledge may been re-
garded as relative to their social and cultural settings (see Niiniluoto 1999: Ch.
7).
Thus, in the ‘translations’, it seems that, contrary to the expectations of the
anti-relativists, one may actually succeed in abandoning the paradox of relativ-
ism of truth because, in the statements (II) and (III), no bipolar truth values are
assumed. Those who wish to use the argument of the paradox of relativism of
truth against the strong programme, draw an extensive but still inadequate con-
clusion from (II) as if the causal nature of beliefs automatically made them
false. Bloor has diagnosed the flaw in the arguments of his critics as follows:
“This premise may be in the extreme form that any causation destroys credibil-
ity or in the weaker form that only social causation has this effect” (Bloor 1991:
17).
This conclusion would be fully adequate only if ‘radical translation’ from (I)
to (II), or to (III) were possible. Since it is not, i.e., the three theses are not
identical, the strong programme cannot be accused of self-refutation.
Mary Hesse suggests an even stronger argument against the critics of the
strong programme. She finds in connection with the paradox of relativism of
truth that, relativism of truth, nevertheless, involves neither incoherence nor
self-refutation of sociological relativism. According to Hesse, the usual argu-
ment against the strong programme may run as follows:
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Let P be the proposition ‘All criteria of truth are relative to a local culture;
hence nothing can be known to be true except in senses of “knowledge” and
“truth” that are also relative to that culture.’ Now if P is asserted as true, it
must itself be true only in the sense of ‘true’ relative to a local culture (in this
case ours). Hence there are no grounds for asserting P (or incidentally, for
asserting its contrary) (Hesse 1980: 42).
Hesse finds that such an attempt of refutation of relativism is obviously falla-
cious “for it depends on an equivocation in the cognitive terminology ‘knowl-
edge’, ‘truth’, and ‘grounds’” (Hesse 1980: 42). Certainly it is incorrect to ask
for absolute grounds for asserting either P or (I), or (II), or any other form of
the paradox, or whatever statement, belief or opinion. Consequently, there is no
conclusive argument for accepting the strong programme, according to Hesse
too.
Hesse describes the conceptual change in epistemology proposed by the
strong programme, as follows:
[W]hat the argument from sociology has done is to suggest that we shift our
concept of ‘knowledge’ so that the alleged refutation becomes an equivoca-
tion. This shift is the essence of the strong thesis: knowledge is now taken to
be what is accepted as such in our culture (Hesse 1980: 42).
Thus the relatedness of knowledge to culture leads, instead of self-refutation, to
self-reflection.
Whereas Hesse, a realist philosopher coming from a probabilistic tradition,
endorses the idea of contextualisation of the concepts of truth and knowledge,
the pragmatic realist Joseph Margolis suggests one should get rid of the strict
bipolarity of truth and falsity in the explanation of scientific knowledge to save
relativism in that way. The strategy of Margolis is to treat the argument that
relativism necessarily leads to inconsistency as a purely technical one. He finds
that:
All we need do is restrict the admissible values — values such as “plausible”
and “implausible”, disallowing “truth” and “falsity” — so that the offending
contradictions and self-refutations are precluded (without, of course, needing
to disallow contradiction or self-refutation in other ways); then we should be
home free (Margolis 1986: 66).
In principle, the views of Margolis and Hesse are quite close, for they both ar-
gue for anti-absolutism, and they both suggest constraints be put on the con-
cepts of truth and falsity relative to some restricted framework, open for further
re-estimations in varying contexts, i.e., they reject universal truth. Thus,
Bloor’s relativisation of scientific knowledge can derive support not only from
Hesse but also from Margolis’s form of restricted relativism.
In addition to the recommendation of eliminating the bipolar truth values,
Margolis suggests another practically important move for restricted relativism.
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To be able to avoid radical incommensurability, and therewith self-refutation
and skepticism, one needs to separate relativism of purely linguistic structures,
such as sentences and propositions, from the relativism of scientific beliefs,
models and theories — in the former case we are bound to bipolarity of the
truth value, but not in the latter case (Margolis 1986: 112–16).
Nevertheless, Harré and Krausz point out a problematic item in Margolis’s
strategy. They find that
However, the abandonment of bipolarity alone does not lead to relativism.
One must add a commitment to the contextual dependence of decisions as to
where on some continuum of degrees the relevant properties of an object lie.
Only then do we have genuine relativism (Harré & Krausz 1996: 147).
This is certainly so, but for our purpose which is to demonstrate that relativism
as such does not necessarily need to be self-refuting when constrained, it would
be even enough to accept only Margolis’s minimal idea of the abandonment of
the bipolar values of truth and falsity. It is so because our point of departure
already is in relativism.
Hence it seems that, as soon as we have abandoned the relativism of truth
paradox —as we have in a number of ways in the restricted relativism of the
strong programme in SSK — the problem of self-refutation is resolved. How-
ever, as I referred to Harré and Krausz above, they mention some other forms of
more or less internally problematic issues in relativism. Let us consider the two
theses of relativism, one of which is called the thesis of ontological independ-
ence: “Entities, states, experiences and so on exist independently of culture for
the fact of cultural diversity vis-à-vis these entities to show up” (Harré &
Krausz 1996: 26). And, the other thesis is known as that of transcultural intelli-
gibility: “Descriptions of some entity, state, experience etc. must be universally
intelligible, if it is to be possible to realise that the entity, state or experience
being described is being treated differently in different cultures” (Harré &
Krausz 1996: 26). In Harré’s and Krausz’s vision, these two assumptions or
theses actually make relativism tenable. The theses enable relativism to escape
regress and self-refutation.
Is Harré’s and Krausz’s first thesis of relativism still not paradoxical? 15 Ac-
cording to this thesis relativism needs some certain ground, independent exis-
tence of entities that makes the diversity of views on these entities, experiences
and states of affairs possible.
For instance, to be able to compare symmetrically two different paradigms
in chemistry we need to assume the existence of a common ground for both of
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 Woolgar finds this to be the irony within the strong programme account that diver-
gent views on a scientific object are taken to be about the same real object. Latour, for
his part, finds that we can assume the access neither to the objects of relativised views
nor to the subjects (social actors) whose views are relativised.
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them in reality. For a comparison of the phlogiston theory of combustion with
the atomistic oxygen-theory of burning, one needs to assume a really existing
entity to correspond to both, the concept of phlogiston, and respectively to
some concept in the atomistic theory, electron, or whatever it may be dubbed.
Not even a one-to-one translation from one conceptual scheme to another is
required. It would be enough if we could learn and translate from one scheme to
another, in principle. But does the assumption for such interpretation of the
grounds not involve the acceptance of foundationalism and objectivism in rela-
tivism? Is it not a variant of self-refutation of relativism, or at least a sort of
inconsistency anyway? As Bernstein has demonstrated (1983: 8), the content of
relativism is anti-objectivism, and this is what Harré and Krausz claim about a
variant of relativism. If we now come to admit that relativism needs to accept
some objectivism, what else may it be than inconsistency?
Similarly, we may see a problem in the hypothetical paradox of transcultural
intelligibility, since, on the one hand, we have — according to relativism —
plurality of cultures and contexts as opposed to universalism, on the other hand,
relativism assumes universalism to the extent making the existence of different
cultures knowable.
It is quite a common praxis to interpret the theses as paradoxical, and in this
connection to delineate relativism as a variant of skepticism:
The interesting charge advanced (by the would-be opponents of relativism),
therefore, is that, although it opposes objectivism, untenable in any case,
relativism is committed to the thesis that only objectivism could preclude
skepticism. Hence, relativism is committed to skepticism, in particular to a
version of the (radical) incommensurability thesis (to the effect that claims
drawn from different “paradigms” cannot be treated as cognitively competing
claims) (Margolis 1986: 70).
Therefore, the first task, according to Margolis, is to reject the mutually exclu-
sive definitions of relativism and objectivism, the definitions like the one sug-
gested by Bernstein. Margolis proposes that:
The counterstrategy is at once clear: construe relativism as (indeed) opposed
to objectivism, disallow the skeptical reading (which the sanguine opponent
of both objectivism and relativism — so styled — already insists is a viable
option), and reinterpret relativism as a thesis about science and rational in-
quiry viewed in terms of just those conditions. The importance of the rela-
tivistic alternative (thus interpreted) lies in this: theories of science and ra-
tional inquiry may (viably) oppose both objectivism (or foundationalism) and
skepticism (or incommensurability or the like); and yet they may still be use-
fully sorted as favoring and opposing a refurbished relativism (Margolis
1986: 70–71).
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The moderate version of relativism as Margolis describes it, must be separated
from all forms of irrationalism, cynicism, nihilism, anarchism, skepticism, and
incommensurability. At the same time, it is a version of relativism that rejects
objectivism, universalism, foundationalism, essentialism and logocentrism.
Naturally, Margolis (1986: 72) recommends to avoid the exclusive option be-
tween objectivism and skepticism, or the like. For such relativism, the para-
doxes could be resolved, even more, the theses of independent existents and
intercultural intelligibility are taken to be necessary for relativism.
Margolis’s moderate relativism suits well with the multi-level relativism of
Harré and Krausz. Hence relativism can be combined with both general histori-
cism and scientific realism for the reason that we may find subtly presented in
the following passage by Harré and Krausz:
Different aspects of the world are available to different kinds of creatures, in
so far as their sensory systems differ, and to different groups of human be-
ings in so far as they are differently placed and differently equipped. In this
sense knowledge of the world tends to the relative. But all such aspects are
aspects of one and the same world, and in that sense knowledge of the world
tends to the absolute (Harré and Krauzs: 224).
Consequently, relativism assumes a modest variant of realism, such as ‘resid-
ual’ realism or ‘single-barrelled’ realism.16 Modest realism in the shape of the
thesis of independent existents saves relativism from the vicious circle of bipo-
lar opposites of objectivism and skepticism. The relativist regress can be
stopped only when some absolutism in the shape of ontological realism and
cultural universalism is taken to be acceptable. Obviously this conclusion en-
tails important consequences for the strong programme and other variants of
restricted relativism.
Although Margolis’s modest relativism seems to suit Bloor’s strong pro-
gramme, Margolis himself regards the epistemologies of Bloor, Collins, and
SSK in general, as social reductionist and skepticist ones. There seems to be a
frequently supported but still erroneous view among philosophers and natural
scientists that the attempts of sociological interpretation of knowledge neces-
sarily lead to social reductionism, or to a kind of idealism, or to skepticism.17
Without developing the argument at greater length here, I just refer to David
Papineau, a philosopher who has examined the issue and reached an atypical
conclusion for a philosopher of science in the 1980s asserting that the sociology
of scientific knowledge, relativist or not, does not necessarily involve skepti-
cism:
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 Both terms are often used by Barnes, see especially Barnes 1992: 137, and both the
terms are also applied by Harré and Krausz.
17
 See, for instance, a recent review article of N. David Mermin 1998.
33
the new sociology of science does nothing to show that scientific practice is
not generally reliable for generating true theories. It may well show that sci-
entists are often swayed by prejudice, ambition and other ulterior motives. It
may well show that the internal mental motivations of scientists are no dif-
ferent from those of the general public. But it by no means follows that the
overall structure of scientific practice is not reliable for truth (Papineau 1988:
51).
The possibility for reconciliation of scientific realism as basic ontological posi-
tion and sociological knowledge relativism appears explicitly in the variant of
scientific realism suggested by Ilkka Niiniluoto (1987: 137) who makes a clear
distinction between the semantic concept of truth and the procedure of
truth(making)18. The semantic concept of truth concerns the field or area of en-
tities postulated by a conceptual scheme (scientific theory, model, etc.). The
procedure of truth (knowledge) concerns the process of gathering credibility.
Although the procedure could be interpreted in narrowly epistemic terms, it
may allow sociological approach as well. Scientific realism in philosophy has
been mainly engaged with the ontology of the postulated entities and theories.
Obviously there is no controversy, no conflict between the two dimensions —
ontology and the study of the context of knowledge-claims. I think, they could
be seen as complementary. In a recent essay on critical scientific realism, Ni-
iniluoto, when referring to Peirce, admits that: “Knowledge is a social product
of a community of investigators.” (Niiniluoto 1999: 94)
Considering Margolis’s criticism on Bloor, we must admit that it is not fully
relevant, for there is no reason to accuse Bloor of skepticism — without further
explication what is meant by skepticism19 — when Bloor (1991: 37) admits
even the correspondence theory of truth: “There is little doubt about what we
mean when we talk of truth. We mean that some belief, judgement or affirma-
tion corresponds to reality and that it captures and portrays how things stand in
the world”. At the same time it is quite clear that Bloor is not a metaphysical
realist20 (or objectivist), he adheres to fallibilism in epistemology:
                                                     
18
 Elsewhere Niiniluoto has indicated that in the case of truthlikeness-realism, i.e.,
critical scientific realism, the cultural, political, social and other contextual determinants
of knowledge can be taken into account. See Niiniluoto 1991, 1995, and especially
1999, Ch.-s 7 & 9.
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 If Margolis means by skepticism, e.g., fallibilist epistemology, his claim is correct.
Nevertheless, it seems that it rather is radical skepticism he keeps in mind.
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 By ‘metaphysical realism’ I mean a view, similar to the so-called double-barrelled
realism (See Barnes 1992) in its strongest possible form, the view that assumes both the
independent existence of objects in reality and our ability to obtain true belief of these
objects. This assumption, in its turn, involves necessity of the ‘ready-made-world’ with
the ultimate number and structure of the existing entities. The position can be formulated
only as a theoretical extreme, for there are no adherents precisely to this view.
34
We never have independent access to reality that would be necessary if it
were to be matched up against theories. All that we have, and all that we
need, are our theories and our experience of the world; our experimental re-
sults and our sensory-motor interactions with manipulatable objects (Bloor
1991: 40).
In a manner quite similar to Margolis, Bloor finds that the universal concept of
truth as defined in the correspondence theory is not suitable for practical expla-
nations. As a scientist, one rather has a point of view, which is given preference
with regard to a research issue because one does not have independent access to
reality, and one does not know the (absolute) truth. It is natural to sustain one’s
own fallible beliefs rather than to have no stand at all. Anyhow, a choice be-
tween possible varieties of views must be made, since one cannot hold more
than one view of the item at a time — to make sense, one has to speak in only
one language at a time.21 Sometimes the view preferred on the basis of the evi-
dence at hand is being called truth. This shows that the term ‘truth’ may be ap-
plied in different senses. Therefore, Bloor suggests putting the question about
truth in another way, focusing on the functions of truth. He distinguishes be-
tween three functions of truth — discriminative, rhetorical and materialist
functions. The first, the discriminative function of truth, refers to the need of
sorting our beliefs into plausible and implausible ones. Often the truth values,
‘true’ and ‘false’ play such a pragmatic role of distinction. The rhetorical func-
tion of truth serves as a means of criticism and convincing or persuading others.
Bloor characterises the third, materialist function as follows:
All our thinking instinctively assumes that we exist within a common exter-
nal environment that has a determinate structure. The precise degree of its
stability is not known, but it is stable enough for many practical purposes.
The details of its working are obscure, but despite this, much about it is taken
for granted. Opinions vary about its responsiveness to our thoughts and ac-
tions, but in practice the existence of an external world-order is never
doubted. It is assumed to be the cause of our experience, and the common
reference of our discourse. I shall lump all this under the name of ‘material-
ism’. Often when we use the word ‘truth’ we mean just this: how the world
stands (Bloor 1991: 41).
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 It is, nevertheless, possible to switch between different views or languages, it is pos-
sible to interpret a single sentence or symbol from different perspectives, but it is not
possible to claim or state different things at one and the same moment and remain con-
sistent at the same time.
35
Such an attitude coincides with what is called objectivity by Margolis (1986:
112–113)22. Objectivity can be seen as a weak form of objectivism. The thesis
of independent existents, objectivity, and materialism seem to be the sides of
the same coin, and on this basis, it seems possible to reconcile realism and
relativism.
Thus I can assert here in concluding this section that, the paradoxes of rela-
tivism and respective kinds of the problem of consistency can be resolved by
introducing certain constraints to relativism. One way for that, is in stating at
the outset of an account, that in this particular application of the concept of
truth, the framework of truth relativism, or epistemic theory of truth is assumed,
either of them being opposed to the classical concepts of truth and relativism.
Another more general prescription may be simply avoiding the bipolar struc-
tures, which involve the liar’s paradox. For Harré and Krausz, as well as for
Margolis, and also for Bloor and Collins, relativism can be made to work in this
way. In this way they seek the explanation of varying, sometimes controversial
scientific views.
2.4. Relativist regress, normativity and
the problem of consistency
Hilary Putnam has referred to a form of the paradox of relativism not yet con-
sidered at greater length here. According to him, a relativist cannot assume a
normative stance with regard to any belief, statement, action or whatsoever. A
relativist cannot assert:
“Relativism is wrong” is wrong.23
Although any relativist wants to save relativism and assert relativism’s being
right and valid, an adherent of hypothetically consistent relativism in SSK
should stay neutral, disinterested, symmetrical and reflexive also about her/his
own claims. It is easy to see how another variant of the paradox of relativism
may follow from that. However, it is also easy to see that Putnam is talking
about the abstract variant of relativism considered above quite in the same
manner as Newton-Smith, focusing on relativism with exclusive bi-polarities.
Therefore, there can be a similar solution to this possible form of paradox of
relativism, a solution comparable with the form considered above in connection
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 Margolis makes a clear-cut distinction between objectivity and objectivism. The
former does not involve the latter. Objectivity is permissible for relativism whereas ob-
jectivism is not.
23
 See Putnam 1982, where the argument comes from, here presented in my refor-
mulation.
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with Margolis’s attempt to reconcile realism and relativism. To abandon the
paradox, Margolis (1986: 68) introduced another restriction to relativism:
“Relativism should not be construed as precluding comparative judgements of
the usual sort and range (for instance, of better or worse, or of more or less
adequate) conceded within theories that do subscribe to bipolar truth values.”
Thus, in Margolis’s modest relativism, normativity, i.e., universality, is permis-
sible to some extent, or in some respects. Thus the paradox is supposed to be
overcome. In sociology of scientific knowledge this variant of the paradox of
relativism is neutralised by introduction of separate levels of relativism. Karin
Knorr Cetina and Michael Mulkay distinguish between epistemic and judg-
mental (levels of) relativism:
Epistemic relativism asserts that knowledge is rooted in a particular time and
culture. It holds that knowledge does not just mimic nature, and insofar as
scientific realism wishes to make such a claim, epistemic relativism is anti-
realist. On the other hand, judgmental relativism appears to make the addi-
tional claims that all forms of knowledge are ‘equally valid’, and that we
cannot compare different forms of knowledge and discriminate among them
(Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983: 5).
Naturally, this last possible consequence of relativism would not find support
among SSK analysts. Following Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, many others have
attempted to abandon judgmental relativism by separating normative/judgmen-
tal stratum from the other dimensions of analysis, thus saving relativism from a
variant of self-refutation.
The issue of normativity in sociology of scientific knowledge has recently
been taken up again by a group of Australian sociologists, Pam Scott, Brian
Martin and Evelleen Richards, who criticise relativist methodology for its illu-
sory neutrality and hidden normativity.24 They do not demand an equal position
for any kind of knowledge, but rather they try to point out that the principles of
symmetry and neutrality are not really valid in SSK analyses, for, on the one
hand, analysts certainly have their preferences, and on the other hand, even if
they do not, symmetrical analysis gives advantage to one of the analysed par-
ties, to which one, depends on the social context. In short, the argument con-
sists in reference to inconsistency of relativist SSK.
Nevertheless, a relativist may argue that the claim of consistent relativism
concerns only one certain level, the object level. In science studies it is usually
the epistemic or epistemological level which is relativised, i.e., epistemic sym-
metry is claimed. The judgements, evaluations, and questions about social sig-
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 Scott, Richards and Martin 1990 find that “an epistemologically symmetrical analy-
sis of a controversy is almost always more useful to the side with less scientific credibil-
ity or cognitive authority. In other words, epistemological symmetry often leads to social
asymmetry or non-neutrality” (1990: 490).
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nificance of a cognitive activity belong to another, meta level or levels, where it
is permissible to take sides and be normative, e.g., to admit that one’s own ap-
proach is more justified and better than its alternatives for certain research pur-
poses. The picture becomes even more complicated when one considers the
procedure of symmetrical analysis in detail. The symmetry principle assumes
that an analyst should be able to switch between two radically different episte-
mological systems (conceptual schemes, models, theories, beliefs, etc.) under
investigation. For this epistemic switch Collins and Yearley have introduced a
term ‘alternation’ into SSK as a loan from Peter Berger’s Invitation to Sociol-
ogy. Alternation means that sociologists exchange different frames of reference,
move between different ‘worlds’, for example, between two different models in
physics, where gravity waves are supposed to exist in one of them and not to
exist (or not to be detectable by the given method) in the other (Collins 1981a).
Thus alternation can be seen as the method or reification of symmetry.
Another kind of alternation occurs when a sociologist needs to switch be-
tween the conceptual scheme of the ‘world’ under investigation and of the
other, her/his own taken-for-granted-world, either her/his own professional or
common sense beliefs. It may be called ‘meta-alternation’ after Collins and
Yearley. For instance, a description of a scientific laboratory may be given
purely in terms of the natural sciences — there are columns, detectors, sample
collectors, amplifiers and recorders with a chromatogram in a lab where gas-
liquid chromatographic analysis is being done. The same laboratory may be
described in terms of social science as a place where scientific authority gathers
support, or, e.g., in common sense language — a room full of computers, tables
with different tubes, pipes, boxes, altogether smelling badly. Normally scien-
tists would subscribe to the first description, some SSK analysts would sub-
scribe to the second, and more radically minded social constructivist or position
consistency sociologists of scientific knowledge would agree with the third de-
scription of the same laboratory.
When considered purely epistemologically even these ‘worlds’, one on the
ground level and the others on different meta levels, could be seen symmetri-
cally, if reflexivity is invoked. This is what a branch of SSK, the so-called re-
flexivism claims to be the necessary and central part of investigation. Accord-
ing to reflexivism, alternation in symmetrical analysis is often accompanied by
‘meta-alternation’ taken to be at least a problematic issue if not a failure. The
general argument against the strong programme and other methodologies of
symmetrical analysis in this context consists again in accusations of partial ob-
jectivity and foundationalism. Collins and Yearley (1992a: 302) point out that
if inadequately understood, the over-emphasised problem of meta-alternation
may entail a new way of knowing nothing in sociology:
In spite of this achievement, all of us, however sophisticated, can switch to
modes of knowing that allow us to catch buses and hold mortgages. We all
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engage as a matter of fact in what we might call “meta-alternation”. Our ar-
gument here is that social studies of science ought to erect meta-alternation
as a principle, not treat it as a failing. To treat it as a failing is to invite par-
ticipation in an escalation of skepticism which we liken to the game of
chicken; in this case the game is epistemological chicken.25
The idea of Collins and Yearley is quite simple, their aim is to explain some-
thing by something else, i.e., to explain scientific knowledge by its cultural and
social conditions. This idea involves acceptance of social reality in the shape it
is given by current social theories and our common sense.26 According to posi-
tion-consistent relativism of reflexivism and symmetrism, Collins and Yearley
should, for the sake of consistency, reflect also on their own conceptual scheme
in relativist manner, but they do not, though they may agree that it would be
possible in principle. Thus their social realism is seen as inconsistent.
In the following three sub-sections I shall consider the arguments from re-
flexivism and symmetrism, and contrast these with social realism. I make use of
a sort of reductio ad absurdum argument. When it is impossible to give a con-
clusive argument for any of the considered variant of relativism in sociology of
scientific knowledge, for all they seem to be somehow inconsistent, be it incon-
sistency in the sense of partial absolutism (realism, materialism, etc.), or incon-
sistency in the sense of relativist regress, following from the requirement of
relativisation of every belief in the so-called position-consistency relativism,
then it is still possible to show that the latter variant of relativism is inconsistent
also in its empirical applications, i.e., its method does not really work, and
therefore the alternative view, that of constrained relativism, is better endorsed
and preferable.
For this analysis it is less important exactly which variant of constrained
relativism to consider, but since the concepts of alternation and meta-
alternation have been elaborated in social realism, I, therefore, devote more at-
tention to social realism of the Bath School here.
One may still wonder, how can social realism be a variant of constrained
relativism? As seen from a natural scientist’s point of view both the variants of
position consistency relativism and social realism are more or less socially re-
ductionist, for they take empirical (natural) scientific factors to play minimal
role in the sciences. Nevertheless, when considered with respect to the consis-
tency problem, social realism can be regarded as a variant of restricted relativ-
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 The metaphor of epistemological chicken refers to a game ‘chicken’ which consists
in dashing across the street in front of cars. ‘Chicken’ is the person who crosses the
street first, the winner is the one who succeeds to cross the street as the last person. In
the game of ‘epistemological chicken’ the winner would be the one who succeeds re-
flecting on one’s own views longest.
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 See Collins 1983: 87–95.
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ism, and thus taken to be compatible with the strong programme, and respec-
tively incompatible with symmetrism and reflexivism.
2.4.1. Reflexivism
According to Steve Woolgar, inter-level inconsistency, i.e., the alternation be-
tween different levels and positions, entails a difficulty he calls the ‘Problem of
Representation’. This is closely related to a variant of objectivism. Woolgar
(1983: 243) distinguishes between three different views on the problem of rep-
resentation:
1. a reflexive27, naive realist position, which assumes scientific representations
truly to picture independent reality ‘out there’ as it is in itself;
2. a mediative position, which takes social environment to mediate reality in
representations, thus endorsing the idea of the parallel existence of different
representations of a piece of reality;
3. a constitutive position, where reality is seen as created by representation.
Relativist sociology of scientific knowledge, or social constructivism, as Wool-
gar applies the term to both, the strong programme and Bath-relativism, is re-
lated to the mediative position. Woolgar notes that sociologists are well aware
of the fact that selection between theories cannot be made on the ground of
facts of reality because of the underdetermination of theories by data. Rather
theory choice is based on a social convention. At the same time, Woolgar
points critically to a shortcoming of the mediative position — the mediative
position assumes that there are ready-made theoretical alternatives, ready-made
representations waiting to be picked up by the scientists of different communi-
ties. Woolgar comes to find ironically that, according to such a view, there must
also exist a ready-made image of science, a ready-made image of what it is to
be a scientist, and respectively the images of cultures, communities, etc. which
de facto mediate reality for the sciences. Woolgar (1983: 251) notes with sar-
casm that the mediative position implicitly assumes one and the same reality to
ground different representations of it.28 This makes Woolgar to conclude that,
although the strong programme has recognised the conventional basis of the
sciences, it still holds on the methods known from the sciences, and therefore,
there is no essential shift from a variant of earlier asymmetric Mertonian soci-
ology of science to the strong programme (1988a: 50–51).
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 It is essential to note that ‘reflexive’ here does not have any connection to ‘reflexiv-
ity’.
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 As we could see above, this is a basic thesis for relativism, the irony would be suit-
able only in the case if such an ontologically realistic view were exclusively opposed
with relativism. Since it is not, there is no reason for irony.
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The constitutive position, initiated by Woolgar, involves (re-)inversion29 of
the object and representation — the research object must be seen as generated
by representation and not the other way round. As a result of the re-inversion,
the social network obtains in addition to its mediative role also a role of gen-
erator of the object. The latter, generative role, is important to keep in mind in
every analysis of knowledge, especially in the case of sociological analysis. No
a priori distinctions can be made between accounts and reality, accounts are the
reality. Thus, even social reality is being created by the sociological accounts.
The only way to avoid inconsistency, according to Woolgar (1988a: 93), is to
abandon unreflexive representationalism, since scientists never face nature as
such in their research, and the same applies to the sociology of scientific know-
ledge — sociologists never face science as such but only theoretically consti-
tuted representations, etc. This is why more reflexivity is needed, according to
Woolgar and Ashmore:
The general issue of reflexivity emerges in the specific area of the social
studies of science, once it is recognised that the same point can be made
about the knowledge produced by SSK. Its determinants, results, insights,
and so on are themselves the contingent product of various social processes
(Woolgar & Ashmore 1988: 1).
Woolgar and Ashmore actually do not have an ambition to solve the problem of
inconsistency of relativism, since they do not believe in the possibility of any
ultimate solution of any problem. They just criticise the other branches of soci-
ology of scientific knowledge for the controversy between their claims of rela-
tivism in the explanation of the scientists’ activities and realism in their self-
reflexive views.
From Woolgar’s point of view, the real issue is the lack of relativism in sci-
ence studies. In his reply to criticism from Collins and Yearley (1992a) where
the two critics classify Woolgar’s reflexivism as a post-relativist approach, he
asks: ”When did we finally get to relativism?” (1992: 330). According to
Woolgar, one should only start with relativism. For this purpose he finds the
new literary forms to serve as a suitable method. In the new literary forms, the
author’s alter ego, a second voice which is suppressed and ignored in ordinary
cases, comes to serve the purposes of reflexivity (see Woolgar 1988b). The
second voice is meant to point at the representations given by the first, author’s
basic voice, to ask what exactly is the generative ground for the given claim,
etc.
The danger of relativist regress does not seem to threaten him because the
problem of relativist regress belongs to another world — the world of formulae,
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 According to Woolgar, inversion of the object and its representation is a feature of
scientific research. As result of scientific practice, hypothetical entities turn out to be
objects which are believed to act as causes of representations. See Woolgar 1988a: 54.
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regularities and logic, the world which is of no interest for a reflexivist. A re-
flexivist is more interested in dismantling myths, traditions, and certain
grounds: “Reflexivity and actor-network theory offer ways of further challeng-
ing the preconceptions and assumptions of (what are now) current orthodoxies”
(Woolgar 1992: 339).
However, there is a controversial precondition that makes reflexivity tenable
as the empirical programme — reflexivity works on the condition of reflexiv-
ism being invalid. The concept of reflexivism cannot mean anything else but
generalised reflexivity. Thus, a consistent reflexivist should be reflexive about
every single belief, every single view, even about the view about reflexivism
itself. Such a position is obviously regressive if not controversial. In the empiri-
cal studies of Woolgar, one can hardly find reflexivism at work. For instance, in
a description of ethnomethodological fieldwork he declares that “The main ra-
tionale of this kind of work is that this process of collection and observation
provides the basis for an authentic picture of what actually goes on in the labo-
ratory” (Woolgar 1988a: 85). On the one hand, he notes that the truth about
science cannot be heard in the interviews with scientists, but, on the other hand,
it appears that an ethnologist can easily find it out:
in situ monitoring of scientific activity gives us the benefit of the experiences
of an observer undergoing prolonged immersion in the culture being studied.
This kind of participant observation thus makes it possible to retrieve some
of the craft character of science. This approach is designed to reveal the
messy, idiosyncratic, stop-and-start character of the work in the laboratory
(op cit.).
To me, both these passages seem essentialist, representational, and certainly
unreflexive.30 Thus reflexivism is not really applied in the fieldwork, and there-
fore such a seemingly radical relativism turns out to be still inconsistent.
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 In an earlier ethnographic study Woolgar and Latour admit that the problem of rep-
resentation emerges in their own descriptions of scientific laboratory, it “is both insolu-
ble and unavoidable” (Latour & Woolgar 1979: 283). However, they see reflexivity as
applied in the ethnographic study without necessary reflexivist regress: “We attempted
to address the issue of reflexivity by placing the burden of observational experience on
the shoulders of a mythical “observer”. We attempted to alert the reader to the nature of
his relationship with the text (and by implication to the nature of readers’ relationship
with all attempts to constitute objectivities through textual expression).” op. cit. The
idea of reflexivity, according to Latour and Woolgar, is to remind the reader that all
texts are some kind of stories.
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2.4.2. Symmetrism
Latour and Callon, too, regard the variants of Edinburgh and Bath relativism as
inconsistent: the strong programme is taken to reduce knowledge to its social
environment, i.e., merely to shift the focus from nature to society. Such a shift
is seen as retaining strong asymmetry. Latour notes that the explanation of sci-
entific knowledge by its social conditions would be acceptable only when “we
can impute interests to social groups given a general idea of what the groups
are, what society is made of, and even what the nature of man is like” (1983:
144). But in the Anglo-American sociology of scientific knowledge the con-
cepts of ideology, society, and interests are, according to Latour, quite ambigu-
ous. Another problem with the strong programme, according to the Paris
School, consists in its inability to overcome the classical dualism of content and
context — content is explained by context as if it were possible to distinguish
between them. Callon asserts that the distinction is impossible because: “con-
text and content are simultaneously reconfigured” (Callon 1995: 51). Latour
points out that in scientific practice the ‘social outside’ and ‘scientific inside’
appear to be in permanent displacement:
There is no outside of science but there are long, narrow networks that make
possible the circulation of scientific facts. [...] Once all these displacements
and transformations are taken into account, the distinction between the mac-
rosociological level and the level of laboratory science appears fuzzy or even
non-existent (1983: 167).
Therefore, Latour finds that in addition to the social turn, science studies need
another radical turn to establish real symmetry. Geometrically expressed, the
turn consists in a 90-degree shift with the symmetry thesis of the strong pro-
gramme. As result, we get the second principle of symmetry which claims equal
explanation of both nature and society (Latour 1992: 279). Latour’s argument
for the new principle of symmetry is based on the ontological equability of na-
ture and society: “We live in a Society we did not make, individually or collec-
tively, and in a Nature which is not of our fabrication” (1992: 281). Neither one
nor the other can be used for explanatory purposes: “Society cannot be used to
explain the practice of science, and, of course, Nature cannot either, since both
are the results of the practice of science- and technology-making” (op. cit.) La-
tour criticises the British sociologists for ignoring the research objects and
technology31, and for giving clear advantage to human actors, in their explana-
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 According to Latour, the main mistake of the British sociologists is taking the con-
cepts of science and technology essentialistically. He finds that “‘science’ does not exist.
It is the name that has been pasted onto certain sections of certain networks” (Latour
1988: 215). The same can be said about technology and society. So, from his point of
view: “We are never confronted with science, technology and society, but with a gamut
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tions of science.32 In the Paris School vision, scientific activities must be seen
as a chain of actions where both human and non-human actors are involved.
Such chains belong to more extensive networks where all elements are consid-
ered equally, their identity is defined in their mutual enrolments and transla-
tions.33 Hence one is not entitled to distinguish between the content of knowl-
edge and its social context any more. The microbe (of anthrax) discovered by
Louis Pasteur belongs to the same network with the French farmers, thousands
of infected cows, with the laboratory of Pasteur and finally, with the interests of
Pasteur. A French microbiologist Pasteur becomes “Pasteur”34, a revolutionist
of scientific medicine, through his ability to find allies, i.e., through his skill to
translate between the interests of different actors of the network. Pasteur was
able to translate farmers’ concerns into the ‘language’ of his own scientific in-
terests, and then back again to the ‘language’ of farmers’ interests. He gave
farmers a new social actor, the microbe, until then invisible reason of the terri-
ble disease, anthrax, and thus he came to show also the ways of getting rid of
the diseases and their economic consequences. The microbe as such is not less
a social actor, according to Latour, than the whole French hygienists’ move-
                                                     
of weaker and stronger associations, thus understanding what facts and machines are is
the same task as understanding who the people are” (Latour 1987: 259). Science and
technology can be seen as only a subset of something called technoscience, a broader
network where besides science and technology interested social forces are involved. See,
e.g., Latour 1987: 175.
32
 Social context is not seen as suitable for the explanation of scientific content be-
cause, on the one hand, it leaves aside the real content, and on the other hand, such an
explanation requires special language which is different from the ‘tribe’s’ own language.
Latour sees such a language choice as a problematic issue for the reason referred
above — we do not and cannot have a complete and objective picture of society. (Latour
1988: 8–9).
33
 In an interview to Werner Callebaut (1993) Latour explains the difference between
the British and French understanding of the notion of “actor”: “What we did in the social
studies of science, all things considered, is to reposition the notion of the actor. I would
call “actor” the shifter, the redistributor, the delegator of actions either to humans or to
nonhumans. In technology studies you can’t start from a list of what humans are able to
do as contrasted to what “mere things” will never be able to do, because the job of the
engineer is to cross the boundary constantly and to reallocate skills and competencies
among “actants”” (Callebaut 1993: 473). To illustrate the difference, I bring some ex-
amples from Latour’s and Callon’s translations between the conceptual framework of
actant-network theory and Anglo-American sociology: ‘actant’ — actor, ‘actant net-
work’ — social relations, ‘translation’ — proof, data (Latour & Callon 1992: 347).
34
 Latour refers to the distinction between the man, Pasteur, and the “Pasteur” — ideas
of Pasteur (or perhaps the reception of his ideas by society?), the former is often identi-
fied with the latter. (Latour 1988: 13).
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ment.35 The microbe made possible the colonial wars without the dangerous
infections, field surgery in the world-war, stormy development of food industry
and wine production. Thus the discovery of the microbe is not just a cognitive
issue, it is a social issue as well, and Pasteur formed and re-formed both the
content and the context at the same time. It is important to note that the politi-
cal/social consequences of the laboratory activities cannot be predictable. For
this reason, they are inseparable from the purely cognitive processes, in princi-
ple: “Pasteur, representing the microbes and displacing everyone else, is mak-
ing politics, but by other, unpredictable means that force everyone else out, in-
cluding the traditional political forces” (Latour 1983: 168). This means, ac-
cording to Latour, that Pasteur modified the society of his time — the interests,
the society and science, all they are included in the changes and the reconfigu-
rations prompted by events in his laboratory.
At the same time, Pasteur as the spokesman of the microbe has to bear an
enormous burden of responsibility for all the ‘translations’. Latour is often ac-
cused of letting scientists speak on behalf of nature — as the only representa-
tives of nature, they obtain considerable power in society. Collins and Yearley
find that:
If nonhumans are actants, then we need a way of determining their power.
This is the business of scientists and technologists; it takes us directly back to
scientists’ conventional and prosaic accounts of the world from which we es-
caped in the early 1970s. (Collins & Yearley: 1992a: 322)
Nevertheless, according to the principle of mutual ‘translations’ in the actor-
network, also the scientists belong to the network and are somehow defined by
the other parts of the network — they are defined, enrolled, translated, so they
are not the independent representatives. A scientist is regarded as a scientist as
long as she or he is taken to be a scientist by the network. Besides that, the
statements, scientific texts, formula, etc. cannot be taken as representing reality
because, according to the actor-network theory: “Statements do not talk of an
outside reality; they are simply one location point in a long and teeming net-
work” (Callon 1995: 53). The symmetrism of Latour and Callon can be inter-
preted so that things turn out to be research objects when they are taken up as
                                                     
35
 Latour describes the displacement of content and context on the example of the hy-
gienists movement and the role of Pasteur in the movement. The French hygienists were
fighting for the improvement of general welfare, e.g., one of their goals was to improve
public health. They saw the reasons of illness in the environment, and therefore the real
actor, one single cause of the diseases, was missing. As soon as Pasteur gave them the
microbe, the hygienists’ ideas gained a theoretical foundation, and thus, hygienists sur-
vive as a social movement thanks to Pasteur. On the other hand, the “Pasteur” is made
by the hygienists’ social network. See for details the first part of Latour 1988: 3–146.
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‘objects’.36 And similarly, science and technology appear to be objects of social
study when they are thus considered, although, in the light of the idea of new
symmetry, Latour and Callon cannot favour purely social explanation of sci-
ence.37 Both the natural and the social sides need to be analysed symmetrically.
In his Science in Action 1987 Latour introduced an image of science as Ja-
nus bifrons whose backward looking face — the one looking to the left on
plane figures — corresponds to the so-called natural scientific realism. His
forward — to the right — looking face, which stands for science in progress,
may be seen equivalent to social realism.38 One is usually natural realist about
the past science, settled, certain and legitimated knowledge, in this sense one
talks about scientific facts. Differently from this, in the science as process one
sees controversies, debates resulting in decisions about what counts as the facts.
Therefore sociological explanation is relevant here. The ‘new symmetry’39,
symmetry between the two sides of Janus bifrons, however does not mean al-
ternation between natural and social realism, rather it must be taken so that na-
ture and society are twin results of the process of network building (Callon and
Latour 1992: 348).40
This is the point where one may note the relativist regress threatening the
entire actant-network approach. Collins and Yearley claim that if one considers
actant-network theory in the light of its own methodology, the theory will re-
quire another consideration as Janus bifrons from another point of view. And,
the new point of view, in its turn, would need to be considered symmetrically
from the next point of view, etc. Collins and Yearley call such a rule of method
active in the actant-network theory hypersymmetry (1992b: 379). If hypersym-
metry is unavoidable, the attempts for consistent relativism necessarily will end
in relativist regress.
                                                     
36
 The ordinary objects of scientific research are seen as quasi-objects — the term
comes from Michael Serres, a French philosopher — the quasi-objects are seen as half
natural, half social. Such quasi-objects are taken to build both nature and society. Again
the identities are created in the mutual ‘translations’ accompanied by inscriptions which
include graphic display, laboratory notebooks, tables of data, reports, etc. (Callon 1994:
50–51).
37
 Purely social explanation is, according to Latour, something characteristic of the
English tradition: “Especially in England, the human actor is supposed not to be decon-
structible” (See Latour’s interview in Callebaut: 472).
38
 In this question Latour’s use of the terms varies from one context to another, he
sometimes calls the two sides respectively as realist and relativist ones (Latour 1989:
107), sometimes he contrasts natural realism with social realism (Latour 1992: 276)
39
 The term ‘new symmetry’ which is introduced by Latour, can be seen as a synonym
for Collins’ and Yearley’s term of ‘symmetrism’ they apply in the characterisation of
Latour’s method.
40
 In this context the authors use the term of general symmetry principle. See also La-
tour 1987: 98–99.
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Nevertheless, Latour and Callon appear to manage the regress in their case
studies, i.e., their pursuit of symmetry is realised without the regressive sym-
metrism. This seems to be another kind of inconsistency — symmetry without
the above claimed symmetrism, reflexivity without the above claimed reflexiv-
ism, and perhaps also relativity without relativism? In their empirical studies,
Callon and Latour proceed quite in the manner of restricted relativism, while
theoretically disagreeing with the foundationalist inconsistency of restricted
relativism.
2.4.3. Social realism
Social realism is an epistemological and methodological view as proposed by
Harry M. Collins in his empirical programme of relativism (EPOR). Collins
takes relativism to be an important methodological rule, but since he is well
aware of the theoretical problems related to relativism, he insists that it is a rule
of methodology:
I do not want to defend relativism. I do not want to talk about what exists in
the natural world or how we ground our knowledge of it. Ontology and
epistemology are not the subject of this paper, the subject is methodology of
social science. I will try to show that the appropriate method for the social
study of science entails that the natural world — as opposed to the social
world — is approached … relativistically — even if a relativistic epistemol-
ogy be resisted (1981c: 216).
According to Collins, the fact “that the natural world needs to be approached in
a relativistic way ... does not imply that the social world be approached in this
way” (1981c: 216). In the footnote explanation, he comes to the definition of
social realism:
I am coming to realize that this is an unusual view — some even find it
shocking. Not only does it deny the importance of, currently fashionable, re-
flexivity, but it reverses the accepted wisdom about where certainty and real-
ity are to be found. My prescription is to treat the social world as real, and as
something about which we can have sound data, whereas we should treat the
natural world as something problematic — a social construct rather than
something real. This seems to me to be an entirely natural view for a social
scientist (1981c: 216–17).
Thus the sociologists of scientific knowledge are supposed to study the social
world of science in the same way the natural scientists study the natural world.
In his later articles, Collins often emphasises the resemblance between the
methods of SSK and the natural sciences: “Most practitioners of SSK, far from
being against science, warrant their own work by reference to “scientific crite-
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ria” — careful observation, repeatability, and so forth” (1996: 230). Elsewhere
Collins, nevertheless, notes that SSK can be seen as a philosophical school:
One school, however, inspired in particular by Wittgenstein and more lately
by phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists, embraces an explicit relativ-
ism in which natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construc-
tion of scientific knowledge. Relativist or not, the new philosophy leaves
room for historical and sociological analysis of the processes which lead to
the acceptance, or otherwise, of new scientific knowledge (Collins 1981b: 3).
Collins distinguishes between three stages in the sociological explanation of
knowledge. The first stage concerns the “empirical documentation of the inter-
pretative flexibility of experimental results” (Collins 1983: 95). One, and the
main issue, under examination in the first stage, was experimental replication.
Collins himself, for instance, has made a case study on the attempts of building
a TEA-laser.41 Through his personal experience in the British laboratories, he
tried to explicate the role of so-called tacit knowledge, the role of skills in sci-
entific practice. Theoretically, the problem concerns social negotiations on
what exactly counts as experimental replication.
A research programme, such as laser-building or detecting the gravitational
radiation,42 involves a set of rules of interpretations taken for granted by the
group of scientists. The taken-for-granted rules of interpretation make knowl-
edge and skills a local phenomenon. Therefore, “the data are not meaningful
outside of this interpretative context” (Collins 1983: 92). In order to reveal the
hidden rules, a sociologist of scientific knowledge must ‘go native’, obtain na-
tive competence in a local scientific culture.43
The taken-for-granted rules become visible also for the ‘native’ participants
in the case of scientific controversy. When there are at least two competing
theories at hand, the way data should be interpreted will be seen as a question-
able item. The interpretation itself turns out to be decisive. Collins notes that:
“A comprehension of the scientists’ interpretative competencies is a vital part
of the enterprise, but whether a change comes about or not, is a consequence of
more than what happens in any single location” (1983: 95). The scientific con-
troversies resulting in the change of a whole set of interpretative rules are, basi-
cally, considered at the second stage of empirical programme of relativism.
At the second stage, the analysis:
“is concerned with the way that the limitless debates made possible by the
unlimited interpretative flexibility of data are closed down. The mechanisms
of closure have been found to include various rhetorical, presentational and
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 For a detailed survey, see Collins 1985 (2nd ed. 1992)
42
 For Collins’ case studies, see Collins 1981a, 1985, & 1996.
43
 Naturally, going native should be accompanied by the ability of alternation between
‘cultures’, for a sociologist cannot become a scientist.
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institutional devices working within a context of ‘plausibility’ and other con-
servative forces” (Collins 1983: 95–96).
If one’s aim is to understand the revolutionary changes in the science, the ac-
tivities of the set of leading experts from different institutions, called the ‘core-
set’, needs to be investigated. According to Collins, the outcome of an at-
tempted change, closure of a problem, depends on the interaction between the
core-set institutions. This is related to what he calls the sociological resolution
of the problem of induction (1985: 6). The core-set model was designed in ac-
cordance to the so-called ‘Hesse net’ — a network-structure of joint entrench-
ment of interrelated concepts. In the ‘Hesse net’ the relations between concepts
are probabilistic and logical ones.44 Collins sees the relations to be “better de-
scribed as the networks of social institutions that comprise forms of life” (1985:
17). In his case study on the attempts to detect gravitational radiation, he analy-
ses the problem of experimental replicability in terms of the core-set model,
respectively, as the social relations between leading institutions. He demon-
strates how the replicability of the experiments first carried out by Joseph
Weber, the initiator of detection of gravitational fluxes, became rejected, step
by step, by the rest of the core-set. Eventually, the scientific consensus was that
Weber’s experiment could not be repeated and, therefore, the method of detec-
tion of gravity waves turned out to be inadequate. In this particular case, the
decisive role in the closure, or in ‘changing the order’ and getting the ‘ships
into the bottles’45 was played by rhetoric applied by Weber’s opponents. How-
ever, this does not mean that Weber’s opponents’ arguments were inaccurate,
quite the contrary — the rhetorical methods were reasonably combined with the
rules of action taken-for-granted by the wider scientific community. Weber’s
opponents knew well that, since the experimental results, in general, possess
more weight than simply theoretical accounts, therefore, they did experiments,
though not as extensive as Weber’s, they presented their arguments as experi-
mentally grounded ones.
The third stage of EPOR concerns studies into wider social and political
structures of scientific knowledge, for: “The core-set does not work in isolation
of course” (Collins 1983: 95) In this respect — what concerns the wider social
connections — social realism has quite often been criticised. The other themes
often criticised are the principles of impartiality and neutrality. The above re-
ferred group of Australian sociologists finds that certain types of commitment
are inevitable, therefore, anything an SSK analyst does, may be seen as bring-
ing forth some political consequences. According to Scott, Richards and Martin
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 See Hesse 1974.
45
 Collins applies the metaphor of ships in the bottles to our stable every-day percep-
tions, to our taken-for-granted rules of interpretations of data. Ships are in the bottles in
the stage of normal science in Kuhn’s terms. Respectively, the paradigm shifts are char-
acterised as changes of order. See Collins 1985.
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(SRM), the political position should be declared openly at the outset of a study.
In his turn Collins notes that it is hard to predict the precise context a study may
happen to be connected to. He finds that ‘commitment to commitment’ which
SRM argue for, itself needs causal explanation. The relation between a cogni-
tive issue and its social context is not always a simple or direct one. As an il-
lustration of the statement, he gives an example: “the bomb may have saved
more lives than it cost, and likewise the pesticides; the environmental catastro-
phes revealed in the Eastern Block may cause us to welcome the victory of
capitalism” (1996: 231). Furthermore, the neutrality tenet should be seen as a
norm, a rule guiding the scientific practice called SSK.
On the other hand, and this is far more important to be noticed for my pres-
ent argument, the empirical programme of relativism is accused of altering the
balance of power between science and culture. Both the Paris School and the
adherents of the reflexivist SSK, such as Woolgar, certainly insist that social
realism is inconsistent, since it replaces one kind of absolutism (natural) with
another (cultural).
On several occasions, Collins has shown via careful analysis that the actant-
network theory appears to come to a similar praxis.46 When Latour and Callon
so-to-say black-box47 the natural scientific entities, according to Collins:
the black-boxedness is not a property of things nor does it transfer from con-
text to context […]; the object of analysis is the thing in the context of use. If
it is only the thing in its moment-to-moment context to which actant status
can be assigned, it must always be on our mind that the power of things is the
power granted to them by the community. This is the position of Changing
Order rather than that of actant-network theory (1992: 187).
The accusations of the lack of reflexivity can be refuted within the principle of
alternation and meta-alternation, as already indicated above.
Another kind of criticism on EPOR comes from the natural scientists, who
do not agree with the proposed lack of empirical constraints in the theory
choices.48 Nevertheless, even this argument can be paralysed or postponed, due
to the framework of alternation. In social realism, such as claimed in EPOR,
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 Bloor (1999) too asserts that the actor-network theory is inconsistent in the above
indicated sense.
47
 Black-boxing is a theoretical assumption that enables an analyst to ‘bracket’ the sci-
entific taken-for-granted meanings and burdens of interpretations of the entities and ob-
jects of the natural sciences. The voltmeters, cromatographs, etc. are seen as black-boxes
producing data.
48
 Also, the strong programme does not agree with the radical opposition between na-
ture and culture, because in the explanations of scientific knowledge, the beliefs about
nature are examined and explained, not nature as such (Bloor 1999). Bloor insists that,
on the other hand, the members of society belong to nature as living organisms (Bloor
1999: 88).
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one regards science as a human activity. Obviously influenced by John Searle’s
Speech Acts, (1969) Collins takes science and scientific knowledge to be insti-
tutional. Scientific beliefs must be regarded as institutions, i.e., every collec-
tively endorsed belief, right or wrong, is an institution. Nature itself as a re-
search object does not make any beliefs about it more or less certain. In reply to
critics, Collins says:
It is often thought that the sociology of scientific knowledge is an attack on
the institution of science as a whole. It is not. The sociology of scientific
knowledge has only one thing to say about the institution of science: it is
much like other social institutions. The re-analysis of scientific method does
not of itself make science into a bad institution (1992: 190).
Collins suggests that the precise relation between the empirical and cultural
constraints, and their connection to a wider social and political context, as well
as the multilevel structure of the institution of scientific knowledge, needs fur-
ther inquiry in a new ‘knowledge science’.
2.5. Conclusion: have we ever been consistent?49
Is consistency of relativism possible? Is consistency achievable in relativism?
The problem of consistency in the SSK appears in three particular forms. The
first of them concerns relativist regress, self-refutation and skepticism. The
second form of the problem appears when relativism is once restricted by some
special conditions, and therefore seen as partially anti-relativist in the sense of
its partial ‘absolutism’. In the third form, the problem can be observed on the
example of the empirical studies carried out by the two relativist schools in the
SSK, both pursuing consistency in relativism, one of them appealing to gener-
alised reflexivity, and, respectively, the other to generalised symmetry. In their
empirical studies, however, they seem to withdraw from their original princi-
ples, and proceed in quite the inconsistent way in the second sense of the term.
Considered philosophically, relativism appears self-refuting if it has been
based on the opposition to the absolutist concept of truth. In any other case,
relativism does not necessarily involve a contradiction. Thus, e.g., the prag-
matic theories of truth as well as epistemic theories of truth do not pose the op-
position.
And even in case of absolutist concept of truth, knowledge relativism would
be acceptable, since truth is a semantic relation between the linguistic or epis-
temic entities — like statements, theories and beliefs, — and reality, whereas
knowledge claims are social constructions, made in their particular contexts.
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 This is a paraphrase of the title of a recent book by Latour We Have Never Been
Modern (Latour 1993).
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As Margolis has shown, partial ‘foundationalism’, ‘universalism’, or ‘ob-
jectivism’ does not necessarily make a relativist programme inconsistent, viz.
self-refutational. According to him, in the case of scientific beliefs, theories and
models, the truth values do not obtain in the sense of universal, mutually exclu-
sive bipolar values. Hence, in the sciences both relativism and absolutism ap-
pear as terms with degrees and respects. Therefore the relation between such
extremes as absolutism and relativism can be seen in quite a flexible way.
Relativism may be characterised as an anti-absolutist attitude, a rule of action, a
tendency, which nevertheless does not exclude ‘absolutist’ tendencies in certain
respects and to certain degrees. Thus, historically and culturally varying scien-
tific beliefs can be analysed and explained relativistically without any particular
fear of inconsistency. Moreover, relativist explanations are tenable only as far
as relativism is constrained to some certain area, i.e., as far as it applies rela-
tively absolutist terms, defining clearly what is taken to be relative, and relative
to what. The claim of necessary relativisation of all beliefs, and respectively the
version of seemingly consistent anti-foundationalism bring us necessarily to
relativist regress, and skepticism. In practice, it is impossible to follow the pre-
scription of relativisation of all beliefs, since it would require, metaphorically
spoken, an extraordinary capability of speaking an unlimited number of lan-
guages in an endless number of voices all at the same time.
In this chapter, I considered how the consequences of the problem of con-
sistency of relativism apply to sociology of scientific knowledge. I observed
two opposite views, viz. restricted, moderate relativism and radical, the so-
called position-consistency relativism. The strong programme of the Edinburgh
School and the empirical programme of relativism of the Bath School, both ap-
pear to be versions of the modest, partially “absolutist” relativism, the first ad-
mitting two kinds of constraints, material and social ones, the latter adopting
only social ones.
Woolgar and Latour for their part, insist on the requirement of consistency
in relativism. They see the main purpose of the SSK studies to be the removal
of any kind of absolutism, and substitution of it for true, i.e., consistent relativ-
ism.
In conclusion we may admit, however, that the versions of relativism which
pursue or pretend pursuing position consistency, inevitably end up in regress.
At the same time, the reductio ad absurdum argument which I invoked in the
section 2.4, shows that both programmes the semiotic analysis by Latour, and
the ethnomethodological research by Woolgar, when applied empirically, in-
volve some hidden assumptions. In empirical research neither of the authors
seems to regard respective principles of position-consistent relativism as really
valid. In Latour’s actant- network-theoretical case studies, the symmetry princi-
ple works only on the hidden assumption of symmetrism being invalid. In
Woolgar’s case studies, reflexivity works only on the hidden assumption of re-
flexivism being inactive. If this is not a controversy, what is it then? As it ap-
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pears that, the more consistent a variant of relativism, the more inconsistent it is
at the same time.
In order to make relativism a tenable and useful programme in the explana-
tion of scientific knowledge, it must become restricted in the way either Harré
& Krausz, Margolis, Hesse or Niiniluoto recommend. A version of restricted
relativism can be seen active in the strong programme and in the empirical pro-
gramme of relativism of the Bath School. In the latter, in particular, the issue of
acceptance of the alternation between different levels, as well as the acceptance
of inter-level inconsistency has been elaborated. In spite of the somewhat
problematic nature of the sociological reductionism of the Bath School, they
have successfully shown that the regress of relativism is not inevitable if rela-
tivism is constrained by levels allowing epistemological and methodological
relativism while disallowing ontological and judgmental relativism.
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3. THE ‘SCIENCE WARS’ AND THE ARGUMENT
OF UNDERDETERMINATION
3.1. Introduction
The so-called ‘Sokal-affair’ in 199650 gave rise to a new wave of debates be-
tween the traditional philosophy of science and the relatively new sociology of
scientific knowledge (SSK)51. Due to the radical nature of the arguments pre-
sented these debates have become widely known as the ‘science wars’. Often
enough, these debates have been depicted as if the status of scientific knowl-
edge were at stake there. Do the sciences discover new facts of reality and ob-
jective laws of nature, or should we regard scientific truths as purely social
conventions? In principle, this is a continuation of old philosophical debates
between realism and anti-realism (or objectivism and relativism) in a new ter-
ritory. SSK has been engaged in these debates since the 1970s when the first
theoretical SSK programme — the strong programme — emerged. As the theo-
retical core of several SSK programmes and schools involves epistemic rela-
tivism, this particular debate between philosophers and sociologists of knowl-
edge is also known as the debate between (scientific) realism and (sociological)
relativism.
One reason why this debate has continued for a long time is the wide range
of mutual misinterpretations. Ian Hacking has described the opposition in these
‘science wars’ as follows: one side tends to combine irrelevant metaphysics
with a rage against reason while the other side insists upon scientific meta-
physics and an Enlightenment faith in reason (Hacking 1999: 62). The conflict
between these two parties seems irreconcilable. It is true that there have been
several attempts of reconciliation, however, sooner or later, the controversy
between philosophy of science and sociology of scientific knowledge has
emerged again.
In the present chapter, I aim to show, on the example of a particular theo-
retical argument often applied in the debate in question — the Duhem –Quine
thesis of underdetermination of theories by data (DQT) — that the intended
argument of the adherents of SSK may have rather unexpected consequences,
and, therefore, it cannot be regarded as a compelling argument for one of the
debating parties. I am going to question the correctness of the application of the
argument, for I find that the argument of underdetermination alone neither jus-
tifies the relativist programme of SSK nor refutes scientific realism. It is im-
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 For a brief survey, see Hacking 1999: 2-5.
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 For an overview presented from a traditional philosophical point of view, see a re-
cent collection of papers edited by Noretta Koertge (1998); and for an SSK view see,
e.g., Bloor and Edge 2000, Collins 1999.
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portant to note that I shall distinguish between the general underdetermination
thesis (UDT) and the Duhem-Quine thesis (DQT). The latter allows to recon-
cile opponents in the ‘science wars’ debate, the former — not necessarily.52
On the other hand, it is not my main purpose to criticise SSK for the appli-
cation of DQT. SSK has been extensively criticised by other philosophers of
science. I see this particular case of the application of the underdetermination
thesis in SSK as a unique opportunity for analysing the assumptions implicit in
the ‘science-wars’ debates. For example, a more detailed analysis of both the
SSK views and several versions of scientific realism results in the conclusion
that these positions, previously considered as opposites, rather have certain
similarities. As soon as one makes a further distinction between different levels
of relativism, such as relativism in ontology and relativism in epistemology, it
begins to appear that both SSK and most versions of scientific realism reject
ontological relativism and accept epistemic relativism.53 This distinction be-
tween different levels of relativism has received no attention from the ‘science
warriors’.
Also, I am going to indicate another possible source of misunderstanding in
the ‘science wars’. These wars largely rest on an inadequate dichotomy — the
dichotomy of the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’ (i.e., the rational reconstruction vs.
social explanation of scientific beliefs).54 The disjunctive either … or … -
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 André Kukla (1998) has demonstrated that no conclusive argument based on the
radical thesis of underdetermination could be found to end the debates between realism
and anti-realism. The underdetermination thesis as such is an ambiguous one: Michael
Dietrich (1993) has, for instance, asked whether it is a theory or a theory choice that is
underdetermined. Larry Laudan (1990) has pointed out that rational underdetermination
cannot be limited to deductive logic only as is often assumed. Following Laudan,
Dietrich distinguishes between logical and epistemic underdetermination. Another dis-
tinction to be made is the one between the holistic views of Duhem or Quine, and the
generalised underdetermination thesis. According to the latter, there is always an infinite
number of theories equally well supported by evidence. In such a form, as noted above,
the thesis is certainly an anti-realist one. Anti-realism, at the same time, does not neces-
sarily involve social explanation of theory choices. The thesis as construed by SSK
rather assumes a moderate kind of underdetermination. See also sections 3.2 and 3.6.
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 By and large, one may distinguish between radical and moderate versions of relativ-
ism. In radical programmes, e.g., as proposed by Woolgar, one assumes the objects un-
der investigation in the sciences to be created by representations (Woolgar 1983). In
moderate programmes — despite its name, I regard the strong programme as a moderate
one — the following theses have been proposed: 1. beliefs on a topic vary by varying
cultural and social settings; 2. the variation needs to be explained by reference to all
kinds of causes for the adoption of the beliefs, regardless of their truth or falsity
(Barnes & Bloor 1982).
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 When the manuscript of the present chapter was already submitted for publication as
an article in Trames, Helen Longino’s new book “The Fate of Knowledge” was pub-
lished. According to Elisabeth Anderson, the cover commentator for this book, Longino
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structure is unsuitable for reconstructing and interpreting the concepts of the
‘rational’ and the ‘social’ in explanations of theory choice. If this dichotomy
were correct, it would mean, for example, that fully rational inferences lack
entirely the social context, or that, on the contrary, only irrational actions need
to be explained by social circumstances.55 It would also mean that, in (cogni-
tively) rational reconstruction, it is only evidence and logic that matters: re-
spectively, in social explanation, evidence and logic should not be seen as con-
straints. If the latter were true, scientific theories, and even scientific facts
should be treated as purely social stipulations. The idea of a mutually exclusive
opposition between the rational and the social (with the aforementioned conse-
quences) has, for instance, served as an argument for Sokal in his attacks
against ‘the postmodernist critics of science’.56. These consequences have also
led many other critics to regard SSK as an idealist programme, if not an anar-
chist one.
On the other hand, the dichotomy of rationality vs. sociality appears within
the SSK theoretical framework as well. The central idea in some of the early
manifestations of the strong programme (Barnes 1974, 1977) and other British
SSK programmatic works seemed to be the abandonment of any rational ac-
count of scientific beliefs in favour of descriptions of the social circumstances
of their emergence (Collins 1981c, Woolgar 1983). As critics immediately
pointed out, such a social account of scientific knowledge, if taken literally,
would be self-refuting.57
Although the dichotomy of rationality and sociality may certainly emerge in
many different contexts, the case of the application of DQT in the realism-vs.-
relativism debate is a most illuminating one. When the thesis was first applied
in SSK, the structure of the argument was as follows:
1. If DQT is valid, theory choices are rationally underdetermined by data.
2. If rational criteria are not available, theory choices have to be based on other
criteria, such as social circumstances for the acceptance of beliefs.
3. Thus, if DQT, then exclusively social explanation of knowledge.
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tional and the social. For similar attempts see also Kusch 2000 and Lõhkivi 2001.
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 The latter has been a view of mainstream philosophy of science for a long time, see
Lakatos 1971, Laudan 1977, Niiniluoto 1999. Also, in early (Mertonian) sociology of
science the organisational structure of scientific research was regarded as responsible
only for mistakes, whereas true representations were seen as true and rational on the
basis of correspondence to reality (for a survey see Woolgar 1988).
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 This is the tag he attached to the modern sociology of scientific knowledge. (Sokal
1996)
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 Self-refutation would be due to the fact that sociological research programmes are
also located in a social context, and the validity of the aforementioned dichotomy would
imply the non-rationality of these programmes.
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In case of missing rational criteria for theory choice, it would be natural to look
for other criteria, such as social circumstances. In this way the dichotomy of
rational vs. social emerges within the SSK framework. To put it differently,
social explanation will be justified only in case of missing rational criteria. The
latter thesis is widely known as the arationality assumption.58 This is exactly
the opposite of the thrust of the original SSK attempts. Thus, if the DQT is
given in the form in which it has often been applied by the relativist sociology
of scientific knowledge, it turns out to be rather an argument against SSK.
On the other hand, as will be shown by the analysis of the views of Duhem
and Quine who do not endorse the radical underdetermination, modest under-
determination of theories by data and a version of holistic interpretation of sci-
entific knowledge could be fully acceptable both for realist and relativist par-
ties.
What seems to be the key issue here is the interpretation of the underdeter-
mination thesis. In section 2, I will examine the particular context of the SSK
application of the underdetermination thesis. As a result of this, I shall pose
some questions for further analysis:
1. What were the exact claims made by Duhem and Quine? How adequately
have they been interpreted in the realism-relativism debate? (Section 3);
2. Is it possible to reconcile relativism inherent in SSK and scientific realism
on the basis of holism acceptable for both of them? (Section 4);
3. Can theories be socially underdetermined? (Section 5);
4. On which conditions can the DQT still be applied within the framework of
SSK without contradictions? What could be the benefit of this? (Section 6).
3.2. The SSK interpretation
of the underdetermination thesis
Traditionally, the underdetermination thesis generally, and the DQT in par-
ticular, has been discussed in the context of meaning holism, theory-ladenness
of scientific observation, and other related issues of philosophy of science and
philosophical logic. With the rise of a new theoretical discourse, the SSK, this
familiar thesis has been planted into new surroundings. For several SSK
authors, the acceptance of the thesis serves as a criterion for opposition be-
tween (philosophical) scientific realism and (sociological) relativism. Those
who adopt the idea that scientific theories are underdetermined by empirical
facts have been supposed to be relativists and anti-realists. According to the
SSK authors, for example, a philosophical position like scientific realism
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 The concept was introduced by Laudan (1977) in his comments on Mannheim’s so-
ciology of knowledge.
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should oppose, if not exclude, the underdetermination of theories by facts as
well as meaning holism altogether. Furthermore, it is obvious that on such con-
strual the DQT is taken to be a strong argument in favour of relativist sociology
of scientific knowledge and against realist philosophy of science.59
This means that within the context of SSK the opposition between philo-
sophical positions has been conceived somewhat differently than in the main-
stream philosophy of science. Realism vs. relativism is hardly among the most
discussed issues for the mainstream. Rather, realism is seen in opposition to
anti-realism, instrumentalism, empiricism, etc. Relativism, in its turn, is con-
trasted with objectivism, universalism or absolutism. However, in this specific
context of SSK argumentation we are considering, the dichotomy has been con-
structed as one of realism and relativism. Therefore, this particular dichotomi-
zation justifies a more detailed analysis of the supposed opposites in the light of
the underdetermination thesis.
Barry Barnes, an SSK author, and one of the founders of the strong pro-
gramme, has given his interpretation of the DQT as follows:
Almost everyone who accepts the Duhem-Quine hypothesis will recognize
that any theory can be maintained compatible with any findings by appropri-
ate strategies of applications and interpretation, and that the strategies in-
volved are just those which maintain our actual accepted theories as our ac-
cepted theories. … I have never doubted the correctness of the Duhem-Quine
hypothesis. This is why I am not realist, but an instrumentalist and a relativ-
ist. Since alternative systems of real universals can always be kept operative,
and since the operation of all of them involves artifice, there is no way of
knowing that the world is constituted of any set of real universals in particu-
lar, or even that it is constituted of universals at all. (Barnes 1981: 493)
Duhem stresses in his The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906) that, in
a scientific experiment, one cannot test a single theory, but rather a set of back-
ground theories together with the particular proposition intended to be tested:
The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions used
to predict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be produced,
there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not tell
us. (Duhem 1906/1954: 185)
Quine’ s stand on the experimental testing of theoretical hypotheses as ex-
pressed in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1953) is more radical:
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Barnes 1974, 1977, 1981, 1992, Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996; Collins 1981b, 1983, 1985,
Woolgar 1983.
58
[A] single theoretical hypothesis cannot be conclusively falsified, so any
statement can be held to be true come what may if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system.60
The basic idea is quite simple: in a holistic system, one can always invoke an
auxiliary hypothesis, so that any kind of falsifying evidence becomes elimi-
nated; therefore, it is possible, in principle, to construct an infinite number of
theories conforming to the evidence available.61
Some sociologists of scientific knowledge have construed the underdetermi-
nation thesis as if there were no empirical constraints, or even if they do exist,
they will be so weak that the data can be flexibly interpreted (See Collins
1981a, b, c, & 1985). Thus, for example, Harry M. Collins suggests replacing
empirical data in the explanation of theory choice with explanation by cultural
diversities:
If cultures differ in their perceptions of the world, then their perceptions and
usages cannot be fully explained by reference to what the world is really
like. …We must treat our perceptions of the world … like ‘pictures in the
fire’. If the world must be introduced then it should play no more role than
the fire in which the pictures are seen. (Collins 1985: 16)
This version of SSK seems to claim that philosophy of science has exhausted
its resources in the pursuit of an explanation of scientific knowledge, and only
sociology is capable of showing how particular contingent scientific theories
are determined or underdetermined by certain social or cultural contexts.62 The
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 Quine 1953, p.43. Lars Bergström has proposed a number of different forms of the
Quinean thesis. The way Quine himself has formulated the thesis varies from one con-
text to another. See Bergström 1993, pp. 331–358.
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 Strange as it may seem, in such a form, the DQT might be taken not as an argument
for holism but rather as an argument against it. Formulated like this, the DQT seems to
allow scepticism or nihilism about scientific findings. The purpose Quine had in mind,
however, was very different from, for example, Feyerabend’s anything-goes scheme.
Quine pointed out that it is impossible to prove a single theory on the basis of experi-
mental data, because the experiment or observation is not set out independently of the
theory. For the sake of clarity, another distinction should be made between Quine’s con-
cept of meaning indeterminacy and underdetermination of scientific theories by facts.
Thus, Quinean holism in philosophy of science was, first of all, meant to replace the
logical empiricist schemes of theory choice. At the same time, radical underdetermina-
tion and strong holism might turn out to be self-refuting on the ground of incommen-
surability: since in a consistently holistic framework, the criteria for the choice of the
framework itself will be missing. Neither Duhem nor Quine assumed such a strong ver-
sion of holism.
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 Curiously, it was Carnap, Hempel and Neurath, logical empiricists at that time, who
suggested in the 1930s — long before SSK emerged — that cultural and social criteria
could be applied in the explanation of theory choice. See, e.g., Hempel 1935.
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underdetermination thesis, understood as justifying the sociological approach,
also seems to involve the idea that a decisive role in the process of theory
choice is played by non-epistemic factors. Since, if there were no empirical
constraints to theory choice, and a theory could be made consistent with any
data, no one theory could be rationally proved to be superior to any other, so
that actual choice between them should be explained by reference to social cir-
cumstances. On this ground, the two central tenets of the strong programme of
SSK — the symmetry claim and the requirement of methodological neutrality
or impartiality of explanation — could be seen to follow directly from the
DQT.63 This is to say that as no single theory can be rationally proved to be su-
perior to any other, all theories (accepted or rejected) must be explained sym-
metrically from a methodologically neutral position.
The social explanation was designed to be carried out as a causal explana-
tion of beliefs. This is expressed by the causality tenet of the strong pro-
gramme: the explanation of scientific knowledge must be causal, it must reveal
the causal mechanisms in the acceptance of a theory. Within the SSK tradition,
especially in social constructivism, the causal mechanisms of knowledge pro-
duction are often seen as conclusively social or cultural.
Ingemar Bohlin (1995: 231), in his excellent summary of the SSK interpre-
tation of the DQT, explains the SSK position as follows: in the situation of ex-
perimental hypothesis testing, a scientist always faces a number of possible in-
terpretations of phenomena, a package of hypotheses and background theories.
This means that the choice of a theory depends crucially on decisions in favour
of one or another interpretation64. In these decisions, according to the strong
programme, one finds the interplay of epistemic and non-epistemic factors, so-
cial and other causes. However, the statement made by Barnes about the DQT
(see above) is ambiguous: it can be read either as a radical social constructivist
proposal, involving ontological relativism65, or as expressing moderate con-
structivism, such as the strong programme, which involves only epistemic rela-
tivism. For radical social constructivism, purely social explanation appears to
be an unconditional consequence of the DQT; this does not hold for the strong
programme.66 For the strong programme, the DQT only serves as an argument
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 This is a possibility for the theoretical validation of these principles, although the
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 A thorough account of the role and the process of choice and decision in the sciences
can be found in Knorr Cetina (1981).
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 An example of radical social constructivism is Woolgar’s postmodernist programme
(1983).
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 Also, the concept of the ‘social’ is interpreted ambiguously within the SSK. As it
will be shown in section 6, the ‘social’ can be interpreted either ‘traditionally’ — as the
area for non-rational, non-epistemic criteria, or ‘non-traditionally — the epistemic or
rational standards for theory choices are regarded as a subset of social causes.
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for denying the possibility of crucial experiments. The adherents of the strong
programme claim that any instance of theory justification has to be seen in its
particular context of decision-making where several factors, including those
traditionally called ‘rational’ and ‘social’, play a role. In this sense, no one rep-
resentation should be preferred over its possible alternatives beforehand.
Physicist N. David Mermin (1998) has criticised the SSK application of the
underdetermination thesis, asserting that the problem in the sciences is not that
any body of data is consistent with an infinite number of possible theories;
rather, the problem consists in finding any theory at all properly conforming to
data. In a reply to this, David Bloor, one of the leading advocates of the strong
programme, insists that such claims cannot be taken as criticism, because this is
exactly what the strong programme says: if nothing fits perfectly, the prefer-
ence of one imperfection over another needs an explanation. The disagreement
between Mermin and Bloor is in fact a difference between normative and de-
scriptive approaches. Mermin compares the epistemologically normative (ide-
alised) underdetermination thesis with the actual situation in the sciences and
reaches the conclusion that real science is very different from the idealisations
in epistemology, whereas Bloor’s point of departure is in descriptive theory of
science from the very beginning. For him, the DQT is a thesis claiming simply
that no theory is a perfect map of reality, and neither are its possible alterna-
tives. Thus Bloor gives his argument for the acceptance of the DQT:
There is no metric measure of shortfall, and we do not know in advance what
further difficulties await us. Ultimately we can only rely on our practical
judgement and on our sense of purpose. Given that our individual disposi-
tions are inclined to vary, whatever we find stable and shared solutions to
such problems of co-ordination, we will be dealing with conventions and in-
stitutions. (Bloor 1998: 633)
In addition to the attempts of sociologists to make use of the DQT, Mary B.
Hesse, a philosopher sympathetic with both Quine’s use of the network meta-
phor and his meaning relativism, on the one hand, and epistemic relativism of
the SSK, on the other, has suggested a similar kind of interpretation of the un-
derdetermination thesis. Her account of social explanation of scientific knowl-
edge is valuable for its critical historical perspective as well. Hesse finds that
the main historical change in the sociology of science is that: “social history of
science is increasingly [...] taken to mean study of the social conditioning of the
theoretical belief systems of science — in other words sociology of science has
become a branch of sociology of knowledge”. (Hesse 1980: 29) This is relevant
for the present discussion because some problems in the SSK interpretation of
the DQT stem from its pre-history when sociology of science and sociology of
knowledge were very different disciplines. According to Hesse, the early ver-
sion of sociology of knowledge as initiated by Karl Mannheim suffered from a
latent contradiction between ‘real’ and ‘distorted’ beliefs. If all beliefs are
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somehow distorted, as Mannheim held, and in need of removal of the distor-
tion, how could one get to know what the ‘real’ part of a belief is, and how
could one know that the ‘real’ is attainable at all? Presented in this form,
Mannheim’s theory seems to be self-refuting in its nature. To avoid the contra-
diction, he introduced a distinction which was later baptised the ‘arationality
assumption’ by Larry Laudan (1977). According to Mannheim, only the ‘ara-
tional’ needed sociological explanation, whereas ‘rational’ turned out to be ra-
tional due to its coherence with other rational ideas.67
Accordingly, the turn in the sociology of knowledge promoted by the strong
programme consists in proposing the view that “true belief and rationality are
just as much explananda of the sociology of knowledge as error and non-
rationality, and hence that science and logic are to be included in the total pro-
gramme”. (Hesse 1980: 32) So, the arationality assumption and the asymmetry
in explanation should be superseded by the strong programme’s principle of
symmetry.
In her analysis, Hesse also finds that Quinean holism and the doctrine of
underdetermination support the strong programme:
Quine points out that scientific theories are never logically determined by
data, and that there are consequently always in principle alternative theories
that fit the data more or less adequately. (Hesse 1980: 32)
Therefore, she insists that it is rational to conclude that:
Thus it is only a short step from this philosophy of science to the suggestion
that adoption of such criteria, which can be seen different for different
groups and different periods, should be explicable by social rather than logi-
cal factors. (Hesse 1980: 33)
However, in an article from 1988, she sees no such direct connection between
Quine’s philosophy and social explanation of science. In Socializing Episte-
mology (1988), she emphasises that the individualist nature of Quine’s episte-
mology should be clearly contrasted with the social approach (Hesse 1988: 98).
As for my own view, I suggest that the sociological interpretation and applica-
tion of the DQT in sociology of knowledge gives rise to several serious prob-
lems. First, the idea of purely social determination of knowledge, endorsed by
radical social constructivism, contradicts our common sense intuitions. As
Hesse has argued, the variety of independent objects of reality may well be
large, but it is not infinite, the world cannot be ‘carved into pieces’ arbitrarily.
Relatively autonomous facts cannot be reduced to ‘purely social stipulation’
(See Hesse 1988: 112–113). This is what many SSK theorists would entirely
agree with. In his reply to the critics Bloor, e.g., has admitted that ‘purely social
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stipulation’ would involve idealism, and this is what most critics attack in SSK,
although the strong programme has always explicitly endorsed materialism
(Bloor 1991, 1996; Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996: 14–15). The strong programme
does not pursue ‘purely social explanation’ even though the DQT is adopted
into its theoretical framework. Actually, it could be asked whether there is any
adherent of the SSK who would take the social explanation literally and exclu-
sively (with the exception of Woolgar who obviously does). But even a radical
constructive programme, the empirical programme of research (EPOR) which is
also identified with the position named ‘social realism’, advocates relativism
only in methodology, without any further ontological or epistemological conse-
quences (e.g., Collins 1985/1992)68. Therefore, the meaning of the concept of
the ‘social’, in SSK use, needs further exploration (see section 6).
Second, if it is assumed, in the spirit of early SSK manifestations (Barnes
1974 & 1977), that the ‘social’ should be understood as a reflection of group
interests, it could also be asked whether it is justified to consider a world-wide
consensus regarding some essentially scientific question only as an outcome of
the interests of leading scientists in a research field or discourse. The interests
as well as other social factors may (hypothetically) be radically different for
different members of the community — or, to express it in terms introduced by
Harry Collins, amongst members of a core set (Collins 1985: 142 & 154–155).
To put it in another way, scientists with very different social and professional
interests may still reach a consensus in some professional matter. The interplay
between the interests and the contents of science must be more complicated
than is held by many sociologists of scientific knowledge and by some critics of
SSK.69
The third problem that arises, if the DQT is interpreted in this particular
SSK manner, concerns the existence of empirical constraints to the social ex-
planation itself. Typically, the sociological study of scientific knowledge in-
volves empirical case studies. Does it mean that in the case of sociological
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 A valuable distinction between the literal and the charitable reading of SSK has
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 See Collins 1996, where he argues for the relative independence and value-neutrality
of the sciences as well as science studies. This article makes one think that Collins dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of social relations: the relations within a scientific practice
and wider social, political, etc. interests. He sees the latter to be quite independent from
the former sphere of interests, as he finds it unpredictable in which political discourse a
purely scientific issue may become involved. See also Hans Radder (1992) who is ask-
ing once again the old question of the social sciences: how are the boundaries between
different social interests and respective groups to be defined. Longino (2002) insists, in
her programme of social epistemology, that instead of group interests the interaction
between scientists with very different group identities is essential for understanding the
procedure of knowledge production.
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study theories are not underdetermined by empirical facts? The old troublesome
reflexivity problem emerges again.70
Fourth, on this interpretation, scientific realism which is taken to be a view
radically opposed to sociological relativism is defined as necessarily rejecting
the idea of the underdetermination of theories by data. Hence, scientific realism
is seen as committed to a naive version of metaphysical realism: as if the world
were truly and genuinely structured in ways depicted by current scientific theo-
ries, or structurable so in principle, so that we would be approaching the ulti-
mate truth step by step. Such an account of scientific realism is certainly over-
simplified, if not inadequate.71
Taking these problematic issues into account, I find it reasonable to recon-
sider the application(s) of the DQT once again. In my opinion, the DQT cannot
be seen as an argument in favour of relativism in sociology of scientific knowl-
edge as long as the aforementioned problems remain unresolved. Neither can
the DQT without further specification be used as the criterion of demarcation
for distinguishing between realism and relativism. The following analysis will
focus on four claims, each of them requiring a separate consideration:
1) The Duhem-Quine thesis is an inappropriate argument against scientific re-
alism. Underdetermination of theory by data and scientific realism are en-
tirely different issues. In certain contexts, scientific realism would rather be
an ally to the sociology of scientific knowledge than its enemy;
2) Theories can be socially underdetermined;
3) Even if social determination could be inferred from the thesis of underde-
termination, it would entail a kind of asymmetry that was initially intended
to be excluded by this very same thesis;
4) The Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination cannot serve as a logical or
technical argument for a sociological explanation of knowledge: the deduc-
tive logical underdetermination does not necessarily imply that social de-
termination is the only alternative; to claim the contrary would also mean
that one has to face the dichotomy between the social and the rational.
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 This does not mean that such an account of science does not exist. On the contrary,
both scientists and scientific administrators of science often assume such a nature of
science. No matter how one labels these views — positivist, realist or objectivist — the
central idea remains the same: the better scientist, the more he or she discovers, the more
facts he or she collects, the more reports he or she writes, etc. The facts are just waiting
outside there to be discovered and generalised into true theories about the world. For
this view see, e.g., Chubin & Restivo 1983; Elzinga 1995.
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3.3. Duhem and Quine between realism and relativism
In the previous sections I have claimed that the Duhem-Quine thesis cannot be
used for drawing a clear-cut distinction between realism and relativism. Now it
is pertinent to consider Duhem’s and Quine’s own self-reflections on their rele-
vant views as well as other philosophers’ views on Duhem and Quine. This is
important since the statements and interpretations vary over a broad spectrum.
The general underdetermination thesis (UDT) could be represented in the fol-
lowing way:
1. Any theory may have an infinite number of empirically equivalent rivals.
2. Empirically equivalent hypotheses are equally plausible.
3. Commitment to a theory is, thus, arbitrary. (See Kukla 1998: 58).
In this form, the underdetermination thesis is undoubtedly an anti-realist argu-
ment. Duhem’s and Quine’s versions of the thesis, although differing in certain
respects, are both less radical than the UDT.
In his famous Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine (1953) argued, first of all,
against the analytical — synthetical dichotomy in empiricism. The other essen-
tial dogma, reductionism, appeared to him as having the same consequences as
the first one. From his point of view, the dichotomy conflicted the very idea of
empiricism because in a consistently empiricist programme analytical truths are
unacceptable. I agree with the interpretation of A. J. Ayer, an opponent to
Quine’s views within logical empiricism, who says that it was Quine’s intention
to deny the feasibility of Carnap’s original project of translating every item
of significant discourse into a language which, in addition to its logical appa-
ratus, contains only references to sense-data, but also to take the much more
radical and more questionable step of denying that any statement, taken in
isolation, can be confirmed or discredited by the occurrence of sensory
events that fall within some special range (Ayer 1982: 245).
The radical step in Quine’s approach — the denial of any possible confirmation
of an isolated statement — was inspired by Duhem.72 Namely, the core idea in
Duhem’s conventionalism (as far as one can regard him as a conventionalist:
according to McMullin (1990) he should rather be seen as attempting to find a
middle way between conventionalism and scientific realism) was that no single
proposition can be proven in the light of facts of reality, for the reason that
there are always several background hypotheses mutually interacting in any
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 According to Don Howard, Duhem’s influence on Quine’s holistic views was at the
beginning indirect, exerting itself through Neurath’s ship-metaphor. Only after Carl
Hempel and Philipp Frank had referred to Duhem’s work on the occasion of the publi-
cation of “Two Dogmas…” in 1951, did Quine become acquainted with Duhem’s views
and included a footnote citation in the second (1953) version of the “Two Dogmas…”
(Howard 1990: 376)
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experimental situation. Therefore, nothing like a ‘crucial experiment’ is possi-
ble in principle.73
Since Duhem devoted special attention to the conceptual problems sur-
rounding symbolic abstractions involved in scientific theories, it would be cor-
rect to argue for the existence of conceptual constraints (as a sort of relativism)
on the basis of his conventionalism.74 Duhem insists that:
The symbolic terms connected by a law of physics are, on the other hand, not
the sort of abstractions that emerge spontaneously from concrete reality; they
are abstractions produced by slow, complicated, and conscious work, i.e., the
secular labor which has elaborated physical theories. If we have not done this
work or if we do not know physical theories, we cannot understand the law
or apply it. (Duhem: 167)
Here it should be noted — as Hesse has done — that our contemporary social
constructivism, and Collins’s in particular, “neglects the point of the Duhemian
conception of holism of theory, which is not that all individual replications can
be reinterpreted at will but that some can, while being constrained by others,
and by the coherence of the whole theoretical network” (Hesse 1988: 113).
In fact, Duhem really claims that:
in order to compare his proposition with reality each (physicist) makes dif-
ferent calculations, so that it is possible for one to verify this law which the
other finds contradicted by the same facts. This is plain proof of the follow-
ing truth: A physical law is a symbolic relation whose application to concrete
reality requires that a whole group of laws be known and accepted (Duhem
168).
Obviously, Duhem must have favoured the idea that laws of nature should be
seen as convergent. The convergence of laws is an argument often applied in
realist philosophies of science (see E. McMullin 1990). So it seems that Du-
hem’s holism is close to realism.
Quine’s view, which says that our knowledge or beliefs are a “man-made
fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges” (Quine 1953: 42), is
also acceptable for a naturalistically minded realist (see, e.g., Devitt 1984 and
Wilburn 1992). The idea of a double dependence of science — on language and
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 All this applies to physics and to those other experimental sciences where the theo-
retical apparatus is as important as the material one. According to Duhem, the facts
gathered in fields like physiology and chemistry can be seen as objective and inde-
pendent, whereas in physics they depend on theoretical framework. (Duhem: 182) This
still does not mean that holism is not valid for physiology and other similar sciences.
Because of theoretical assumptions shared with physics-like sciences holism is relevant
even for these sciences.
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 Brenner (1990) finds some similarities between Duhem and the ‘Natural Ontological
Attitude’ of Arthur Fine (1984).
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experience, fits perfectly well into current realist epistemology. Therefore, the
following Quine-inspired claim made by Hesse that “no theory can exactly
capture the ‘facts of matter’, even if it makes sense to speak at all of ‘facts of
the matter’ outside the possibility of description by some theoretical conceptual
framework or other” (Hesse 1980: 33) is in full accordance with a version of
critical or transcendental realism. It would be in accordance with an even
stronger version of realism — the metaphysical realism — which assumes a
causal theory of reference, the central idea of metaphysical realism being that
the meaning of a theoretical statement is governed by social factors such as lin-
guistic stereotypes, social linguistic division of labour, etc. Here, I think it is
important to distinguish between ‘metaphysical realism’ and metaphysical re-
alism. The former label is attached to an anecdotal assumption — sometimes
also classified as positivism, objectivism, simply realism or monism — the ac-
count which posits a ‘ready-made-world’ capable of being viewed by the
‘God’s Eye’. Examples of the latter are the metaphysical realisms of Kripke
and Putnam. The difference between these positions is that the first view can be
characterised as involving an epistemic fallacy (see Bhaskar 1978: 36). It is a
metaphysical position which assumes that human classifications coincide with
the real structure of the world. The second kind of metaphysical realism is a
metaphysical view of natural kinds as rigid designators like proper nouns (e.g.,
Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975). The latter is also endorsed by the strong pro-
gramme. The strong-programme analysts justify their adherence to Kripke’s
metaphysics by reference to the identification of natural kinds on the basis of
spatio-temporal continuity, “a collective may come much closer to successful
achievement of the task” (Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996: 66, see also Bloor 1999).
Thus, it only remains to add that the ‘realism’ of Quine’s ‘relativism’ be-
longs to one of the most frequently studied issues in Anglo-American philoso-
phy. Duhem’s and Quine’s versions of holism can be interpreted both in a real-
ist and relativist spirit, or as middle-way positions committed to neither of these
views.
3.4. The possibility of holistic realism
David Papineau has pointed out that the DQT does not really do any harm to
scientific realism (Papineau 1995). His argument, in general, is similar to the
argument by Hesse referred to in the previous section — that neither Duhem
nor Quine assumed total underdetermination of theories by data. Rather, they
intended to demonstrate that some theory choices are underdetermined by data,
therefore, the decision must be made on the basis of other background assump-
tions, which are certain to include theoretical assumptions, as well as other
relevant experimental data and many other contingent issues. The central idea
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of this kind of holism is that in a scientific experiment, the scientists’ percep-
tion of the objects under investigation is always mediated by background as-
sumptions (Quine 1992), so that the interpretative aspect is involved in the very
stage of facing evidence. There is no independent evidence, or to put it in terms
of empiricism without two dogmas: there is no independent observation lan-
guage75. If one compares this simple and clear idea with various views of those
philosophers who claim to be scientific realists, one will have an answer to the
question whether a holistic variant of realism is possible.76 However, the ques-
tion may be approached from many different perspectives. The relationship
between the observable and unobservable is a central topic in several theoreti-
cal discourses: e.g., debates in the philosophy of mind over the content of
mental states and other issues are, in some respect, pertinent to the present dis-
cussion (see, e.g., the analysis of interpretation in Barnes, Bloor & Henry
(1996)), however, this will not be discussed here. Other relevant topics which I
shall not consider here are: probabilistic inferences and inductivism in general,
the opposition between realism and methodological anti-realism (Laudan, van
Fraassen, and the ‘internal realism’ of Putnam).
My concern here is only certain versions of scientific realism which have
been involved in one way or another, in discussions on sociological relativism.
Some realist philosophers have explicitly claimed that there is no conflict be-
tween realism and knowledge relativism; many others believe tacitly that real-
ism can be complemented by sociological relativism of knowledge; and still a
few others prefer to keep realism and relativism in sharp opposition. Bhaskar,
Papineau and Hesse seem to represent the first of these positions. Rom Harré
could also be seen as an ally with knowledge relativism. Michael Devitt, Ian
Hacking and Ronald N. Giere will here be regarded as representatives of the
second kind of realism. There are surely realist philosophers and views oppos-
ing both holism and knowledge relativism. Since the concept of anti-relativism,
however, is not unequivocal, I will not consider any specific example of this
kind of realism in the present essay. Hypothetically, it should be a variant of
deductive ‘double-barrelled’ realism77 or monism where ontological claims
about the objects in reality are taken to coincide with epistemological ones, i.e.,
the world consists of the objects known already or knowable in principle. Ac-
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 Duhem, however, made an exception here for non-physical sciences.
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 For a scientific realist, such a question may seem redundant or naïve, because in
contemporary scientific realism an account of theories as pictorial representations of
reality could hardly be found. In this dissertation, the issue of holism in realism is only
one landmark on the way to reconciliation of realism and relativism.
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 The term ‘double-barrelled’ realism has been introduced by Barnes (1992). In such
an account, one runs realism in ontology and realism in epistemology together, so that
the world is assumed to have permanent structure represented or capable of being repre-
sented by our concepts. Longino (2002) calls this position monism.
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cording to this view, knowing should be seen as individualistic learning by rea-
soning and experience.
Having this classification in mind, it seems to me that I have taken two steps
at once: I have attempted to show the possibility of reconciling realism and
relativism before having really shown the possibility of holistic realism. There-
fore, let us consider the question of holism and realism first. Only after that can
one draw any conclusions about the possible compatibility of realism and rela-
tivism because — as mentioned above — holism as such involves neither
commitment to realism nor to relativism.
A theory of explicitly holistic realism has been proposed by Hesse in The
Structure of Scientific Inference (1974). She describes scientific theories as
models “in terms of a network of concepts related by laws, in which only prag-
matic and relative distinctions can be made between the ‘observable’ and the
‘theoretical’” (1974: 4).
The networks consist in inter-related inductive inferences, so that the truth
value of a statement may depend on its coherence with the whole theory as well
as on its correspondence to the world:
It is this inductive construal of theoretical systems that has dictated realism,
and realism is represented by the fact that all statements of a theoretical net-
work have truth value and can therefore be assigned probability value as a
measure of our belief (Hesse 1974: 293).
Harré has also endorsed the idea of inductive realism. Actually, he distin-
guishes between three levels or varieties of realism: policy realism, depth real-
ism and convergent realism. The Policy-Realism claim is that
it is reasonable to read scientific theories as if the models upon which they
are based resemble the aspects of the world they represent to some degree
(Harré 1996: 138).
The Depth-Realism claim is that:
models which stand in for unobservable aspects of the world resemble
those aspects in relevant respects and in some degree, provided that the
theories expressing them were empirically adequate, ontologically
plausible and manipulatively efficacious (op. cit.).
And the Convergent-Realism claim is that:
in the progress of science as measured by the improving empirical adequacy,
ontological plausibility and manipulative efficacy of successive theories, the
models for those theories are of greater verisimilitude (op.cit.).
Harré insists that establishing the first two varieties would be necessary for the
possibility of the last one.78 Realism for him is, first of all, a theory of ontologi-
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cal assumptions, or a theory of reference. Through the theoretical models con-
structed it will be possible to test the resemblance between the type-hierarchies
and natural kinds (see Aronson, Harré & Way 1994). It is important to note that
resemblance is assumed between certain structures — the type-hierarchies and
the natural kinds. Nowhere in this theory can one find any attempt of one-to-
one pictorial representation: it is structures, models and networks that are as-
sumed and compared. It is a holistic model.
Similarly, Giere takes the central issue in his descriptive theory of natural
science to be model(ling). His models are primarily constructions: “Scientists
construct theoretical models that they intend to be at least partial representa-
tions of the systems in the real world” (Giere 1988: 92). Models are like maps,
internally coherent systems, resembling the territory mapped in certain respects
and degrees. He defends a position called perspectival realism which claims the
substitution of:
the standard framework of objectivist reference and truth as a basis for de-
veloping an interpretation of the practice of modern science. Rather than
thinking of science as producing sets of statements that are true or false […],
we should think of it as a practice that produces models of the world that may
fit the world more or less well in something like the way maps fit the world
more or less well. In such a framework, it is sufficient that empirical evi-
dence can sometimes help us decide that one type of model fits better than
another type in some important respects. (Giere 1999: 240–41)
Hacking focuses on laboratory science, describing it as a system-like structure
with three groups of elements: ideas, things and marks. According to Hacking,
Duhem’s holism concerned only the sphere of ideas, it was too intellectual.
Therefore, theories were seen as unstable or indeterminate:
Stable laboratory science arises when theories and laboratory equipment
evolve in such a way that they match each other and are mutually self-
vindicating. Such symbiosis is a contingent fact about people, our scientific
organizations, and nature (Hacking 1992: 56).
Hacking’s argument is directed against underdetermination. But his criticism
towards Duhem’s holism can also be read as an accusation in setting limits to
holism. The above-depicted structure certainly enables a wider holistic inter-
pretation. Science is concerned with laboratory reality as a whole, therefore,
Hacking emphasises that the reference to nature in the above-quoted passage
should not be understood as if nature actively contributed to the success of sci-
ence, or as if nature could be used in the explanation of the success. The con-
cept of nature here is restricted to the empirical nature faced in laboratories. His
entity realism is known by the slogan: ‘If you can spray them, then they are
real’ (Hacking 1983: 22). But the ‘reality’ of entities is not seen as everlasting:
‘we may live today in an environment in which all our apparatus ceases to work
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tomorrow.’ (op. cit.) Theories come and go, the laboratory practice changes,
new entities come into existence, however, according to Hacking, it “has noth-
ing to do with ‘meaning change’ and other semantic notions that have been as-
sociated with incommensurability” (1992: 57). This is so because theories
should not be seen as simple conjectures about ‘the world’, rather “[w]e invent
devices that produce data and isolate or create phenomena, and a network of
different levels of theory is true to these phenomena” (Hacking 1992: 57 - 58).
Hacking’s version of entity realism seems to be holistic only conditionally, as
long as incommensurability is excluded. That is a modest variant of holism.
From a sociologist’s point of view, Hacking’s entity realism has a clear advan-
tage over the DQT with regard to compatibility with knowledge relativism: here
one is not required to introduce any special conditions for avoiding the dichot-
omy of the rational and the social. The ‘rational’ and the ‘social’ are not seen as
standing in opposition to each other.
There could still be a problem because, quite in line with the ‘double-
barrelled realism’, Hacking claims that: “I run knowledge and reality together
because the whole issue would be idle if we did not now have some entities that
some of us think really do exist.” (1983: 28) Nevertheless, not every claim of
knowledge immediately assumes double-barrelled realism. Michael Devitt who
defines his version of realism as an ontological one, finds that even such a re-
alism must be partly epistemic, because knowledge is assumed also in the thesis
“the world must be independent of our knowledge of it. So at least that much
epistemology must be settled to settle realism.” (Devitt 1984: 4) When talking
about the ontological assumptions and the metaphysical theory of reference,
what is meant is the question “what would the world be like if our knowledge of
it were true?” For this reason, it is easy to confuse a metaphysical theory of ref-
erence — ‘residual’ realism in Barnes’s terms — with ‘double-barrelled real-
ism’. In my opinion, since the use of the concept of knowledge in scientific re-
alism varies from one author to another, the only suitable criterion for the dis-
tinction must be a pragmatic one: we need to analyse what is actually being
done or what is actually being claimed in a theory or a programme.79
The distinction between the ‘residual’ and ‘double-barrelled’ realism is also
related to the issue of meaning finitism: knowledge relativism claims that “the
established meaning of a word does not determine its future applications. …
Meaning is created by acts of use.” (Bloor 1983: 25) Does this mean appealing
to the radical underdetermination again: because of the lack of empirical con-
straints, knowledge claims should be explained only by social ones? Not neces-
sarily. First, as both Duhem and Quine asserted, empirical underdetermination
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 Therefore, I do not agree with the view of Barnes (1992: 144) on Bhaskar whom he
regards as a representative of double-barrelled realism. Although Bhaskar has used the
term ‘metaphysical’ for classifying his realism, it is in accordance with Barnes’s residual
rather than double-barrelled realism.
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is valid only in some respect, in some specific part of a holistic system. And
second, finitism as such does not exclude empirical constraints, it only insists
that “we are to think of meaning extended as far as, but no further than, the fi-
nite range of circumstances in which a word is used” (Bloor 1983: 25)80. There-
fore, one could even claim that empirical constraints involve social constraints,
and vice versa. On this question Hacking and Bloor would agree: compare, for
example, the aforementioned argument of Hacking with the following passage
from a recent article by Bloor:
All knowledge always depends on society. This is because, as I have argued
and as case-studies demonstrate, society is the necessary vehicle for sustain-
ing a coherent cognitive relation to the world, especially a relation of the
kind we take for granted in our science (Bloor 1999: 110).
For a strong programme relativist, there are no pure independent facts, no pure
data, no meanings based on inherent properties, — no more than there are any
pure social stipulations in the sciences.
Both the transcendental form of realism, such as Bhaskar’s or Niiniluoto’s
critical realism, and the version of empirical/inductive realism such as entity
realism or Hesse’s probabilistic realism, involve interpretation as a function in
concept formation, and they both allow a wide range of interpretations of
physical reality. One can say that such realism and the relativist SSK treat
meaning in a similar, Wittgensteinian manner — as use.
Barnes (1992) finds that as soon as a realist comes to mention truth condi-
tions, s/he must adhere to ‘double-barrelled’ realism. This I find to be a rash
conclusion. Even if, in the realist approach, the meaning of a concept contains
its truth conditions, i.e., if part of its meaning could be seen as reference, this is
no loss for knowledge relativism yet. Reference could be understood as a hy-
pothesis about the kinds of things there are in the world. Since we do not have
direct access to the world, independently of our minds, we can only rely upon
evidence which, indirectly, provides us with a positive or negative proof of the
hypothesis. Therefore, the meaning of a concept remains interpretational and
theoretical even in scientific realism, and it cannot be identified either with evi-
dence (data, appearances) or with some ‘inherent properties’. Meaning and ref-
erence both remain contingent and local issues in this approach.
Modest meaning holism has some other advantages in addition to those con-
sidered in this essay in connection with the realism–relativism debate81, for in-
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 See Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996, and particularly Bloor 1999 for the importance of
empirical constraints in explanation of scientific beliefs. See also Elzinga 1992, pp.60 -
61.
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 There have been various attempts of reconciliation of realism and relativism which
are not considered in the present chapter, e.g., the ‘two-tier-thinking’ of Elkana (1978)
and the ‘double-reality of the sciences’ (Elzinga 1993). The account involving the dis-
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stance, it enables one to reach a better understanding of mistakes. According to
this model, mistakes can be analysed as entirely natural and rational products of
cognitive activity. This is to say that modest meaning holism involves fallibilist
epistemology (see Papineau 1987).
3.5. Social underdetermination
Even those who admit the importance of social circumstances in the explana-
tion of scientific knowledge, have to note that social underdetermination is as
plausible as epistemic or logical underdetermination of theory choice. Perhaps
it has been another misinterpretation of the underdetermination thesis that, in
case of lacking empirical constraints, social constraints indispensably should be
invoked. First of all, neither UDT nor DQT deny the existence of empirical
constraints. Rather, the problem is — as pointed out by Longino (2002: 63) —
that sometimes the constraints are insufficient for imposing a decision in one or
another direction. Even if social factors could be seen as playing a role in the-
ory choice, this does not necessarily mean that the list of possible restrictions is
limited to two mutually exclusive kinds of constraints.
Michael Dietrich (1993) finds it to be a common misinterpretation of DQT
that the underdetermination of theories and the underdetermination of choices
between theories are conflated with each other. If one focuses on the underde-
termination of choices, one will find that underdetermination is a relation based
on the principles of choice (Dietrich 1993: 114). Thus, when the choice is taken
to be logically underdetermined, and there are several theories mutually in con-
tradiction but equally well supported by evidence, the decision could be made
on the basis of some other principles.
According to Dietrich, however, more often the underdetermination is not
seen as a logical relation, but rather as an epistemic one: some of the several
epistemic criteria are underdetermined whereas others are not. The epistemic
criteria, according to Laudan, include logical compatibility, explanation of evi-
dence and empirical support by evidence. Respectively, three kinds of rules or
principles for theory choice are implied.82
But the choice could also be made on the basis of the criterion of the lowest
experimental costs. Dietrich points to the multiplicity of methodological rules
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 The number of criteria for an adequate theory varies from one philosopher of science
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simplicity, and fruitfulness.
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for theory choice — the rules or standards applied may be epistemic, pragmatic,
and social. And all of them involve respective kinds of underdetermination.
Dietrich notes that the Duhem- Quine thesis has had a special place in the
sociology of science: it has allowed to break down the internal — external divi-
sion. Still, he agrees with Laudan that the sociologists are over-optimistic when
they regard the DQT as problem-free.
For example, the SSK authors seem not to have paid any attention to the
possibility of variation in the strength of holistic claims constructed on the basis
of the DQT. The strong version of holism involves the whole range of problems
connected with incommensurability83 whereas modest holism does not. Neither
have the adherents of the SSK considered the possibility of social underdeter-
mination.84
Longino refers to a related difficulty of choice between different value sys-
tems independently of the theories involved (Longino 1990: 182). Such holism
contains a vicious circle because facts, theories and (social) values are all mu-
tually related:
Thus, there would be no independent way of choosing between a theory that
claims that some relationship is natural and one denying this, or between a
theory prohibiting interference in natural relationships and one permitting it
(Longino 1990: 182).
This may be interpreted as underdetermination as well. As it also follows from
Dietrich, underdetermination should be seen as a complicated scheme where
pragmatic, social and epistemic factors interplay. His conclusion is that theory
choice and underdetermination should be regarded as contingent problems. It is
always important to ask what exactly is underdetermined and to which degree.
In what way is something underdetermined or determined?
The moral for the sociology of scientific knowledge seems to be that since
theory choice can be socially underdetermined under certain conditions, it is
unreasonable, for a sociologist, to hold on to the strong underdetermination the-
sis. A modest version, on the other hand, allows a sociologist to pursue a de-
tailed analysis of all the criteria operating in theory choice.
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 Indirectly, this possibility is involved in the strong programme’s principle of causal
explanation which includes explanation of all causes of beliefs and the reflexivity prin-
ciple. These principles taken together should lead to the possibility of social underde-
termination.
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3.6. DQT and its consequences for the SSK relativism:
the dichotomy of social vs. rational
3.6.1. The arationality assumption revisited:
a pragmatic argument
In his commentary on a critical article against the strong programme and social
constructivism (Roth & Barrett 1990), Steve Fuller (1990) has been concerned
mainly with the arationality assumption. For Roth and Barrett, the target of
criticism was the application of the DQT by sociologists. Fuller agrees with
them that in the sociologists’ use of the Duhem-Quine thesis, the arationality
assumption often appears in its latent form. However, the end result of Roth’s
and Barrett’s criticism is the reappearance of the dichotomy between rationality
and sociality. Their taken-for-granted trust in DQT is presented in such a way
that it could easily be turned against the whole sociological enterprise. They
regard radical underdetermination as a dominant thesis in the SSK tradition.
Fuller disagrees with Roth and Barrett in this oversimplified account of SSK
views and critically reformulates their argument to indicate that it would lead to
the absurd conclusion that:
if a foolproof method for theory choice were possible, then there would be no
need for a sociology of scientific knowledge (Fuller: 665).
The arationality assumption, according to which social explanation is required
only for the arational, contradicts the principle of symmetry. The latter is a
central theoretical thesis in the strong programme, and in the SSK in general.
Thus, if a social explanation of theory choice is invoked only in case there is no
rational explanation available, i.e., when rational criteria are not met, it would
immediately imply asymmetry and a hierarchical structure of explanation. A
proper, symmetric account explains both, the ‘rational’ and ‘arational’, by
similar kinds of causes.85
Fuller, following the line of reasoning presented by Roth and Barrett, as-
sumed in his argument that the appeal to DQT in SSK must be unconditional —
as seemed to be the case in some specific SSK declarations of the 1980s — so
that it would necessarily involve the validity of the implication ‘if DQT, then
social determination of knowledge’, and even the other way round. If this im-
plication were valid, it would certainly revive the logical positivist dichotomy
of the rational and the social. Thus, Fuller is led to the conclusion that sociol-
ogy would indispensably fall into the trap of logical positivism as soon as the
DQT is adopted. This means that the SSK would return to historical division of
labour between philosophy and sociology, where the task of philosophy was to
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give normative explanations and the task of sociology was to explain anoma-
lies. For this reason, Fuller finds that it is not strategically reasonable for rela-
tivist sociology to rely upon the DQT. Furthermore, in Fuller’s opinion, Quine
must be seen as a philosopher within the internalist tradition whose views are
quite similar to those of Laudan, a major critic of the SSK account of science.
Laudan’s criticism against DQT does nothing more than probe a few minor dif-
ferences in his and Quine’s views. Fuller’s recommendation to the SSK is a
pragmatic one: it is unreasonable to rely upon arguments deriving from a hos-
tile tradition.
One may well agree that Duhem and Quine obviously are related to the in-
ternalist tradition86, because Quine’s naturalised epistemology was by and large
an individualist theory, and so was Duhem’s instrumentalism. At the same time,
due to holism their epistemologies should be considered apart from general
foundationalist tendencies in the internalist tradition. Anti-foundationalism is a
feature of DQT that could be shared with the epistemology of the sociology of
scientific knowledge. Still, anti-foundationalism alone is insufficient for ac-
cepting SSK relativism. The range of all anti-foundationalist epistemologies is
rather wide.
The thesis of underdetermination of theories by facts has been over-
exploited in philosophy, and the same applies to sociology of scientific knowl-
edge. Some sociologists, viz. radical social constructivists, have reinterpreted
the DQT as if claiming a total lack of empirical constraints. Such an interpreta-
tion necessarily involves the above-mentioned difficulties for sociology of
knowledge, plus the fact that neither Duhem nor Quine would have accepted
such an interpretation. Criticism based on the arationality assumption, like the
one presented by Roth and Barrett, leaves intact the modest SSK relativism of
the strong programme. And modestly holistic claims seem to endure the SSK
account of scientific knowledge. The latter issue will be considered in the fol-
lowing section.
3.6.2. Laudan vs. strong programme and Hesse
In this section, I shall first analyse a major criticism directed against both the
DQT and the application of the thesis in sociology of scientific knowledge. In a
number of critical articles, Larry Laudan has chosen either a strategy of refuting
the whole thesis as long as it can be seen as an argument for holism in episte-
mology, or a strategy of refuting its possible consequences. Many other similar
attempts have been made (see, e.g., Richard Boyd 1973, Lars Bergström 1993
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and F. Weinert 1995). For the analysis of the current debate between realism
and relativism such a radical approach is not really necessary. In a more tradi-
tional bipolar case, where one assumes realism to stand in unambiguous oppo-
sition to relativism, so that the latter would necessarily be in accordance with
the underdetermination thesis, it would be indispensable for a realist to argue
against underdetermination. As shown in previous sections, the DQT is less
radical than the general underdetermination thesis; neither is the opposition
between SSK relativism and scientific realism identical with the opposition
between realism and antirealism. Therefore, it is not necessary either to refute
or prove the DQT. For my analytical purposes, it is sufficient just to examine
why it is incorrect to deduce social determination of knowledge from the DQT,
what consequences such an inference might involve, and what would be the
solution to the problem. As claimed above, direct inference of social explana-
tion from the DQT would commit us to the misleading dichotomy of rational vs.
social. The dichotomy is misleading because, as indicated, it involves the ara-
tionality assumption which appears to be implausible. However, this argument
is not a compelling one. For the ‘science warriors’, the arationality assumption
and the dichotomy of rationality vs. sociality can be sustained, and the war
continued. A reconciling alternative may be found in social epistemology which
offers a third-way solution without the notorious dichotomy.87 To my mind, the
strong programme variant of relativism and the views of Mary Hesse belong to
the third way rather than to radical social constructivism.88 Therefore, I am go-
ing to consider Laudan’s criticism on Hesse and the strong programme and
suggest a response.
In his article Demystifying Underdetermination (1990), Laudan demon-
strates that deductive underdetermination is not necessarily valid for the whole
area of possibly rational inferences89. Even if certain rules or standards strongly
underdetermine theory choice, the choice may still be a rational judgement
based on other rational criteria. Laudan concludes: “what is wrong with QUD
[Quine’s underdetermination] is that it has dropped out any reference to the
rationality of theory choices, and specifically theory rejections” (Laudan 1990:
276). Accordingly, Laudan reformulates Quine’s thesis to show that no reason-
able argument for such a thesis can be given:
QUD2: any theory can be rationally retained in the face of any recalcitrant
evidence (Laudan 1990: 277).
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 See Longino’s recent study in social epistemology (Longino 2002).
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 Those who endorse the dichotomy, tend to interpret the ‘social’ either as wishful,
ideologically biased or interest-laden thinking. In the third-way approach, the ‘social’ is
regarded as a concept applying to shared standards for the ‘rational’ as well as the pat-
terns of human interactions in knowledge production.
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 Laudan 1990, pp. 267–297. See also Laudan & Leplin 1991, pp. 449–472, and Lau-
dan 1981, and 1982.
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He finds this to be equal to the following assertion:
to say that a theory can be rationally retained is to say that reasons can be
given for holding that theory, or the system of which it is a part, is true (or
empirically adequate) that are (preferably stronger than but) at least as strong
as the reasons that can be given for holding as true (or empirically adequate)
any of its known rivals (Laudan 1990: 277).
Via several complicated reformulations of the DQT, Laudan actually tries to
show that in no form can the underdetermination thesis entirely exclude rational
criteria for theory choice. He stresses the fact that rational criteria do not end
with deductive logic. Thus, for instance, Laudan restates the thesis in a form
that looks quite Popperian: “any theory can be shown to be as well supported
by any evidence as any of its known rivals” (Laudan 1990: 277).
Laudan refers to Popper because the latter has shown that theories with the
same positive instances e may be differently supported by the same evidence e.
For example, the verisimilitude of the competing theories may vary, or the prin-
cipal falsifiability may be different. Both these are purely rational or epistemic
criteria for theory choice. And there are other rational criteria such as rational
assertability or warrantability, reliability, plausibility, simplicity, problem
solving ability, predictive power etc.
Thus, Laudan succeeds in showing that the Quinean deductive underdeter-
mination does not extend over every possible epistemic criterion for theory
choice. Even if deductive logic is abandoned, there remain certain possibilities
for rational or epistemic determination.
On the other hand, since my brief analysis of Duhem’s and Quine’s views
resulted in the conclusion that neither Duhem nor Quine advocated total under-
determination, one may suppose that they might even have agreed with Laudan.
Laudan’s criticism is more adequate if directed against the general thesis of
underdetermination. It is the UDT rather than the DQT that can be seen to in-
volve irrational holism or radical perspectivism in epistemology. Laudan’s
main purpose is to defend epistemology from such holism. For him, the sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge in particular is an illustrative case of irrationality.
Therefore, he has chosen to attack the aforementioned argument by Mary Hesse
(1980). In his criticism, he focused on an alleged mistake Hesse and the strong
programme sociologists have made: “[It] is that of supposing that any of the
normative forms of underdetermination […] entails anything whatever about
what causes scientists to adopt the theories or the ampliative rules that they do”
(Laudan 1990: 288).
This criticism will be fair if the dichotomy of rational vs. social is taken for
granted. This means that, according to Laudan, there are two strictly separated
areas: the domain of normative, rational inferences and the domain of contin-
gent causes of scientists’ beliefs. This reminds one of Reichenbach’s distinction
between the ‘context of justification’ (normative, rational inferences) and the
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‘context of discovery’ (subjective causes of beliefs). Within such a framework,
the DQT of underdetermination certainly belongs to the first area and the social
issues to the second. Laudan comes to recapitulate the same idea in a number of
different ways, opposing ‘good reasons’ and ‘causal production of belief’:
The Duhem-Quine thesis is, in all of its many versions, a thesis about the
logical relations between certain statements; it is not about, nor does it di-
rectly entail anything about, the causal interconnections going on in the
heads of scientists who believe those statements [...] Whether theories are
deductively determined by the data, or radically underdetermined by that
data; in neither case does anything follow concerning the contingent proc-
esses whereby scientists are caused to utilize extralogical criteria for theory
evaluation [...] The point is that normative matters of logic and methodology
need to be sharply distinguished from empirical questions about the causes of
scientific belief. (Laudan 1990: 289)
Now that he has made a clear-cut distinction between the ‘rational’ and the ‘so-
cial’, he makes a sudden turn and ascribes this newly constructed dichotomy
(rational vs. social) to Hesse and sociology of scientific knowledge, and starts
to refute it as an incorrect one. Thus Laudan reads Hesse’s argument as presup-
posing that: “everything is either deductive logic or sociology” (Laudan 1990:
288). After that, he attempts to show that, for Hesse, the concept of the ‘ra-
tional’ is limited to deductive logic only. On the other hand, he points out —
contrary to his own stand — that the laws of logic are formulated in a language
made by humans (as social beings), and should therefore be considered as ‘so-
cial’. He finds that Hesse has, in fact, neglected the social aspect of the laws of
logic.
It is obvious that Laudan has misinterpreted Hesse’s argument. I shall first
consider the criticism concerning the minor issue of the laws of logic. What
Hesse actually opposes is the traditional, individualistic, exclusively rational
explanation of scientific knowledge that she calls ‘the logic of science’ (Hesse
1980: 33). Instead, she suggests a network-image of scientific knowledge where
the laws of logic cannot be seen as essentially different from the laws of sci-
ence. Therefore, Hesse certainly regards the laws as having a social aspect.
As to the main point, which concerns the criticism on the limited scope of
rational criteria, one should note that, in Hesse’s use, ‘rationality’ is surely not
restricted to deductive logic only. In the same section where Hesse gives her
reasons why there “is only a short step from (Quinean) philosophy of science to
the suggestion that adoption of such criteria, which can be seen to be different
for different groups and different periods, should be explicable by social rather
than logical factors” (op. cit.), she explicitly enumerates the criteria (varying
from one paradigm to another) of ‘what counts as a good theory: criteria of
simplicity and good approximation’ (op. cit.), etc. Therefore, I think, Hesse
cannot be accused of reducing rationality to deduction, even if rationality is
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being considered purely in terms of rationalist philosophy. Moreover, in the
very same paragraph, she claims that both these criteria and “what it is to be an
‘explanation’ or a ‘cause’ or a ‘good inference’, and even what is the practical
goal of scientific theorising” must be made intelligible by extra-scientific cau-
sation. This idea has not received any attention from Laudan.
Hesse certainly does not argue against the ‘rational’, and her ambition is not
to abandon epistemology. On the contrary, she has argued that epistemology
cannot be excluded from an account of science as a social institution, because
such an attempt of exclusion would, sooner or later, result in the conclusion
that: “An epistemology is needed to discover an epistemology.” (Hesse 1988:
107)
The main difference between Hesse’s and Laudan’s approaches is that
Hesse does not dichotomise the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’. For Hesse, the ‘ra-
tional’ is social/historical. For instance, she insists that: “Nothing is lost epis-
temologically if theories are taken relative to social context” (Hesse 1980:
xxiv).90 David Bloor has also presented arguments for the view that “epistemic
factors are really social factors”. (Bloor: 1984: 297)
Laudan’s ambition has been to prove that the inference of social explanation
from deductive underdetermination is incorrect, since there are other epistemic
criteria available for theory choice, ignored by Hesse and the strong pro-
gramme.91
Even if seen from the third-way perspective, the implication ‘DQT → social
determination’ is a false one — basically because it involves a sort of category
mistake. 92 With this implication, one also assumes that the ‘social’ must be
seen as a sort of negation of the ‘rational’: the ‘social’ may be understood only
in the same terms as the ‘rational’ — as its negation, as non-rational (irrational,
arational). Following this logic, many critics of SSK tend to emphasise the ir-
rationality of the sociological account of scientific knowledge. The critics take
it for granted that, when social factors are seen to be operating, no room is left
for the rational factors, and vice versa. This opposition is essential in the ‘sci-
ence wars’.
A third-way solution would be to consider the context of justification to-
gether with the context of discovery, and to inquire why particular rational
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 In a recent study, Martin Kusch has argued for a similar position he calls ‘sociolo-
gism’. This is a view that “all ‘rational entities’ (arguments, theories, reasons) are ‘social
entities.” (Kush: 2000: ix)
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 As shown by Dietrich’s argument referred to in section 5, it is the variation of epis-
temic criteria, and accordingly, the epistemic underdetermination rather than the logical
one that makes sociological explanation more plausible.
92
 For a historical analogy of category mistake, see The Concept of Mind by Gilbert
Ryle (1949) which criticised the Cartesian understanding of mind via the negation of the
concept of body.
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standards are taken to be valid in particular social contexts. This means,
roughly, that the rational is social in its nature. Then the disjunctive structure
disappears: the ‘rational’ and the ‘social’ are not seen as concepts of the same
logical category any longer.
Still, the inadequacy of the above implication does not mean that the DQT
and holism should be opposed by sociology of scientific knowledge. The ac-
ceptance of the DQT and adherence to holism in SSK seem rather to be empiri-
cal or contingent matters. Hesse has offered the following argument for ac-
cepting both:
[I]t is generally accepted that in a complex scientific situation theories will be
underdetermined by logic and evidence and hence not explicable by purely
scientific reasons in that sense. But the claim becomes substantial if we take
it in the sense that internal reasons drawn from logic, evidence, normal in-
ductive reasoning, and the local scientific tradition (“background knowl-
edge”) are not sufficient, and moreover that the remaining explanatory gap
cannot be filled by reference to individual psychology (“great man” theories
of explanation), and should not be filled by appeal to simple historical acci-
dent (Hesse 1988: 104).
Thus, she finds that a kind of contextualist approach is needed where both the
empirical-theoretical/rational and the social issues are taken on board. Among
realist philosophers, Rom Harré has also explicitly stated that the rational is
social. (Harré 1983). Harré as well as Bhaskar assume epistemic relativism
within the framework of scientific realism. As they see it, epistemic relativism
enables them to take into account culturally and historically varying standards
of rationality.
There still remains a central question to be answered: are the strong pro-
gramme and other SSK theories justified in their reliance upon the Duhem-
Quine thesis, or are they not?
Many SSK theorists are aware of the possible consequences of the dichot-
omy of rational vs. social (see Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996: 28). Hesse has also
noted that “Quinean epistemology is essentially individualist” (1988: 98), i.e., it
is not a collectivist social theory of knowledge93. Karin Knorr Cetina and Mi-
chael Mulkay (1983), two leading social constructivists, concede that some of
Laudan’s conclusions are correct, e.g., that social explanation cannot simply be
logically inferred from the underdetermination of theories by data. However,
they see the DQT to support social explanation of scientific knowledge any-
way:
if the thesis that scientific theories are logically underdetermined by evidence
is correct, it removes an important constraint on theory acceptance which
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 Social theories may also be individualist in their nature, e.g., those interpreting the
‘social’ via mutual intentions of the individuals (see Searle 1995).
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opens the way for social science investigation (Knorr Cetina & Mulkay 1983:
3).
Thus they redefine the function of the DQT:
while the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination does not prove that so-
cial factors structure scientists’ theory choices, it does make it more likely
that some kinds of non-logical factors play a role (op. cit., p. 4).
With this conclusion they do not really solve the problem: at best, it is a com-
monsensical solution inspired by some specific interests of empirical research.
Still, their argument is valuable, because it hints at an essential issue empha-
sised by Laudan. The point is that the DQT itself is not enough for deducing
sociological relativism. As mentioned in the introduction, there are many dif-
ferent forms of the thesis, each of them claiming to yield different conse-
quences. In one form, the thesis can be used in line with a positivist tradition of
argumentation; in another form, the thesis can be applied by Popperians; in still
another form, by rationalists like Laudan, etc. The thesis itself does not involve
commitment to any specific position. Thus, the Duhem-Quine thesis could be
used as an argument in the SSK only under certain conditions:
1. The dichotomy of the rational and the social is not assumed;
2. The social determination of theory choice is not directly deduced from the
thesis;
3. The thesis as such, without further specifications, will not be used for the
explanation of one’s commitment to SSK (or any other view).
3.7. Conclusion
The starting point for this chapter was the Duhem-Quine thesis (DQT) of un-
derdetermination of theories by facts as an argument often used in relativist
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) for justifying social explanation of
knowledge. My preliminary intention was to show that the argument may have
unexpected consequences and it may involve contradiction. In addition to that, I
tried to show that the DQT is irrelevant for the realism — relativism debate, at
least insofar as scientific realism and relativism in SSK are concerned, on the
one hand, and the DQT as a modest underdetermination thesis, on the other.
The DQT can be adjusted to the requirements of realism, and so, the thesis in
itself is incapable of directly imposing relativism or realism.
I come to the following conclusions:
1. The argument of deduction of social explanation from the underdetermina-
tion thesis contradicts the central principles of sociology of scientific knowl-
edge: even if it were correct to deduce purely social stipulation from the DQT,
it would directly involve accusations in idealism, which the SSK has actually
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sought to avoid. The strong programme, in particular, has emphasised materi-
alism as its essential commitment.
2. A central thesis of the strong programme, the symmetry tenet, may be con-
tradicted by consequences that follow from the DQT. The implication:
‘DQT → exclusively social explanation of knowledge’
if presented without further specifications, involves a dichotomy between the
rational and the social. This dichotomy, in its turn, involves an asymmetry of
explanation, resulting in the notorious ‘arationality assumption’.
3. However, on closer examination, it appears that it does not follow directly
from the DQT that one could remove the empirical constraints for concept ap-
plication and, respectively, restrict oneself to purely social explanation of
knowledge. Underdetermination is not identical with indeterminacy: rather, it
deals with a particular theory within a larger network of theories.
4. What is also worth noting is the possibility of underdetermination of social
explanation. If it is natural to assume theory- and value-ladenness of observa-
tion, it will be as likely that sociological analysis is value-laden.
5. The idea of modest theory-ladenness of observation, essentially accompa-
nying the DQT, is acceptable for both realism and relativism, because in both
scientific realism and sociological relativism knowledge production in the sci-
ences is conceived as a hypothetical, constructive and self-corrective process.
Still, the basis for self-correction is seen differently: in the realist case, it may
contain both empirical and social factors; in relativism, views regarding the
grounds of cognitive action vary from one tradition to another. The strong pro-
gramme seems to be relatively close in its approach to critical scientific real-
ism, while radical social constructivism, tending towards a symbolic model of
human social cognitive action, denies the empirical constraints of knowledge
and sees it as a basically ritual activity.
6. Thus, one may also conclude that, in the light of the Duhem-Quine thesis of
underdetermination, the previously obvious and indubitable opposition between
scientific realism and relativist sociology of scientific knowledge seems to dis-
appear. Therefore, the present analysis can be seen as a contribution to the
wider project of reconciling scientific realism and SSK, as well as a contribu-
tion towards ending the ‘science wars’.
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4. A CASE STUDY: HERMAN BOERHAAVE —
COMMUNIS EUROPAE PRAECEPTOR
(EXTERNALISM VS. INTERNALISM
AS EXPLANATORY SCHEMES FOR HISTORY
OF SCIENCE)
4.1. Introduction
Hermann Boerhaave (1668–1738), according to the often-quoted expression of
his pupil Albrecht von Haller, Communis Europae Praeceptor, the teacher of
all Europe, has not received the attention from the historians of science that he
should deserve. In the early 18th century, he attracted students from almost all
over the world. To mention only a few, among his students were Linné from
Uppsala, Haller from Göttingen, Cullen, Monro, and Sinclair from Edinburgh
and he had contacts with Russian and Chinese scholars, etc.94 What was the
basis of his fame? One cannot connect any scientific discovery to his name. At
the same time, we know that his pattern of scientific work, his method spread
all over Europe. A number of historians of science find that it was Boerhaave
who made the Newtonian turn, i.e., the Scientific Revolution, in chemistry, as
well as in biology and medicine. If so, why is Boerhaave then almost unknown
at the end of the 20th century?
In this chapter, I shall restrict myself to Boerhaave’s chemistry, although his
scientific pursuits also concerned biology and medicine. The main issue of my
study, however, is not the history of chemistry, rather it concerns some meta-
level historiographical questions.
As soon as the theoretical discussion on the methodology for the studies of
history of science began, the meta-historiographical positions concerning the
interpretation of the Scientific Revolution became divided into two major tra-
ditions, one called internalism and the other externalism. The meta-
historiographical dichotomy of internalism vs. externalism certainly applies to a
remarkably wider area of questions in the history of science than that of the
Scientific Revolution. For a long time, the internalist model served as an ‘offi-
cially’ accepted historiographical position, whereas externalism was taken to be
a position of Marxist, leftist and other radically minded marginal historians.
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 See for instance  (Brock, 1992: 37, 77, 108, 133), (Butterfield, 1949/1980: 205).
According to G A Lindeboom (1968), about one third of his students came from Eng-
lish-speaking countries, where, at that time, no good medical education could be ob-
tained, large number of students came from German-speaking countries, so, relatively to
the other national groups only minority were Dutch. See his Herman Boerhaave: The
Man and his Work (1968), p. 363.
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Nowadays, the general attitude has changed. Internalism has become a view of
the past that almost no-one in the field of history of science accepts any more,
whereas externalism has advanced and become a widely approved position, al-
though it might seem odd to talk about generality or universality of external-
ism, because externalism in itself rejects any ‘big pictures’.95
According to the internalist rational reconstructions, the Scientific Revolu-
tion must be seen as a logical consequence of the earlier, pre-scientific imagi-
nations of alchemy, iatrochemistry, etc., even if the revolution itself consists in
the break with old tradition, it is the break within the content — in the inter-
nalist approach only the content matters. The problem with internalism is that it
assumes the sciences to be following a mysterious internal rationality of devel-
opment. Thus, chemistry was seen to become a science only after the ‘rational’
and ‘progressive’ Newtonian metaphysics was accepted by its practitioners. It
is quite obvious how arbitrary and present this idea is — it imposes contempo-
rary standards of rationality as universal upon history. As result of this kind of
meta-historiography, only the achievements, discoveries and inventions sup-
porting the supposed line of progress, remain visible in the story of science.
Newton and mechanicism, of course, are seen as an important stage of the uni-
versalist history of science. Against this background, it even may seem sur-
prising that Boerhaave has acquired such a marginal position. The reason for
that consists in the causes why Boerhaave introduced mechanicism into chem-
istry. In his natural sciences, mechanism served just as an instrument for practi-
cal purposes. Seen in the light of the dichotomy internal vs. external, the causes
of acceptance of a theoretical belief must be regarded as external. Even within
internalism, it is obvious that some external factors cannot be neglected. How-
ever, it is not just a matter of including the external issues. The internalist ap-
proach cannot be improved just by adding the external influences, although
many internalist philosophers, historians and sociologists of science have pro-
posed such an idea.96 The external issues will thereby still remain secondary,
additional and unimportant for the whole rational reconstruction. For instance,
Larry Laudan takes it for granted that the external issues are something secon-
dary and separate from the real essence of science, so he comes to insist that:
In sum, if it is true that science matters (both intellectually and institution-
ally) because of the manipulative and predictive skills which its ideas confer
on their possessors, then a concern with science as a cognitive process must
be primary, for until we have understood how science works cognitively, the
largest question about science will remain unanswered. The theorists of sci-
entific change recognise the centrality of the cognitive; that is why their theo-
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 See for example Lakatos (1971), Laudan (1977 and 1981).
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ries focus primarily on the dynamics of scientific belief change. (Laudan
1996: 52)
For this reason, as in such an account the external factors are regarded as
something to be kept apart from the content, those not satisfied with that, could
suggest another theoretical point of departure, a one which enables us to con-
sider the external circumstances seriously, and that could be called externalism.
Nevertheless, such a conclusion in itself is not satisfactory either. The problem
with externalism, constructed as a counterpart of internalism, is that it preserves
the whig history scheme, or internalism as such. Radical externalism would
involve explanation of scientific knowledge in terms of social, economic, po-
litical, ideological, etc. causes. That means a social, economic, or political, etc.
reduction.97 Since the externalist model will thus view just the social, ideologi-
cal or political, i.e., contextual aspect of scientific knowledge, it may appear
necessary to save also the internal history in parallel, relating to the real content
of science. Robert Young, a proponent of a form of externalism, which he calls
contextualism or relativism, admits that
It is therefore very difficult indeed to refrain from treating the materials in
terms of the model of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors, science and society
(Young 1973: 376).
Therefore, the label of externalism turns out to cause a serious confusion.
Those who regard themselves as the externalists are certainly interested in the
contents of scientific knowledge as well as its context. The externalists stress
the significance of the connection between content and context. Thus they do
not just deal with the external aspect of science, as one could assume on the
ground of the dichotomy: internalism vs. externalism, they deal with science in
its context. Externalism tends to be opposed to any ‘big pictures’ of the pro-
gressive ‘edge of objectivity’.98 To be precise, as for the question of the Scien-
tific Revolution, there are two rather different tendencies within the externalist
tradition: one of them endorses the idea that, there was the revolutionary turn
that requires an explanation by reference to the external reasons. The other ten-
dency could be called as continuism, and according to this consistently exter-
nalist view, there is no Scientific Revolution as such (see Henry 1997). Those
who adhere to the idea of revolutionary change, may still be criticised for the
whiggish bias, because, as John Henry (1996) has put it: the revolution marks
the change from something unknown to us to something like us, or our science.
Our contemporary science is taken to be the measure.
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The continuists argue that in the history of sciences, we only find particular
scholars — researchers, engineers, surgeons, and teachers — involved in their
particular practical activities, solving problems, constructing new devices, do-
ing experiments. Scientific Revolutions as well as the progressive and degen-
erative research programmes, rational models of research traditions, etc. belong
to the ‘big pictures’ of internalist history.
The difficulties, however, just begin here, because the distinction between
the internal and external factors is practically a very complicated one, the con-
tent and the context of scientific knowledge appear to be inter-related. For in-
stance, there has been a lot of discussion around the possible classification of
scientists’ metaphysical, religious and aesthetic views, whether these should be
seen as internal or as external ones (McMullin 1987: 58–64)? A number of
historians consider ideological and metaphysical views as internal ones,
whereas the others refer to these as external to scientific knowledge. Since I
prefer to leave this huge historical discussion aside in my study, I suggest to
replace the traditional, and still problematic dichotomy of internal vs. external
with another, that of intrinsic and extrinsic, originally proposed by John R. R.
Christie and Jan Golinski (1982) The new dichotomy is constructed with the
intention of historical analysis and explanation. For such an explanation, one
should choose between the two alternative approaches: either to consider both
the internal and the external issues closely related to a particular discipline at a
particular time and in a particular location, e.g., chemistry in Leyden in the
1720s, — this is the intrinsic approach; or to consider the scientific ideas in the
light of some non-scientific, i.e., general metaphysical, epistemological, ideo-
logical, etc. framework — this is the extrinsic approach.
When following the intrinsic approach after Golinski and Christie, the rea-
sons, that caused Boerhaave to accept Newtonianism, can be easily explained
by the practical needs of his scientific activities: knowledge needs to be organ-
ised for the purposes of the treatment of the patients, as well as for teaching and
communication. For Boerhaave, mechanicism served as a conceptual tool for
efficient knowledge transfer. Similarly the big changes in the sciences in gen-
eral, related to mechanicism, the new worldview that caused the change of sci-
entific language, can be explained by reference to practical purposes of com-
munication and teaching sciences, rather than by internal metaphysical neces-
sity. Steven Shapin, a strong-programme historian, points to the common defi-
ciency of many traditional accounts of the Scientific Revolution as a tendency
to overestimate the formal methodological considerations. Methodology, he
finds, is, in part, a myth, and the myths have certain historical functions. There-
fore, the methodologies need to be investigated in the context of respective
practices:
[W]e will still need a more vivid picture of what a range of modern natural
philosophers actually did when they set about securing a piece of knowledge.
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Modern natural philosophers did not just believe things about the natural
world; they did things to secure, to justify, and to distribute those beliefs.
Doing natural philosphy, that is, was a kind of work. So we now need to turn
from abstract methodological formulas to the practical work of making expe-
rience fit for certain kinds of natural philosophical inquiry. (Shapin 1996:
95–96)
In the internalist tradition, Boerhaave has been seen as a Newtonian scholar
who was close to revolutionary turnabout in chemistry. It is thus important to
add to the internalist description, that he was not only a great Newtonian
scholar who prepared ground for Lavoisier’s work in chemistry. He was a prac-
tising surgeon, chemist, biologist, and a physiologist who was occupied with
several practical questions: how to treat his patients, how to classify diseases,
how to prepare drugs, how to understand a human body and processes therein,
how to classify herbs which he needed for preparing drugs, and finally, how to
pass all this practical knowledge that he possessed to the next generation of
scholars.
In the following section, I will analyse the meta-historiographical questions
at somewhat greater length, in the third section, Boerhaave’s chemical activities
will be considered in the light of the meta-historiographical conclusions. In the
fourth concluding section, I will return to the questions posed at the outset to
the chapter.
4.2. A few further meta-historiographical considerations
4.2.1. The internalist — externalist distinction vs.
the intrinsic — extrinsic
According to a widespread opinion among historians of science, the content of
17–18th century science was mainly determined by religious, economic and so-
cial factors. (Nilsson 1984: 107) According to another opinion, development of
science is supposed to be explained on the basis of the science itself, on that of
observations and experiments more than theories and hypotheses, without ref-
erence to the historical context. (Nilsson 1984: 110) The first is the called as
the externalist and the second as the internalist position. Since the distinction is
a problematical one, as we could see in the introduction — it often is namely
the internalist position that assumes religious or metaphysical factors to deter-
mine the content, etc., — I hereby invoke another dichotomy, as suggested by
J. R. R. Christie and J. V. Golinski, namely that of intrinsic and extrinsic.
They describe their intrinsic approach as follows:
The analytical focus we urge is concerned with the question of the nature of
chemistry as an historical practice. This focus is interested in the whole range
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of social and cultural conditions governing both practical chemistry and
chemical discourse, but it is the human activities of practising and talking
about chemistry which are central, and around which broader themes are ar-
ticulated. We would like to describe this perspective as an ‘intrinsic’ one.
Against it we would set a class of approaches which could be described as
‘extrinsic’. Such approaches shift the focus of analysis away from chemical
practice to non-chemical fields of discourse. Assuming the nature of chemis-
try as fundamentally unproblematic, the extrinsic approach tends to construct
chemistry in terms which give great emphasis to the influence thereon of ac-
tivities such as speculative natural philosophy, matter-theory, epistemology,
methodology and theology (Christie and Golinski 1982: 235-36).
Without rejecting the influence of metaphysics, theology, etc. on chemistry,
they, in contrast to the extrinsic approach, do not presuppose unidirectional
determination of chemistry by external attitudes. An intrinsic approach insists
upon the problematic nature of the relationship between such factors and the
practice of chemistry.
According to Christie and Golinski, internalism includes those factors that
have been designated above as extrinsic to chemistry, whereas it denies the so-
cial, economic, cultural characteristics in the description of scientific process,
focusing only on the ‘pure products of intellect’. The intrinsic approach, by
contrast, demands sensitivity towards the precise location of intellectual pro-
duction, for the location might have certain effect on the discipline, thus, e.g.,
theology and epistemology are suitable for explanation of chemical activities in
certain circumstances, relevance of these explanations is historically variable.99
In their article, Christie and Golinski demonstrate how the intrinsic meta-
historiography might be made to work on the example of the 17-18th century
chemistry as a practical and a didactic discipline.
In a later writing, Golinski (1993) points out that the misleading dichotomy
brings one to a theory of postponed revolution in chemistry and its conse-
quences such as referred to in Herbert Butterfield’s account.100 According to
Butterfield, most historians of chemistry tended to consider chemistry as a sci-
ence that suffered remarkably from the postponed revolution. Historians of
chemistry tended to underestimate the achievements of the 17th century. Only
after Lavoisier’s contribution in the late 18th century, they thought, can one
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 Also a philosophical approach as presented by Nicholas Jardine (1991) appears to
have the local scientific practices with the package of theoretical assumptions, applied
rules and methods, institutional, educational and technological factors in its focus. In his
account — very close to the intrinsic one — Jardine claims that it is the ‘scenes of in-
quiry’ that need to be put in the centre of both historical and contemporary science
studies.
100 See H. Butterfield (1949/1980), Ch. XI, “The Postponed Scientific Revolution in
Chemistry”, pp. 191- 209.
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speak about the scientific conceptual structure in chemistry. For Golinski, the
view of historians, who attach rationality to the 17th century chemistry only to
the extent it has taken over mechanistic philosophy and language, is equally
fallacious. In the opinion of those historians, the criterion of maturity of science
was its mechanicism, and the first scientific chemists accordingly were Nicho-
las Lemery (1645-1715) and Robert Boyle (1627-1691), whose works contain
mechanistic elements. Golinski finds that:
Such a historiography simplifies the relations between the chemistry and
natural philosophy of the seventeenth century by assigning to chemical prac-
tice a position of subservience and passivity with respect to theoretical de-
velopments in contemporary metaphysics (Golinski 1993: 368).
Some studies on the 17th century chemistry say that the mechanistic philosophy
was accepted by chemists only because of psychological and epistemological
considerations, the language mechanics offered was a privileged one, clear and
easily applicable in chemistry and in other fields of natural science as well.
However, such an attitude lacks historical specificity, as Golinski argues, the
transition could happen in any place at any time.
According to Golinski both the French historian Hélène Metzger and Butter-
field take the criterion of a mature science to be the existence of a logical
structure of concepts, founded upon a metaphysical theory of matter. Such a
structure is assumed to be a mental entity, psychologically connected with im-
mediate experience. Also, such a structure would be separable from its histori-
cal and material manifestations, words, texts, and practices. Consequently, the
mechanical language of chemistry was regarded simply as representing the
metaphysical structure.
Golinski sees two connected assumptions to exist in this historiography,
first, that chemistry is taken to be essentially dependent on a philosophy of
matter, and second, that the language in which chemistry represents phenomena
is seen to be unproblematic. Chemical texts just reflect the philosophical theory
that rest on the background and correspond with reality. In Metzger’s opinion,
the mechanistic attitude enables us to abandon the allegorical and metaphorical
style of earlier chemical discourse. An interesting question arises, how actually
did the alchemical obscure languages function? To what extent and how did
alchemists understand each other? And why did chemists suddenly come to ac-
cept the mechanic concepts instead of the old alchemical language? Did they
just decide to start talking more clearly?
4.2.2. From alchemy to scientific chemistry
According Maurice Crosland (1963), a historian of chemistry, it is plausible
that the need for reorganisation of the language appeared within the alchemical
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symbolic tradition itself. Crosland refers to Lemery who had been rather critical
about his contemporary chemists’ language, thus in his days already (in the end
of 17th century) the obscure language of alchemy was out of date.
Lemery’s own mechanistic rationalisations of the texts had a direct practical
purpose: his pharmaceutical prescriptions needed to be widely understandable.
So, we are justified to ask together with Christie and Golinski (1982: 245): did
the mechanistic rationalisations serve, in some sense, as legitimisation for his
chemistry, or were they a result of the search for clear and unambiguous de-
scriptions of chemical processes?
Golinski points to another example of the intrinsic approach to the history of
chemistry. This is Owen Hannaway’s work on the history of early modern
chemistry. Hannaway proposed to investigate the origins of chemistry at the
beginning of the seventeenth century as a didactic discipline. In his opinion, the
formation of chemistry, as a textual tradition, predated the widespread accep-
tance of mechanical philosophy.101 The main task was to distinguish between
the activities called chemistry and that of alchemy. Hannaway characterises
chemistry and alchemy in terms of different attitudes to modes of argument and
communication, and for the very possibility of learned discourse. Chemistry
could be seen as a didactically oriented discipline, committed to the values of
open and clear communication, whereas alchemy was an object of conspiracy.
Hannaway equates the birth of chemistry as a didactic art with the appearance
of Andreas Libavius Alchemia (1597) and sees it as formed in opposition to the
Paracelsian-Hermetic school, exemplified in Oswald Croll’s Basilica Chymica
(1609). Croll’s (alchemical) epistemology was individualistic: all the knowl-
edge is taken to be the result of the interaction between a man as microcosm,
the centre and subject of creation, and macrocosm. The interaction or externali-
sation of knowledge is possible only via a sympathetic attraction between these
two: micro- and macrocosm. Knowledge was conferred by divine grace, rather
than by reason, it could be read neither from the nature nor from the books. For
Libavius, chemistry was supposed to be open, co-operative, and hence cumula-
tive. His famous Alchemia was an attempt to embody chemical doctrine in a
form that made it as communicable as possible.
Golinski sees Hannaway’s approach as opposing that of Metzger and
Crosland, according to whom, one may still claim that the language of chemis-
try changed because chemists decided to start talking more clearly, using
mechanistic philosophy and corresponding terms for the purpose. Chemists
even could have made such a decision, but the reason of that certainly lay in the
communicative needs. Knowledge can only be acquired from other people, e.g.,
from the texts written by other people, if one can read them, and at special in-
stitutions, arranged for the purpose of the spread of knowledge. The institutions
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 Referred via (Golinski, 1993: 372).
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of learning and teaching, for example universities, can exist only as long as
there is a demand for academic knowledge.
According to Golinski, the social basis for the new model of chemical com-
munication requires to be construed by reference to its historical context. The
17–18th century chemistry might be characterised by an expanding market for
printed chemical texts, whereas besides that there also was a kind of restricted
communication between chemists: chemical and other technological secrets
were exchanged between one another, to the advantage of both participants.
The new kind of communication offered opportunities for power, and new ca-
reers, which concerned new institutions, e.g., progressing universities. Crosland
(1963: 370) notes that there were close connections between chemical theory
and the industries involving porcelain, dyes and gunpowder.
4.2.3. A parallel to the oxygen-revolution
The ‘oxygen-phlogiston revolution’ at the end of the 18th century which has
often been considered as the revolution establishing a scientific paradigm in
chemistry, a revolution which in the internalist sense of the term, appears to be
problematic if considered against the background of different meta-
historiographical perspectives. Christie and Golinski (1982: 259) find that there
was nothing that Lavoisier said about oxygen or phlogiston that the Edinburgh
chemists had not said earlier. Lavoisier was not ‘the final chapter of the influ-
ence of Newtonian matter-theory’ regarding eighteenth century chemistry
(Christie and Golinski 1982: 258). Different chemical communities were occu-
pied with different theoretical and empirical issues, thus, ‘the revolution’ was
variable. For Hannaway, e.g., Lavoisier’s revolution consists in the decision to
embody the new chemistry (new nomenclature) in an elementary textbook
which was a realisation of the power of the word for chemistry (Christie and
Golinski 1982: 260–61). Consequently, Boerhaave and his students from Edin-
burgh, could be regarded as revolutionary in chemistry as well, especially, in
the light of Lindeboom’s statement that Boerhaave was considered as the first
scientific chemist by his contemporary scientists.
4.3. Boerhaave as a chemist
4.3.1. Science and (or) Art
According to Lindeboom, Boerhaave was an iatrophysicist who was interested
in chemistry. However, it was Boerhaave who had brought chemical practice
into the university. Thus, he himself had introduced a certain criterion for the
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distinction between science and art: since then, sciences belonged to institu-
tions like universities, arts such as alchemy, iatrochemistry, and botany were
developed outside of the academic institutions, in drug stores, etc. Boerhaave,
himself, uses both the term of ‘Science’, and the term of ‘Art’ about (even uni-
versity) chemistry. Some historians interpret the emphasis on ‘Art’ as a rhetori-
cal intention of convincing his audience in the need to develop chemistry as a
Science, the others, such as Lindeboom, point out that in Boerhaave’s time, the
terms ‘Art’ and ‘Science’ were used as synonyms. Otherwise, Boerhaave would
have preferred ‘Science’ because what he had in mind, was science. Christie
and Golinski refer to the unauthorised publication of Boerhaave’s lectures,
from the year 1727, where Boerhaave compares chemistry with the art of
sculpting. Both the artists intend particular effects in the material world, both
require material tools, and a principle of effective knowledge. Effective knowl-
edge for Boerhaave meant communicable knowledge. (Christie and Golinski
1982: 248)102 For both the artists the concept of ‘instrument’ is a central one:
all the Aristotelian elements were defined as instruments, having a similar
function in relation to the concept of art. Instrument is needed to attain the in-
tended aim of the artist, so ‘fire’ — or any other ‘instrument’ — all equally
served for the didactic aims.
Not only chemistry, but also the other sciences, such as geometry, botany,
etc. were taken to be the arts. It can be understood as a popular metaphorical
account of the sciences by a demonstration of their the practical connections.
The turn from purely scholastic writing to experimental science capable of
solving practical problems was, perhaps, the main revolutionary change in the
academic tradition. Theory became related to practice. It is not then surprising
that in the period of transition the terms of ‘Science’ and ‘Arts’ were confused
and conflated. Even the greatest scientists were engaged with the alchemical
experiments: Newton and Boyle are well-known examples. Also, Boerhaave
boiled mercury during a period of almost sixteen years, until a careless student
broke the vessel. Being himself critical about alchemy and iatrochemistry, he
admitted that important facts could be found by alchemists’ observations.
According to Boerhaave, the movement in chemistry from art to science was
possible only because chemistry was capable of correcting her mistakes — of
abandoning the magical and mystical basis of alchemy, the dream of gold-
making, exaggeration with the idea of effervescence and the wrong interpreta-
tion of fire as an immaterial substance. Therefore he assured in his inaugural
speech in 1718, that
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 Didactic practice as an aim was emphasised only in the first unauthorised issue of
Boerhaave’s New Method of Chemistry 1727 known through a translation of Peter Shaw,
based on notes from Boerhaave’s lectures. The didactic aspect was decreased in the
Elementa Chemiae 1735 published by Boerhaave himself.
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while acknowledging that Science is strewn with the chemists errors, I shall
try to prove that these same errors have been most successfully wiped out,
solely by the efforts of these same chemists (Boerhaave’s Orations 1983:
194).103
The principal mistake, from his point of view, was the uncritical application of
chemical ideas in medicine, and respectively, the consideration of physiological
processes as similar to those of chemistry. In Discourse on Chemistry Purging
Itself of Its Own Errors, he criticised van Helmont, Paracelsus and his teacher
Sylvius for these kinds of errors.
4.3.2. Making chemistry a physical science
In his textbook Elementa Chemiae, Boerhaave defines chemistry as
an Art that teaches us how to perform certain physical operations, by which
bodies that are discernible by the senses, or that may be rendered so, and that
are capable of being contained in vessels, may be thence produced, and the
causes of those effects understood by the effects themselves, to the manifold
improvement of various Arts (Lindeboom 1968: 328).
Boerhaave’s chemistry could be seen as a branch of Newton’s physics. Its vari-
ous phenomena could generally be explained simply in terms of motion. When
water dissolved salts, this was simply by the interior motion of its particles.
These particles were in fact conceived as atoms — the solid, massy, hard, im-
penetrable, movable particles, as the atoms were depicted by Newton. Boer-
haave speculates on the different sizes of atoms, which would serve for the ex-
planation of certain chemical reactions. He believed that mathematics could be
usefully applied in chemistry, his approach was more quantitative than usual at
that time, e.g. it was not every chemist who when referring to the solubility of a
salt would mention temperature. (Crosland 1963: 393-97). It was also due to the
fact that, according to Golinski, he was the first who brought the thermometer
systematically into chemistry in the 1720s (Golinski 2000: 190).
Boerhaave’s most characteristic quality was his exactness, he formulated
seven rules for doing experiments, and he followed these rules strictly. His
writings are systematic, clear and accurate. His main textbook in chemistry
Elementa Chemiae covers systematically all the chemical knowledge in Europe
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“Discourse on Chemistry Purging Itself of Its Own Errors”, in Boerhaave’s Orations
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at that time, and was used in many universities as a textbook for many years104
And it was Boerhaave who introduced microscope into chemical research.
His practical interests and will to cure his patients, made Boerhaave to ex-
amine carefully the nature of substances like milk, eggs, cream and other or-
ganic products. However, his firm adherence to the physical method and critical
attitude, caused by that, towards iatrochemists’ studies on effervescence, did
not allow him to realise the importance of the area we call biochemistry today.
Data from experiments, which he had completed, spread widely among other
scientists, and were approved. Thus, he did everything to develop chemistry as
a science, as he had promised to do in his Discourse on Chemistry Purging it-
self of its Own Errors, 1718. First of all, he taught the new generation to under-
stand the importance of chemistry. With great pathos he turned to his students
in the end of the Discourse on…(Boerhaave’s Orations 1983: 212-13) and ex-
pressed his gratitude to them whose demand had forced him to resume teaching
and working on chemistry year after year.
4.4. Conclusions
At the beginning of this chapter, I posed a question why was Boerhaave so fa-
mous all over the Europe in the 18th century? And why is he almost forgotten by
the end of 20th century?
Aant Elzinga and Andrew Jamison (1984) find that his fame was based on
the school he created, and which continued his tradition that might be called
practical utopia — a pedagogical utopia, oriented to systematisation and or-
ganisation of scientific training at the university. Boerhaave was famous be-
cause of his didactically orientated research in the sciences with practical aims
of medicine. He was even somewhat eclectic, joining together different theories
and traditions, but joining only to the extent the theories enabling communica-
tion and co-operation to solve some practical problem. He had a catalytic influ-
ence on the creation of, e.g., the Edinburgh school of medicine and chemistry,
and therefore, the impact on British 18th century medicine and chemistry gener-
ally.
He did not make any scientific discovery. His only invention was a green-
house heater (Cunningham 1986: 41) But as Elzinga and Jamison point out, in
the early 18th century science: “It is the social meaning, generalist ambitions,
and external service orientation that dominate” (Elzinga & Jamison 1984: 162).
Boerhaave’s practical utopia suited well the social environment of the early
eighteenth century. Leyden in the Republic of Netherlands was a real citadel of
                                                     
104 The University of Tartu was among the others, there are several copies of Boer-
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95
tolerance because the University of Leyden was open to all students, irrespec-
tive of nationality or creed. This was different from the Oxford and Cambridge
Universities, which admitted only the members of the Anglican Church,
whereas many other universities in Europe were under Catholic control.
State and university authorities gave support to his chemical and medical
studies. There were plenty of donations to his laboratory. It is namely because
in his case, “the emphasis lay more on social utility and meaning than on scien-
tific growth in any narrow sense” (Elzinga & Jamison 1984: 161).
Crosland (1963: 370) indicates that Boerhaave’s textbook and even notes
from his lectures found easily readers, there was a market for the systematised
representations of the chemical knowledge. It was certainly related to the in-
creasing need for applicable knowledge, necessary, for example, for the manu-
facture of porcelain, gunpowder, dyes, etc. Chemistry become a popular science
by the second half of the 18th century, and chemistry was firmly established as
one of the physical sciences — namely with the accent on the physical sciences.
Here the answer to the second question becomes transparent. Boerhaave ap-
plied Newtonian mechanics and its extension, the theory of affinity to a new
area of research — chemistry — whereas chemistry itself remained secondary
or an assistant science in comparison to physics. It was regarded as a science to
the extent it contained physics. On the other hand, chemistry served medicine.
Chemistry enabled one to describe a few phenomena, which were not accessi-
ble by the other sciences. Without any doubt, chemistry turned out to be a sci-
ence in comparison to alchemy or iatrochemistry because chemistry had be-
come independent from the main mistakes of the latter — magic and mystic
explanations — that Boerhaave referred to in his famous Oration, Discourse on
Chemistry in 1718. This, again, may be regarded as a credit to Boerhaave. Also,
his influence on the Scottish and French schools in chemistry is remarkable.
But he did not complete the change in the paradigm, that was left for Lavoisier,
who is regarded as the founder of the scientific chemistry — at least by the in-
ternalist historians — because he was able to link the French pneumo-chemistry
together with the Newtonian tradition. It must be mentioned that Lavoisier
could be seen as one of the pupils — as a reader of the textbook — of Hermann
Boerhaave, Communis Europae Praeceptor.
Unfortunately, the textbooks in history of science often overlook the great
teachers and the applicants of scientific findings whose influence on the dis-
coveries and discoverers cannot be over-estimated. Perhaps the great teachers
of the past will receive more attention when the intrinsic model of history of
science gathers strength and comes more often to replace the internalist ‘big
pictures’ of the great discoveries which still tend to be favoured, if not in re-
search environment, still in popular publications and textbooks.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In this essay, after the introductory considerations in chapter 1, I analysed the
problems related to the concept of relativism. How this concept is applied in the
sociology of scientific knowledge is discussed in chapter 2. After having
summarised the critical arguments by philosophers of science who, in general,
assume the classical absolutist concept of truth relativism and contrasted their
views of relativism with this absolutism, I showed that in the SSK, the concept
of relativism is not construed as parasitic upon absolutism. In principle, there
are two approaches: one endorsing the classical concept of truth as a semantic
concept which is of no relevance for the relativist concept of knowledge con-
struction; and the other appealing to a pragmatic concept of truth (and, respec-
tively, to a pragmatic concept of relativism) without mutually exclusive truth
values which would turn relativism self-refuting.
In addition to the discussions between philosophers of science and the ad-
herents of the SSK, I also compared different SSK positions. It appears that
those pursuing the consistency of relativism, i.e., relativisation of every single
belief, fall into the trap of inconsistency even twice — first, because of the re-
gress and self-refutation involved in generalised relativism, and second, be-
cause of ignoring the principles of generalised relativism (reflexivism, or re-
spectively, symmetrism) in empirical studies. Thus it also appears that those
who limit relativism to a particular level of their account of science, or, in gen-
eral, set constraints to relativism, are even less inconsistent. The latter approach
can be quite easily reconciled with the metaphysical position of scientific real-
ism. In the particular case of the strong programme, realism in ontology is as-
sumed explicitly.
In chapter 3, I once again considered the application of the Duhem-Quine
thesis (DQT) of the underdetermination of theories by data in the SSK context.
In the early stage, the SSK authors favoured the DQT as an argument for social
explanation of theory choice. The SSK argument was as follows: if DQT, then
social explanation is required. At closer examination, however, the thesis of
underdetermination appears to involve the arationality assumption — the view
that only the arational requires social explanation (from the lack of rational
criteria one deduces the necessity of social explanation). This contradicts the
core principles of the SSK. Therefore, as far as the dichotomy of the ‘rational’
and the ‘social’ is assumed, the SSK should rather avoid the underdetermina-
tion. Also, one should take into account the fact that the theory choice may be
socially underdetermined as well. In addition to these counter-arguments, it is
important to note that the Duhem-Quine thesis does not make the distinction
between scientific realism and relativism in the SSK. The general underdeter-
mination thesis (UDT) in its turn does not necessarily involve sociological
relativism — rather it involves a version of anti-realism, which does not neces-
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sarily mean relativism (e.g., the constructive empiricism of van Fraassen as-
sumes the UDT).
On the other hand, part of the criticism directed against the SSK application
of the DQT is irrelevant. Laudan, e.g., assumes that for the SSK everything is
either deductive logic or sociology, i.e., in his opinion the adherents of the SSK
reduce rationality to logic. Thus he points out that there are other rational crite-
ria for theory choice besides deductive logical ones. However, it is exactly the
plurality of epistemic criteria that makes social explanation more plausible. Be-
sides that, in most contemporary versions of the SSK, no such dichotomy of the
rational and the social is assumed. Rather, rationality is considered as social,
since the criteria, or the standards of rationality, are related to the local con-
texts.
In a case study on the 18th century chemistry and the meta-historiographical
programmes, chapter 4, I compared two classical theoretical schemes, inter-
nalism and externalism, which both appeared to be inadequate for the explana-
tion of changes that occurred in chemistry in the early 18th century. As an alter-
native, I considered the intrinsic account as proposed by Golinski which could
be regarded as a middle-way position between the internalist and externalist
schemes. At the same time, the intrinsic account is contrasted to the extrinsic
one. The advantage of the intrinsic approach appears in the explanation of the
change of scientific knowledge. It enables to take into account the various as-
pects of scientific practice: the practical interests of experiment, treatment of
patients, and the mechanisms for knowledge transfer, such as didactic and
communicative practices. In contrast to the traditional internalist approach
where particular scientists just mark the objective progress of ideas, the intrin-
sic approach brings forth the activities of the scientists, thus making history
richer. When Herman Boerhaave, the great teacher from Leiden of the early 18th
century, is regarded as just a Newtonian scholar in the internalist accounts; in
the intrinsic account, he is regarded as a major figure, due to his textbooks and
didactic practice.
In the light of the debate between the philosophy and sociology of science,
the intrinsic meta-historiography could be seen as a middle-way position, where
both the ‘cognitive’ and the ‘social’ matter, since, within this context also the
‘cognitive’ is depicted as social by its nature.
98
REFERENCES
Aronson, Jerrold L., Harré, Rom & Way, Eileen Cornell (1994) Realism Rescued. Lon-
don: Duckworth.
Ayer, A. J. (1982) Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. N.Y.: The Vintage Books.
Barnes, Barry (1974). Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul.
Barnes, Barry (1977). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Barnes, Barry (1981) “On the ‘Hows’ and ‘Whys’ of Cultural Change (Response to
Woolgar)”. Social Studies of Science 11, 481–98.
Barnes, Barry (1982). T. S. Kuhn and Social Science. London: Macmillan.
Barnes, Barry (1983). “On the Conventional Character of Knowledge and Cognition”. In
K.D. Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay, eds. Science Observed: Perspectives in the Social
Study of Science. London: Sage Publications, 19–51.
Barnes, Barry (1992) “Realism, Relativism and Finitism”. In Cognitive Relativism and
Social Science. D. Raven, L. Van Vucht Tijssen & J. De Wolf, eds. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Books, 131–47.
Barnes, Barry (1993). “How to do Sociology of Knowledge”. In Danish Yearbook of
Philosophy, Vol. 28, 7–23.
Barnes, Barry & Bloor, David (1982) “Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of
Knowledge”. In Rationality and Relativism. M. Hollis & S. Lukes, eds. Oxford:
Blackwell, 21–47.
Barnes, Barry, Bloor, David & Henry, John (1996) Scientific Knowledge. A Sociologi-
cal Analysis. London: The Athlone Press.
Bergström, Lars (1993) “Quine, Underdetermination, and Scepticism”. The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. XC, No. 7, 331–58.
Bernstein, Richard J. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneu-
tics, and Praxis. Oxford: Blackwell
Bhaskar, Roy (1978) A Realist Theory of Science. (2nd ed.) Sussex: The Harvester Press,
N.J.: Humanities Press.
Bhaskar, Roy (1986). Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, London, N.Y.:
Verso.
Bloor, David (1973) “Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics”.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 4, 173–191.
Bloor, David (1981) “The Strengths of the Strong Programme”. Philosophy of the So-
cial Sciences, 11, 199–213.
Bloor, David (1983) Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, N.Y.: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
Bloor, David (1984) “The Sociology of Reasons: Or Why “Epistemic Factors” are
Really “Social Factors””. In Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn. James
Robert Brown, ed. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Bloor, David (1991) Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd edition. London, Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
Bloor, David (1996) “Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge”. Social Studies of Sci-
ence 26, 839–856.
99
Bloor, David (1997) “What is a Social Construction?” VEST, 10 (1): 9–21.
Bloor, David (1998) “Changing Axes: Response to Mermin”. Social Studies of Science
28, 624–35.
Bloor, David (1999) “Anti-Latour”. Studies in history and Philosophy of Science 30, 1,
81–112.
Bloor, David & Edge, David (2000) “Knowing Reality Through Society”. Social Studies
of Science 30, 1, 158–160.
Boerhaave’s Orations (1983) Translated with introductions and notes by E. Kegel-
Brinkgreve and A.M. Luyendijk-Elshout, Leiden: E.J. Brill/Leiden University Press.
Bohlin, Ingemar (1995) Through Malthusian Specs? A Study in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence Studies, with Special Reference to the Theory and Ideology of Darwin Histori-
ography. PhD Dissertation. The Department of Theory of Science, University of
Göteborg.
Boyd, Richard N. (1973) “Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evi-
dence”. Noûs VII, 1–12.
Boyd, Richard N. (1984). The Current Status of Scientific Realism. In J. Leplin (ed.)
Scientific Realism, Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 41–82.
Brenner, A. A. (1990) “Holism a Century Ago: the Elaboration of Duhem’s Thesis”.
Synthèse 83, 325–35.
Brock, W. H. (1992) The Fontana History of Chemistry. London: Fontana Press.
Butterfield, H. (1949/1980) The Origins of Modern Science 1300–1800. London: Bell &
Hyman.
Callebaut, Werner (1993) Taking the Naturalistic Turn, or, How Real Philosophy of
Science is Done: Conversations with William Bechtel ... [et al.]/ Organized and
Moderated by Werner Callebaut. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago
Press.
Callon, Michel & Latour, Bruno (1992) “Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath
School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley”. In Science as Practice and Culture. A.
Pickering, ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 343–68.
Callon, Michel (1995) “Four Models of the Dynamics of Science”. In Handbook of Sci-
ence and Technology Studies. S. Jasanoff, G. E. Markle, et al., eds. London, New
Delhi: Sage Publications, 29–63.
Chalmers, Alan (1988) (2nd ed.). What Is This Thing Called Science? Milton Keynes:
The Open University Press.
Chalmers, Alan (1990). Science and its Fabrication. Milton Keynes: The Open Univer-
sity Press.
Christie, J. R.R. and Golinski J. V. (1982) “The Spreading of the Word: New Directions
in the Historiography of Chemistry 1600-1800”. History of Science, 20: 235–66.
Chubin, Daryl & Restivo, Sal (1983) “The ‘Mooting’ of Science Studies: Research Pro-
grammes and Science Policy”. In Science Observed: Perspectives in the Social Study
of Science. Knorr Cetina & Mulkay, eds. London: Sage Publications, 53–83.
Collins, H. M. & Yearley, Steven (1992a) “Epistemological Chicken”. In Science as
Practice and Culture A. Pickering, ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
301–26.
Collins, H. M. & Yearley, Steven (1992b) “Journey Into Space”. In Science as Practice
and Culture. A. Pickering, ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 369–89.
100
Collins, H. M. (1981a) “Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a Physical Phe-
nomenon”. Social Studies of Science 11, 33–62.
Collins, H. M. (1981b). “Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism”. Social
Studies of Science 11, 3–10.
Collins, H. M. (1981c) “What is TRASP? The Radical Programme as a Methodological
Imperative”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11, 215–24.
Collins, H. M. (1982) “Special Relativism — The Natural Attitude”. Social Studies of
Science 12, 139–43.
Collins, H. M. (1983) “An Empirical Relativist Programme in the Sociology of Scien-
tific Knowledge”. In Science Observed: Perspectives in the Social Study of Science.
K. D. Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay, eds. London: Sage Publications, 85–114.
Collins, H. M. (1985) Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific Prac-
tice. London, Beverly Hills, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Collins, H. M. (1992) “Afterword: Science Acts”. In the 2nd ed. of Changing Order,
183–93.
Collins, H. M. (1996) “In Praise of Futile Gestures: How Scientific is the Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge?” Social Studies of Science 26, 229–44.
Collins, H. M. (1998) “Socialness and the Undersocialized Conception of Society”. Sci-
ence, Technology & Human Values Vol. 23, No 4, 494–516.
Collins, H. M. (1999) “The Science Police”. Social Studies of Science 29, 2, 287–94.
Crosland, M. (1963) “The Development of Chemistry in the Eighteenth Century”. Stud-
ies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. XXIV: 369–441.
Cunningham, A. (1986) “Medicine to Calm the Mind: Boerhaave’s System, and Why It
Was Adopted in Edinburgh”. In A. Cunningham and R. French (eds.) The Medical
Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, 41–66.
Dancy, Jonathan (1985) An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: B.
Blackwell.
Devitt, Michael (1984) Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Dietrich, Michael (1993) “Understanding and the Limits of Interpretative Flexibility”.
Perspectives of Science 1, 1, 109–26.
Duhem, Pierre (1906/1954/1991) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. by
Phillip Wiener, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Elkana, Yehuda (1978) “Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical
Relativism”, Social Studies of Science 8, 309–26.
Elzinga, Aant (1992) “The Theory of Epistemic Drift, a Way of Relating the Social and
the Epistemic”. Revue Roumaine De Philosophie, 36, 45–61.
Elzinga, Aant (1993) “Vetenskapens dubbla verklighet”. I B. Molander (red.) Språkets
speglingar. Filosofiska essäer om språk, grammatik och vetenskap. Stockholm:
Carlssons, 118–138.
Elzinga, Aant (1995) “Traces of Eurocentrism in Current Representations of Science”.
VEST: Tidskrift för Vetenskapsstudier, 8, 4, 85–95.
Elzinga, Aant and Jamison, Andrew (1984) “Making Dreams Come True: An Essay on
the Role of Practical Utopias in Science”. In Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science between
Utopia and Dystopia. In the series of Sociology of the Sciences, Vol. VIII. E. Men-
delsohn and H. Nowotny, eds., 147–72.
Everitt, Nicholas & Fischer, Alec (1995) Modern Epistemology. A New Introduction.
N.Y., St. Louis, etc.: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
101
Fine, Arthur (1984) “Natural Ontological Attitude”. In Scientific Realism. J. Leplin, ed.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 83–107.
Fuller, Steve (1990) “They Shoot Dead Horses, Don’t They?: Philosophical Fear and
Sociological Loathing in St. Louis”. Social Studies of Science, 20, 664–81.
Giere, Ronald (1988) Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Giere, Ronald (1999) Science without Laws. Chicago & London: The University of Chi-
cago Press.
Gillispie, C. C. (1960) The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay on the History of Scientific
Ideas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Golinski, Jan V. (1993) “Chemistry in the Scientific Revolution: Problems of language
and communication”. In Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution. D.C. Lindberg
and R.S. Westman, eds. Cambridge/New York/Port Chester: Cambridge University
Press: 367–96.
Golinski, Jan V. (1998) Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Golinski, Jan V. (2000) ““Fit Instruments”: Thermometers in Eighteenth-Century
Chemistry”. In Instruments and Experimentation in the History of Chemistry. F. L.
Holmes & T. H. Levere, eds. Cambridge, Mass. & London, England: The MIT
Press.
Hacking, Ian (1982) “Language, Truth and Reason”. In Rationality and Relativism. M.
Hollis & S. Lukes, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 48–66.
Hacking, Ian (1983) Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hacking, Ian (1984) Experimentation and Scientific Realism. In J. Leplin (ed.) Scientific
Realism, Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 154–72.
Hacking, Ian (1992) “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences”. In Science as
Practice and Culture. A. Pickering, ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 29–63.
Hacking, Ian (1999) The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass. & London,
England: Harvard University Press.
Harré, Rom & Krausz, Michael (1996) Varieties of Relativism. Oxford, UK & Cam-
bridge USA: Blackwell.
Harré, Rom (1983) An Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences. London: Macmillan.
Harré, Rom (1986) Varieties of Realism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Harré, Rom (1996) “From Observability to Manipulability: Extending the Inductive Ar-
gument for Realism”. Synthèse, 108: 137–155.
Harris, James F. (1993) Against Relativism. A Philosophical Defence of Method. La-
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publ. Co.
Hempel, Carl (1935) “On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth”. Analysis 2, 4, 49–
59.
Hempel, Carl (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Glencoe, III.: The Free Press,
1965.
Henry, John (1997) The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. Lon-
don: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Hesse, Mary (1974) The Structure of Scientific Inference, London: Macmillan.
Hesse, Mary (1980) Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science,
Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press.
102
Hesse, Mary B. (1988) “Socializing Epistemology”. In Construction and Constraint. E.
McMullin, ed. The Shaping of Scientific Rationality, Notre Dame, Ind. University of
Notre Dame Press, 97–122.
Hesse, Mary B. (1992) “Science Beyond Realism and Relativism”. In Cognitive Rela-
tivism and Social Science. D. Raven, L. v. Vucht Tijssen & J. De Wolf, eds. New
Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Publishers, 91 - 106.
Hollis, Martin (1982) “The Social Destruction of Reality”. In Rationality and Relativ-
ism. Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes, eds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Howard, Don (1990) “Einstein and Duhem”. In Synthese 83, 363–384.
Jardine, Nicholas (1991) The Scenes of Inquiry: On the Reality of Questions in
theSciences. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Knorr Cetina, Karin (1981) The Manufacture of Knowledge. An Essay on the Construc-
tivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press.
Knorr Cetina, Karin & Mulkay, Michael (1983) “Introduction: Emerging Principles in
Social Studies of Science”. In Science Observed: Perspectives in the Social Study of
Science. Knorr Cetina & Mulkay, eds. London: Sage Publications, 1–17.
Koertge, Noretta, ed. (1998) A House Built on Sand: Explaining Postmodernist Myths
about Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koertge, Noretta (1999) “The Zero-Sum Assumption and The Symmetry Thesis”. Social
Studies of Science 29, 5, 777–84.
Kripke, Saul (1972) “Naming and Necessity”. In Semantics of Natural Language. D.
Davidson & G. Harman, eds. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1990) “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Desig-
nation”. In Scientific Theories. C. Wade Savage, ed. Minneapolis: Minnesota Un.
Press, 298–318.
Kukla, André (1998) Studies in Scientific Realism, New York, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Kusch, Martin (2000) “Introduction”. In The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. M.
Kush, ed. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lakatos, I. 1971 “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions”. In PSA 1970 In
Memory of Rudolf Carnap. Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting. Philosophy
of Science Association, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. R.C. Buck and
R.S. Cohen, eds. Vol. VIII, Dordrecht: Reidel: 91–136.
Latour, Bruno (1983) “Give me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World”. In Science
Observed: Perspectives in the Social Study of Science. Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, eds.
London: Sage Publications, 141–70.
Latour, Bruno (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers
through Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno (1988) Pasteurization of France. Translated by A. Sheridan & J. Law.
Cambridge, Mass., London, England: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno (1989) “Clothing the Naked Truth”. In Dismantling Truth Reality in the
Post-modern World. Lawson, H. & Appignanesi, L., eds. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 101–26.
Latour, Bruno (1992) “One More Turn after the Social Turn...”. In The Social Dimen-
sion of Science. E. McMullin, ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 274–94.
Latour, Bruno (1993) We Have Never Been Modern New York: Harvester.
103
Latour, Bruno & Woolgar, Steve (1979) Laboratory Life. The Social Construction of
Scientific Facts. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications.
Laudan, Larry & Leplin, Jarrett (1991) “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermina-
tion”. Journal of Philosophy 88, 9, 449–72.
Laudan, Larry (1977) Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific
Growth. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.
Laudan, Larry (1981) “The Pseudo-Science of Science?” Philosophy of the Social Sci-
ences 11, 173–98.
Laudan, Larry (1982) “More on Bloor”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12, 71–74.
Laudan, Larry (1984). Science and Values. The Aims of Science and Their Role in Sci-
entific Debate. University of California Press.
Laudan, Larry (1990) “Demystifying Underdetermination”. In Scientific Theories. C.
Wade Savage, ed. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 267–97.
Laudan, Larry (1996) “The History of Science and the Philosophy of Science”. In Com-
panion to the History of Modern Science. R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie
& M. J. S. Hodge, eds. London & New York: Routledge.
Lindeboom, G.A. 1968 Herman Boerhaave. The Man and his Work. London: Methuen
& Co Ltd.
Longino, Helen (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in Scien-
tific Inquiry. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Longino, Helen E. (2002) The Fate of Knowledge, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Lõhkivi, Endla (1996) “Duhem-Quine’i alamääratuse tees ja realismi-relativismi tüli”,
Akadeemia, 8, 8, 1682–97. Summary in English p. 1762.
Lõhkivi, Endla (1998) “Pursuing Consistency in Relativist Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge”. TRAMES, A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, No 4,
Vol. 2 (52/47), 299–330.
Lõhkivi, Endla (2001a) Reconciling Realism and Relativism: A Study of Epistemologi-
cal Assumptions in Relativist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Göteborg: Institu-
tionen för idéhistoria och vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs Universitet, Rapport nr. 202.
Lõhkivi, Endla (2001b) “Hermann Boerhaave — Communis Europae Praeceptor: ‘In-
ternal vs. External in the History of Science”. In Estonian Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science, R. Vihalemm, ed. Kluwer 2001, 139–150.
Lõhkivi, Endla (2001c) “Social Construction: Constructing Facts or Constructing
Knowledge?” In Historiae Scientarum Baltica: Abstracts of XX Baltic Conference
on the History of Science, Tartu, January 30-31, 2001, pp. 33–34.
Lõhkivi, Endla (2001d) Changes in the Image of Science after the Social Turn. In Anne
Kull (ed.) The Human Being at the Intersection of Science, Religion, and Medicine,
Piirid ja kohtumised: teadus ja religioon tehnoteaduslikus maailmas, (Proceedings
of the International Colloquium Tartu, 4-5 May 2001), Tartu Univerity Press 2001,
86–93).
Lõhkivi, Endla (2002) “The ‘Science Wars’ and the Duhem-Quine Argument of Under-
determination” TRAMES: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, No 2,
Vol. 6 (56/51), xxx–xxx.
Margolis, Joseph (1986) Pragmatism Without Foundations. Reconciling Realism and
Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell.
104
McMullin, E. (1987) “Scientific Controversy and its Termination”. In Scientific Contro-
versies. Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure of Disputes in Science and
Technology. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and A. L. Caplan, eds. Cambridge/London/
New York: Cambridge University Press: 49–91.
McMullin, Ernan (1990) “Comment: Duhem’s Middle Way”. Synthèse 83, 421–30.
Mermin, N. David (1998) “The Science of Science: A Physicist Reads Barnes, Bloor
and Henry”. Social Studies of Science 28, 4, 603–23.
Newton-Smith, W. (1982) “Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation”. In Ration-
ality and Relativism. M. Hollis & S. Lukes, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 106–22.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1987). Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1991) “Realism, Relativism, and Constructivism”. Synthèse 89, 135–
62.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1992). Queries About Internal Realism. Proceedings of the Confer-
ence on Scientific Realism, Beijing.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1995). Maailma 3 objektid. In Akadeemia 7, no. 12, 2541–68. Trans-
lated from Niiniluoto 1990 Maailma, minä ja kultuuri. Emergentin materialismin
näkökulma. Helsinki: Otava, Luku 1, 14–42.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1999) Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nilsson, Ingemar (1984) “Vetenskapshistoria. Att studera vetenskapens förändring”. I
Forskning om forskning eller Konsten att beskriva en elefant. J. Bärmark, red. Lund:
Natur och Kultur: 105–41.
Papineau, David (1987). Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Papineau, David (1988). “Does the Sociology of Science Discredit Science?” In Rela-
tivism and Realism in Science. Robert Nola, ed. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 37–57.
Papineau, David (1993). Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA:
Blackwell.
Papineau, David (1995) “Methodology: the Elements of the Philosophy of Science”. In
Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject. Grayling, A. C., ed. Oxford University
Press, 123–80.
Pickering, Andy (1984). Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle
Physics. Edinburgh & Chicago, Ill.: Edinburgh University Press & The University of
Chicago Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975) “The Meaning of “Meaning””. In Mind, Language and Reality.
Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press.215–71.
Putnam, Hilary (1982) ”Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized”. Synthèse 52, 1982, p. 3–
23.
Putnam, Hilary (1989). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass., London: The
MIT Press.
Quine, Willard van Orman (1953a) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. In From a Logical
Point of View, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 20–46.
Quine, Willard van Orman (1969). “Epistemology Naturalized” In Ontological Relativ-
ity and Other Essays, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 69–90.
Quine, Willard van Orman (1992) The Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge, Mass.; London,
England: Harvard University Press.
Radder, Hans (1992) “Normative Reflexions on Constructivist Approaches to Science
and Technology”. Social Studies of Science 22, 141–73.
105
Ringer, Fritz (1992) “The Origins of Mannheim’s Sociology of Knowledge”. In The
Social Dimension of Science. E. McMullin ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of No-
tre Dame Press, 47–67.
Roth, Paul and Barrett, Robert (1990) “Deconstructing Quarks”. In Social Studies of
Science. 20, 4, 579–631.
Ryle, Gilbert 1966 (1949). The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 13–
25.
Scott, Pam, Richards, Evelleen & Martin, Brian (1990) “Captives of the Controversy:
The Myth of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controver-
sies”. Science, Technology & Human Values 15, 474–94.
Shapin, Steven (1996) The Scientific Revolution. London: The University of Chicago
Press.
Shapin, Steven & Schaffer, Simon (1985) Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle,
and the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. Allen Lane & The Penguin
Press.
Smith, R. (1997) The Fontana History of the Human Sciences. London: Fontana Press.
Sokal, A. D. (1996) “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies”. In Lingua Franca
6 (4), 61–64.
Taylor, Charles (1982) “Rationality”. In Rationality and Relativism Hollis & Lukes, eds.
Oxford: Blackwell, 87–105.
Weinert, F. (1992) “The Duhem -Quine Thesis Revisited”. International Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 9, 2, 147–56.
Wilburn, Ron (1992) “Semantic Indeterminacy and the Realist Stance”. Erkenntnis, 37:
281–308.
Woolgar, Steve (1983) “Irony in the Social Study of Science”. In Science Observed:
Perspectives in the Social Study of Science. K. Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay, eds.
London: Sage Publications, 239–66.
Woolgar, Steve (1988a) Science: the Very Idea. Chichester, Sussex & London: Ellis
Horwood & Tavistock Publications.
Woolgar, Steve, ed. (1988b) Knowledge and Reflexivity. London: Sage Publications.
Woolgar, Steve (1992) “Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and
Yearley”. In Science as Practice and Culture. A. Pickering, ed. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 327–42.
Woolgar, Steve & Ashmore, Malcolm (1988) “The Next Step: an Introduction to the
Reflexive Project”. In Knowledge and Reflexivity. Woolgar, ed. London: Sage Pub-
lications, 1–14.
Young, R. (1973) “The Historiographic and Ideological Contexts of the Nineteenth-
Century Debate on Man’s Place in Nature”. In Changing Perspectives in the History
of Science: Essays in Honour of Joseph Needham. M. Teich and R. Young, eds.
London: Heinemann: 344–438.
106
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN
Teadusliku teadmise sotsioloogia
filosoofi vaatekohalt nähtuna
Käesolev uurimus koosneb sissejuhatavast probleemi-ülevaatest ja kolmest va-
rem eraldi ilmunud artiklist, mida on siin avaldamiseks kohandatud. Sissejuha-
tavas ülevaates käsitlesin teadusliku teadmise/tunnetuse sotsioloogia põhilise
teoreetilise suuna, nn tugeva programmi tunnetusteoreetilisi seisukohti, tuues
välja selle neli printsiipi (seletuse kausaalsus, sümmeetrilisus, erapooletus ja
enesekohasus), mille alusel paljud kriitikud, nii teadusfilosoofid kui –sotsioloo-
gid on püüdnud näidata tugeva programmi vastuolulisust. Nimetatud printsiipi-
dega nõustumine või mitte-nõustumine võimaldab ka klassifitseerida erinevaid
teadusliku tunnetuse sotsioloogia koolkondi. Samuti esitasin sissejuhatavas
osas üldistavalt põhilised teadusfilosoofiliste argumentide tüübid teadusliku
tunnetuse sotsioloogia vastu. Äärmuslikke neist argumentidest tuntakse ‘teadu-
se sõja’ metafoori kaudu. Nn ‘teaduse sõja’ argumentidele on ühine tendents
luua kritiseeritavast vaatekohast karikatuur. Nii kujutatakse sotsioloogilist
teadmise käsitust otsekui viimane välistaks teadusliku teadmise seletusest rat-
sionaalsuse ja püüaks selle asendada meelevaldsete sotsiaalsete kokkulepetega.
Samas kalduvad mõned tunnetussotsioloogid kujutama teadusfilosoofilist
teadmise käsitust kui paratamatult individualistlikku ja logitsistlikku. Nii on
‘teaduse sõjale’ tunnuslik eeldada dihhotoomiat: ratsionaalne sotsiaalse vastu.
Oma uurimuse kõigis osades püüdsin tunnetussotsioloogia seisukohtade ük-
sikasjaliku filosoofilise analüüsi abil näidata, et mitte kõigi sotsioloogia tradit-
sioonide puhul pole õigustatud nö ‘teaduse sõja’ tüüpi argumendid, isegi kui
mõne puhul on. Näiteks eelmainitud tugevat programmi võib pigem iseloo-
mustada kui ‘kolmandat teed’, mis võimaldab vähemalt dialoogi filosoofia ja
sotsioloogia vahel.
Üks tüüpargumente teadusliku tunnetuse sotsioloogia vastu on sellega ole-
tatavalt kaasnev idealism: kui teadmine on loomult sotsiaalne nähtus, siis pais-
tab nagu ei mängiks tegelikkus selle objektina enam mingit rolli ning selle võib
kõrvale jätta — järelikult ei sõltu teadmine sotsiaalkonstruktivismi järgi mate-
riaalsest tegelikkusest, ja võib piiranguteta ‘konstrueerida’ mida tahes. Sotsio-
loogia oponendid asuvad sellelt aluselt tõestama, et tegelikkus ‘osutab vastupa-
nu’ ja ei ole võimalik konstrueerida mida tahes. Paraku on see argument rajatud
eksiarvamusele, et sotsioloogid räägivad faktide konstrueerimisest, kui tegeli-
kult peetakse silmas teadmise konstrueerimist. (Tugev programm pooldab klas-
sikalise teaduse määratluse asemel institutsionaalset.) Tugevas programmis te-
hakse selget vahet väidete ontoloogilise ja epistemoloogilise kihi vahel — kui
räägitakse sotsiaalsest konstruktsioonist, siis peetakse silmas uskumuste tekke
mehhanisme, mille juures eeldatakse kogukonnale ühiseid keelelisi, kultuurilisi,
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praktilisi tavasid, mis mõjutavad iga tajuotsustust. Seega on empiirilised tõen-
did tõenditeks vaid sedavõrd kui antud traditsioonis ja taustateadmisi arvestades
saab neid tõenditeks pidada. Tõendid kuuluvad epistemoloogia ja mitte onto-
loogia valdkonda. Viimases on tugev programm realismi pooldaja. Osalt on
ontoloogiline realism samas seotud eeldatud epistemoloogilise relativismiga:
kuna eeldatakse uskumuste varieerumist ühe ja sama objekti kohta, siis peab
olema mingisugune alus arvamaks, et tegu on ikka sama objektiga. Ka sellele
mõnevõrra problemaatilisele seisukohale rajavad mitmed teadussotsioloogia
oponendid oma kriitika.
Idealismi argumendi kõrval, kritiseerivad teadusfilosoofid sotsioloogiat, vii-
dates sellele, et ehkki mõnel üksikul juhtumil teaduse ajaloos või tänapäeva
teaduses toimivad teadlased oma sotsiaalsetest huvidest, võimuambitsioonidest
või soovmõtlemisest tingitult, siis üldiselt see teaduses nii ei ole. Teaduses
kehtivate üldtunnustatud normide hulka kuuluvad objektiivsuse ja erapooletuse
nõue, mida kõik järgida püüavad.
Paraku ka selle kriitika puhul on tegu eksiarvamusega, nagu eeldaks sot-
siaalne teadmise/tunnetusteooria, et teadmised on sobingute ja võltsingute tu-
lemus. Tunnetussotsioloogia seisukohalt tähendab teadmise sotsiaalne loomus
seda, et teadmised luuakse inimeste ühise tegevuse ehk interaktsiooni tulemu-
sena. Interaktsioon ise väärib sotsioloogide arvates uurimist, kuna sel moel loo-
detakse jõuda selgusele, miks mingil konkreetsel juhtumil, mingis kindlas kon-
tekstis langetati just niisugused või teistsugused valikud ja otsused, sel moel
loodetakse saada teada, miks mingis kontekstis peetakse õigeks ühe- või teist-
suguseid ratsionaalsuse standardeid. Kriitikute seisukoha puhul tuleb tähele
panna varjatu eeldust: ratsionaalne vs. sotsiaalne, mida vähemalt tugeva prog-
rammi sotsioloogias ei ole: ratsionaalset mõistetakse ratsionaalsena sotsiaalse
konteksti kaudu.
Sarnasel vaatekohal on nn sotsiaalepistemoloogia, kus aga erinevalt sotsio-
loogiast, mis on oma teaduskäsituses deskriptiivne, on tegu normatiivse lähe-
nemisega, ja seetõttu täiendatakse sotsioloogide väidet: ratsionaalne on sot-
siaalne, väitega: sotsiaalne on ratsionaalne. Viimane tähendab seda, et
sotsiaalepistemoloogide arvates, tuleb puhkudeks, kui tavaliselt kriitilise hoia-
kuga teadlasrühmas mingil üksikjuhtumil tekib nö soovmõtlemine või ten-
dentslikkus, näha ette sotsiaalne korrektsiooni mehhanism (näiteks eelretsen-
seerimise nõue teenib just seda eesmärki).
Teadusfilosoofias leiavad teadusliku tunnetuse sotsioloogia uurimused ja
argumendid järjest enam käsitlemist. Käesolev uurimus ei pretendeeri täieliku
ülevaate andmisele neist käsitlusist, vaid keskendub kolmele enim ja kõige te-
ravamalt käsitletud kitsale probleemile.
Teises peatükis keskendusin relativismist kui niisugusest johtuvatele prob-
leemidele. Absolutistliku tõe relativismi määratlusega kaasnevad relativismi
paradoksid nagu valetaja paradoks. Sellele rajab oma kriitika Newton-Smith,
kes püüab tõestada, et relativismi tõttu on sotsioloogilised teadusekäsitused en-
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nastkummutavad. Samas näitavad Harré ja Krausz, et kui relativismi piirata, siis
õnnestub pardaoksi vältida. Sarnasel seisukohal on Margolis, kes pakub pigem
pragmaatilise lahenduse, mille põhisisu on, et relativismiga ei kaasne paradok-
sid, kui ei eeldata vastandlikke tõeväärtusi nagu lihtsate propositsioonide puhul.
Isegi kui eeldada absolutistlikku tõerelativismi mõistet, ei ole selle abil võima-
lik kummutada tugeva programmi teese. Tugev programm ei eelda tõe relati-
vismi, vaid uskumuste, teadmiste, väidete, teooriate relatiivsust. Millisele ka
tugeva programmi teesidest relativismi paradoksi ei püütaks rajada, ebaõnnes-
tuvad need katsed, sest teesides ei ole tegu vastandlike tõeväärtustega nagu va-
letaja paradoksis.
Tunnetussotsioloogia eri suundade vahel on relativism põhjustanud nn järje-
kindluse-vaidluse. Woolgar järjekindluse taotlejana leiab, et iga uskumus tuleb
oma taustaga siduda, sel moel teeb ta relativismi regressist reegli ning kritisee-
rib tugevat programmi relativismi piiratuse pärast. Latour leiab, et looduse
inimühiskonnas toimivate suhete kaudu seletamine on uue asümmeetria keh-
testamine, mistõttu on vaja teist pööret tõelise sümmeetria kehtestamiseks (tu-
geva programmi sümmeetria tees nõuab erinevate uskumuste ühetaolist seleta-
mist), tuleb leida uus vaatepunkt, millelt loodust ja ühiskonda saaks käsitleda
ühetaoliselt. Üldistatult nõuab see printsiip aga järgmist vaatepunkti, millelt
eelmised kolm oleksid sümmeetriliselt käsitletavad ja nõnda edasi. Jällegi on
järjekindluse nõude tagajärjeks regress. Samas empiirilistes uuringutes kumbki
neist tugeva programmi kriitikutest oma teoreetilisest programmist kinni ei pea.
Seega on relativismi järjekindluse taotlejad ebajärjekindlad kahes mõttes: nen-
de programmilised seisukohad on ennastvääravad ja nad ei pea empiirilistes
uuringutes oma programmist kinni, kui nende poolt kritiseeritud briti tunnetus-
sotsioloogia on ebajärjekindel vaid relativismi piiratuse mõttes.
Kolmandas peatükis uurisin Duhem-Quine’i alamääratuse teesi rakendamist
teadusliku tunnetuse sotsioloogias. Ilmneb, et oodatud veenva teoreetilise põh-
jenduse asemel võib DQT hoopis sotsioloogia taotluste vastu toimida: kui eel-
dada nagu osa sotsiolooge 1980ndate algul ja osa jätkuvalt, et kui on teooriava-
liku ratsionaalne alamääratus, siis paratamatult järgneb sellest sotsiaalne sele-
tus, siis tuleneb sellest, et sotsiaalsed asjaolud tulevad arvesse vaid ratsionaal-
sete kriteeriumite puudumisel, st nö aratsionaalse valiku puhul. Aratsionaalsus
sotsiaalse seletuse eeldusena toob kaasa asümmeetria, mis on teadusliku tead-
mise sotsioloogia programmiliste seisukohtadega vastuolus. Lisaks sellele, tu-
leb arvestada ka sotsiaalse seletuse alamääratuse võimalusega. Kolmandaks, kui
teadusliku tunnetuse sotsioloogia varasel perioodil peeti oluliseks teoreetilist
vastandust teadusliku realismiga ja nähti DQT-s selget kriteeriumi vahetegemi-
seks realismi ja relativismi vahel ning argumenti relativismi poolt, siis lähemal
Duhemi ja Quine’i vaadete uurimisel selgub, et need ei ole anti-realistlikud.
Üldistatud alamääratuse tees (UDT) küll võimaldab vastandada realismi ja anti-
realismi, kuid viimane ei tähenda antud kontekstis vältimatult relativismi, rää-
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kimata sotsioloogilisest relativismist. Üldise alamääratusega on, näiteks, hästi
kooskõlas van Fraasseni empirism.
Duhem-Quine’i teesiga toovad sotsioloogid ise vaidlusse dihhotoomia rat-
sionaalne vs. sotsiaalne. Samas, kummalisel kombel, on see olemas ka kriitikute
argumentides, kes sotsioloogide alamääratuse kasutust ründavad. Larry Laudan
näiteks omistab tugevale programmile ja selle pooldajale, filosoof Mary
Hessele, seisukoha: kõik on kas deduktiivne loogika või sotsioloogia. Seejärel
asub Laudan seda omistatud seisukohta kritiseerima, väites, et
1) ratsionaalsete valikukriteeriumite ala ei piirdu deduktiivse loogikaga;
2) isegi kui kehtib täielik ratsionaalne alamääratus, ei järgne sellest midagi
kontingentsete uskumuse tekke ja omaksvõtu põhjuste kohta.
Mida Laudan tähele ei pane, on see, et sotsioloogid ei taanda ratsionaalseid kri-
teeriume kitsalt loogikale ning just laiemalt mõistetud episteemilise (ala)määra-
tuse (so mitte kitsalt loogilise) puhul kasvab sotsiaalse seletuse tõenäosus. Pea-
legi ei eelda vähemalt mõned tunnetussotsioloogia koolkonnad enam niisugust
ratsionaalse ja sotsiaalse vastandust, nagu domineeris nende varastes uurimus-
tes. Pigem käsitletakse ratsionaalsuse standardeid kui kohalikke, kontekstisidu-
said standardeid. Epistemoloogia, mida pooldab tunnetussotsioloogia, on lo-
kaalne.
4. peatükis, leiab käsitlemist üks teadusajaloo juhtum, mis illustreerib
vaidlust vastandlike meta-historiograafiliste seisukohtade pooldajate vahel. Ma
võrdlesin internalismi ja eksternalismi 18. sajandi nn teadusliku revolutsiooni
seisukohalt keemias. Ilmneb, et kumbki neist seletusskeemidest ei võimalda
anda vastuoludeta käsitlust keemiarevolutsioonist. Nö kolmanda-tee lahenduse
pakub Golinski, kes asendab klassikalise vastanduse ekstrinsilise-intrinsilise
vastandusega. Ekstrinsiline on ajalooteooria, mis seletab üksikjuhtumit, usku-
must või avastust ideoloogia, metafüüsika, religiooni, poliitilise ideoloogia või
muu teadusvälise asjaolu kaudu; intrinsiline on teooria, kus seletus rajatakse
teaduse praktikale, sisu seletatakse tegevuste kaudu, milles sisu sünnib, teadmi-
se edasiandmise viiside, katsemeetodite, ja –tehnika, uurimiseesmärkide ja
probleemipüstituse kaudu. Sel moel muutuvad nähtavaks ja oluliseks teadusega
seotud didaktika ja kommunikatsioon. Teise rolli omandavad õpetlased, kes
internalistliku või ka eksternalistliku skeemi järgi vaid markeerisid mõne suure
metafüüsilise või teadusliku suuna progressi. Traditsiooniliste meta-historio-
graafiate järgi seisnes 18. sajandi alguse Leideni suure õpetaja Herman
Boerhaave tähtsus selles, et ta vahendas Newtoni mehaanika oma õpilaste kau-
du Lavoisierini, kes nö teostas hiljaks jäänud revolutsiooni keemias. Intrinsilise
meta-historiograafia järgi on Boerhaave puhul tegu silmapaistva praktiliste la-
henduste pakkuja, õpetaja ja õpikute autoriga, kelle õpetus levis üle kogu maa-
ilma, kes oma süstemaatilisusega mõjutas Linnéd ja kes võttis mehhanistliku
maailmavaate kõrval keemias kasutusele kvantitatiivsed meetodid. Ajalooteo-
reetilise pöördeta poleks see 21. sajandil meile teada.
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Intrinsiline, nö lokaalne ajaloouurimine on leidnud toetust ka teadusfilosoo-
fidelt nagu näiteks Nicholas Jardine. Kriitikutele nagu Laudan, kes väidab, et
kui oluliseks peetakse teaduse manipuleerivat ja ettenägevat võimet, siis tuleks
ka teadusajaloo uurimises esmalt tegelda kognitiivse ajaloo ja alles siis kõige
muuga, saab intrinsilise positsiooni pooldaja vastata, et kognitiivne probleem
ongi sellise uurimise keskmes, kuid seda käsitletakse seoses teadlaste tegevuse-
ga, teadust ei mõisteta kitsalt kui loogilist järelduste jada, vaid kui tegevuste
jada, sh ka loogilised järeldused. Jällegi eeldab Laudan ‘teaduse sõjale’ omast
vastandust: kognitiivne sotsiaalse vastu, mida intrinsilise meta-historiograafia
pooldajad ei eelda.
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